com.xylink.linuxclient

MEDIUM
maintainer isbest 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from devcdn.ainemo.com, which is a CDN host associated with Ainemo (爱奈末), not the official xylink.com domain. The package installs and executes binaries (XYWinQTPri, launch.sh) extracted from this .deb. While devcdn.ainemo.com appears to be a legitimate CDN used by Chinese software vendors (Ainemo provides packaging/distribution services), it is not the official upstream host (xylink.com), creating a supply-chain dependency on a third-party CDN. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk for the specific version, but the host itself is unofficial. This is a real medium-severity concern: prebuilt executables from a non-official host that get installed and run on the user's system. Not clearly malicious, but the trust chain is indirect.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source_x86_64=(https://devcdn.ainemo.com/private_cloud/xinchuangclient/xinchuang3.3/signed_com.xylink.linuxclient_"$pkgver"-20220823_amd64.deb)
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from devcdn.ainemo.com, which is a CDN host associated with Ainemo (爱奈末), not the official xylink.com domain. The package installs and executes binaries (XYWinQTPri, launch.sh) extracted from this .deb. While devcdn.ainemo.com appears to be a legitimate CDN used by Chinese software vendors (Ainemo provides packaging/distribution services), it is not the official upstream host (xylink.com), creating a supply-chain dependency on a third-party CDN. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk for the specific version, but the host itself is unofficial. This is a real medium-severity concern: prebuilt executables from a non-official host that get installed and run on the user's system. Not clearly malicious, but the trust chain is indirect.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: isbest <icoderdev@outlook.com>
2
3pkgname=com.xylink.linuxclient
4pkgver=3.3.0.7571
5pkgrel=2
6pkgdesc="Xylink Video Conferencing linux client."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://www.xylink.com"
9license=('custom:xylink')
10options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
11source_x86_64=(https://devcdn.ainemo.com/private_cloud/xinchuangclient/xinchuang3.3/signed_com.xylink.linuxclient_"$pkgver"-20220823_amd64.deb)
12sha256sums_x86_64=('01952278f2910101ee00d745dc8964de691698a497e66c861cfaf5bbb596f2df')
13
14package(){
15 echo "-> Extracting the data.tar.xz..."
16 bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir/"
17
18 echo "-> Remove redundant files..."
19 rm -rf "$pkgdir"/com.xylink.linuxclient_"$pkgver"-20220823_amd64.deb
20
21 # License
22 install -D -m644 "$pkgdir"/opt/apps/com.xylink.linuxclient/files/share/doc/nvidia-graphics-driver/copyright \
23 "$pkgdir"/usr/share/licenses/"$pkgname"/LICENSE
24
25 echo "-> Fix file system permission..."
26 chmod 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable
27 chmod 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps
28
29 chmod +x "$pkgdir"/opt/apps/com.xylink.linuxclient/files/bin/XYWinQTPri
30 chmod +x "$pkgdir"/opt/apps/com.xylink.linuxclient/files/launch.sh
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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