concordium-node-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer charlottedurand 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from distribution.mainnet.concordium.software, which is the official Concordium project's distribution infrastructure (not a personal or unofficial host). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates MITM risk. However, this is still a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub source (not the upstream GitHub releases page), and the binary is executed directly on the user's system. The domain is plausibly official Concordium infrastructure, but it is not a well-known, widely-audited distribution channel. The medium rating is appropriate: pinned hash reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk (the hash could have been set when the host was already compromised), and the package installs an executed binary from a non-standard host. This is a legitimate medium concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=("https://distribution.mainnet.concordium.software/deb/concordium-node_${pkgver}-mainnet_amd64.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from distribution.mainnet.concordium.software, which is the official Concordium project's distribution infrastructure (not a personal or unofficial host). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates MITM risk. However, this is still a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub source (not the upstream GitHub releases page), and the binary is executed directly on the user's system. The domain is plausibly official Concordium infrastructure, but it is not a well-known, widely-audited distribution channel. The medium rating is appropriate: pinned hash reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk (the hash could have been set when the host was already compromised), and the package installs an executed binary from a non-standard host. This is a legitimate medium concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Martoko <mbastholm at gmail dot com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=concordium-node-bin
    
      4pkgver=1.0.1
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Node for the Concordium blockchain"
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://github.com/Concordium/concordium-node"
    
      9license=('AGPL3')
    
      10depends=('postgresql-libs' 'openssl' 'unbound')
    
      11install=concordium-node-bin.install
    
      12source=("https://distribution.mainnet.concordium.software/deb/concordium-node_${pkgver}-mainnet_amd64.deb")
    
      13sha256sums=('dcb76543e4fb0346242df1d8873bbdf89af6ccbd49ea6b4d315bd1dc4c14a135')
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16    tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      17    rm -r "${pkgdir}/usr/share" # Delete changelog.Debian.gz
    
      18    mv "${pkgdir}/lib" "${pkgdir}/usr"
    
      19}
    
      20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2