cosbrowser

maintainer weearc · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage from cos5.cloud.tencent.com (Tencent's own COS/object-storage CDN, which is the official distribution channel for this Tencent tool) with sha256sums='SKIP'. The host is Tencent's own infrastructure, not a random personal host, so the supply-chain risk is lower than a truly unofficial mirror. However, skipping the checksum entirely means any future change to the file (intentional or via compromise) would go undetected. The AppImage is extracted and its app.asar (Electron application bundle — executed code) is installed. The combination of an unverified binary blob (no checksum, no PGP signature) from a CDN that, while official, could serve different content over time is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: if the CDN object is replaced or the URL is hijacked, arbitrary Electron code would be installed and executed on user systems. This is not clearly malicious but is a real packaging risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:31 source=("https://cos5.cloud.tencent.com/cosbrowser/releases/cosbrowser-latest-linux.zip")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage from cos5.cloud.tencent.com (Tencent's own COS/object-storage CDN, which is the official distribution channel for this Tencent tool) with sha256sums='SKIP'. The host is Tencent's own infrastructure, not a random personal host, so the supply-chain risk is lower than a truly unofficial mirror. However, skipping the checksum entirely means any future change to the file (intentional or via compromise) would go undetected. The AppImage is extracted and its app.asar (Electron application bundle — executed code) is installed. The combination of an unverified binary blob (no checksum, no PGP signature) from a CDN that, while official, could serve different content over time is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: if the CDN object is replaced or the URL is hijacked, arbitrary Electron code would be installed and executed on user systems. This is not clearly malicious but is a real packaging risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1#Maintainer: weearc <q19981121@163.com>
    
      2pkgname=cosbrowser
    
      3pkgver=2.8.3
    
      4pkgrel=3
    
      5epoch=
    
      6pkgdesc="腾讯云COS工具"
    
      7arch=("x86_64")
    
      8url="https://cloud.tencent.com"
    
      9license=('custom')
    
      10groups=()
    
      11depends=(
    
      12	 'gtk3'
    
      13	 'libxcb'
    
      14	 'libappindicator-gtk2'
    
      15	 'gconf'
    
      16	 'libnotify'
    
      17	 'libxss'
    
      18	 'libxtst'
    
      19	 'electron11'
    
      20	)
    
      21makedepends=()
    
      22checkdepends=('electron11')
    
      23optdepends=()
    
      24provides=()
    
      25conflicts=()
    
      26replaces=()
    
      27backup=()
    
      28options=()
    
      29install=
    
      30changelog=
    
      31source=("https://cos5.cloud.tencent.com/cosbrowser/releases/cosbrowser-latest-linux.zip")
    
      32noextract=()
    
      33sha256sums=('SKIP')
    
      34validpgpkeys=()
    
      35
    
      36prepare() {
    
      37	cd ${srcdir}/
    
      38	./cosbrowser.AppImage --appimage-extract
    
      39    
    
      40}
    
      41
    
      42
    
      43package() {
    
      44	install -d ${pkgdir}/opt
    
      45	install -d ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
    
      46	install -d ${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons
    
      47	install -d ${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications
    
      48	install -d ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses
    
      49	
    
      50	echo "#!/bin/bash
    
      51electron11 /opt/$pkgname/app.asar -no-sandbox \$@" > ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/$pkgname && chmod a+x ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/$pkgname
    
      52	
    
      53	echo "[Desktop Entry]
    
      54Name=$pkgname
    
      55Name[zh_CN]=$pkgname
    
      56Exec=/usr/bin/cosbrowser %U
    
      57Terminal=false
    
      58Type=Application
    
      59Icon=cosbrowser
    
      60Comment=
    
      61Comment[zh_CN]=
    
      62Categories=Network;FileTransfer;" > ${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop
    
      63
    
      64	mkdir ${pkgdir}/opt/$pkgname
    
      65	install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/squashfs-root/resources/app.asar ${pkgdir}/opt/$pkgname/app.asar
    
      66	
    
      67		
    
      68	for i in 16 22 24 32 36 48 64 72 96 128 256
    
      69	do
    
      70        mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${i}x${i}/apps
    
      71        install ${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/0x0/apps/$pkgname.png ${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${i}x${i}/apps/$pkgname.png
    
      72    done
    
      73}
    
      74

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2