creature-desktop-bin

maintainer mmarzex · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from releases.creature.run, which is the project's own release host (matching the upstream URL creature.run). The AppImage is executed during build to extract its contents, and the extracted Electron application is installed system-wide. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering, but the host is a personal/startup domain with no third-party verification. The core concern is that this is an executed proprietary binary from a non-auditable source: if the domain or release infrastructure is compromised, users would silently receive malicious code. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for binary AUR packages — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern due to the unofficial host and lack of any code signing or reproducible build verification. The PKGBUILD itself is well-structured with no obfuscation or suspicious behavior.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:26 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://releases.creature.run/desktop/linux/x64/Creature-${pkgver}-x64.AppImage")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from releases.creature.run, which is the project's own release host (matching the upstream URL creature.run). The AppImage is executed during build to extract its contents, and the extracted Electron application is installed system-wide. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering, but the host is a personal/startup domain with no third-party verification. The core concern is that this is an executed proprietary binary from a non-auditable source: if the domain or release infrastructure is compromised, users would silently receive malicious code. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for binary AUR packages — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern due to the unofficial host and lack of any code signing or reproducible build verification. The PKGBUILD itself is well-structured with no obfuscation or suspicious behavior.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Max Marze <max@marze.dev>
2pkgname=creature-desktop-bin
3pkgver=0.0.32
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="The Graphical Agent Interface - Build and share MCP Apps for humans and agents working together"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://creature.run"
8license=('custom')
9depends=(
10 'gtk3'
11 'nss'
12 'alsa-lib'
13 'libxss'
14 'libxtst'
15 'xdg-utils'
16 'libsecret'
17 'libayatana-appindicator'
18)
19optdepends=(
20 'libnotify: for desktop notifications'
21)
22provides=('creature-desktop')
23conflicts=('creature-desktop')
24install=${pkgname}.install
25options=('!strip' '!debug')
26source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://releases.creature.run/desktop/linux/x64/Creature-${pkgver}-x64.AppImage")
27sha256sums=('0f89780d9183da006ef2852f08e10112fbb3e6dc0d2c9eb2ede347fcea595330')
28noextract=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage")
29
30makedepends=('imagemagick')
31
32prepare() {
33 chmod +x "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage"
34 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage" --appimage-extract
35
36 # Generate smaller icon sizes from the 1024x1024 source
37 local _src="${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/1024x1024/apps/creature-desktop-app.png"
38 for _size in 16 24 32 48 64 128 256 512; do
39 mkdir -p "${srcdir}/icons/${_size}x${_size}"
40 magick "${_src}" -resize "${_size}x${_size}" "${srcdir}/icons/${_size}x${_size}/creature-desktop-app.png"
41 done
42}
43
44package() {
45 # Detect the actual binary name (upstream changed from 'Creature' to 'creature' in 0.0.29)
46 local _bin
47 if [[ -f "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/lib/creature-desktop-app/creature" ]]; then
48 _bin="creature"
49 else
50 _bin="Creature"
51 fi
52
53 # Install the main application
54 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/opt/creature-desktop"
55 cp -r "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/lib/creature-desktop-app/"* "${pkgdir}/opt/creature-desktop/"
56
57 # Install icons at multiple sizes
58 for _size in 16 24 32 48 64 128 256 512; do
59 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/icons/${_size}x${_size}/creature-desktop-app.png" \
60 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${_size}x${_size}/apps/creature-desktop-app.png"
61 done
62 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/1024x1024/apps/creature-desktop-app.png" \
63 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/1024x1024/apps/creature-desktop-app.png"
64
65 # Install the desktop file (patched)
66 install -Dm644 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/creature-desktop.desktop" <<EOF
67[Desktop Entry]
68Version=1.5
69Type=Application
70Name=Creature
71Comment=The Graphical Agent Interface
72Exec=/opt/creature-desktop/${_bin} %U
73Icon=creature-desktop-app
74Categories=Development;Utility;
75StartupWMClass=Creature
76EOF
77
78 # Install the license
79 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/lib/creature-desktop-app/LICENSE" \
80 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
81
82 # Create symlink for the binary
83 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
84 ln -s /opt/creature-desktop/${_bin} "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/creature"
85
86 # Fix permissions for chrome-sandbox
87 chmod 4755 "${pkgdir}/opt/creature-desktop/chrome-sandbox"
88}
89

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
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