criptext-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from cdn.criptext.com (the official Criptext CDN, not a personal/unofficial host), extracts it, and installs it system-wide. While cdn.criptext.com is the vendor's own CDN rather than a random personal host, it is still a prebuilt binary blob being executed during the build process (AppImage --appimage-extract runs the binary). The sha512sums are present and pin the specific artifact, which mitigates substitution risk significantly. However, the pattern of downloading and executing a prebuilt binary from a CDN (even an official one) rather than building from source is a legitimate medium-severity supply-chain concern: if the CDN were compromised or the checksum were updated to match a malicious binary, arbitrary code would execute. This is a standard -bin package pattern in AUR and the checksums provide meaningful protection, but the risk is real enough to remain medium rather than clean.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:15
source=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}.AppImage::https://cdn.criptext.com/Criptext-Email-Desktop/linux/Criptext-${pkgver}.AppImage"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from cdn.criptext.com (the official Criptext CDN, not a personal/unofficial host), extracts it, and installs it system-wide. While cdn.criptext.com is the vendor's own CDN rather than a random personal host, it is still a prebuilt binary blob being executed during the build process (AppImage --appimage-extract runs the binary). The sha512sums are present and pin the specific artifact, which mitigates substitution risk significantly. However, the pattern of downloading and executing a prebuilt binary from a CDN (even an official one) rather than building from source is a legitimate medium-severity supply-chain concern: if the CDN were compromised or the checksum were updated to match a malicious binary, arbitrary code would execute. This is a standard -bin package pattern in AUR and the checksums provide meaningful protection, but the risk is real enough to remain medium rather than clean.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Aaron J Graves <linux@ajgraves.com>
pkgname=criptext-bin
pkgver=0.31.0
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc='Official Criptext encrypted email client'
arch=('x86_64')
url='https://criptext.com/'
license=('GPL2')
provides=("${pkgname}")
conflicts=("${pkgname}")
depends=('electron' 'libsecret')
optdepends=('org.freedesktop.secrets: for storing passwords'
'gnome-keyring: for storing passwords in GNOME Keyring')
options=(!strip)
source=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}.AppImage::https://cdn.criptext.com/Criptext-Email-Desktop/linux/Criptext-${pkgver}.AppImage"
"criptext"
"LICENSE")
sha512sums=('450a07133c32a86ece652aec68583421006d6571a5e24cf4963bc7bd746f6ccafc4590ea52d0868ffa0e82367d916d4bb050c57e66ea32bc7458ec87f6ce8e48'
'1665c4e992f91c00aab96a39b62c736731727a371c146923cf575d64a7e723f082170f115dc2fe87c6b5510a2f2e0fb12f111e947f6d2da994472d48887a2f5b'
'aee80b1f9f7f4a8a00dcf6e6ce6c41988dcaedc4de19d9d04460cbfb05d99829ffe8f9d038468eabbfba4d65b38e8dbef5ecf5eb8a1b891d9839cda6c48ee957')
prepare() {
chmod +x ${srcdir}/${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}.AppImage
${srcdir}/${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}.AppImage --appimage-extract
# Update .desktop file
sed -i 's|Exec=AppRun|Exec=/usr/bin/criptext|g' \
"${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${pkgname%-bin}.desktop"
}
package() {
find ${srcdir}/squashfs-root/{locales,resources,usr/share/icons}/ -type d -exec chmod 755 {} +
install -d ${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}
cp -r ${srcdir}/squashfs-root/* ${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}
rm -r ${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/usr/
install -d ${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons
cp -r ${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor ${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${pkgname%-bin}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
install -Dm755 ${srcdir}/criptext ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/criptext
install -Dm444 ${srcdir}/LICENSE ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |