cryo

maintainer cryolab · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the maintainer's own domain (cryonet.io) rather than a standard forge or distribution mirror. The binary is executed/installed directly. While a detached PGP signature is downloaded alongside it, the validpgpkeys line is commented out, meaning the signature is never actually verified by makepkg. The sha256sums are present and pin the specific artifact, which mitigates casual tampering, but without PGP verification the trust anchor is solely the TLS certificate of cryonet.io. This is a real supply-chain concern: if the host or its TLS were compromised, a malicious binary could be installed. The pattern is a genuine medium-risk scenario — an executed binary from a personal/project host with disabled signature verification — not a false positive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:28 source_x86_64=("$pkgname-$pkgver-$CARCH.deb::https://cryonet.io/downloads/linux/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the maintainer's own domain (cryonet.io) rather than a standard forge or distribution mirror. The binary is executed/installed directly. While a detached PGP signature is downloaded alongside it, the validpgpkeys line is commented out, meaning the signature is never actually verified by makepkg. The sha256sums are present and pin the specific artifact, which mitigates casual tampering, but without PGP verification the trust anchor is solely the TLS certificate of cryonet.io. This is a real supply-chain concern: if the host or its TLS were compromised, a malicious binary could be installed. The pattern is a genuine medium-risk scenario — an executed binary from a personal/project host with disabled signature verification — not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Manuel Pietschmann <mpi@cryonet.io>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=cryo
    
      4arch=('x86_64')
    
      5pkgver=0.5.22
    
      6pkgrel=1
    
      7pkgdesc="A visual file manager with p2p file transfers"
    
      8url="https://cryonet.io"
    
      9license=('custom:"Copyright (c) Manuel Pietschmann"')
    
      10groups=()
    
      11depends=('hicolor-icon-theme'
    
      12         'libpng'
    
      13         'libexif'
    
      14         'libjpeg-turbo'
    
      15         'libsodium'
    
      16         'libraw'
    
      17         'sqlite')
    
      18makedepends=('xz')
    
      19optdepends=('tor' 'p7zip')
    
      20provides=()
    
      21conflicts=()
    
      22replaces=()
    
      23backup=()
    
      24options=()
    
      25install=
    
      26changelog=
    
      27source=()
    
      28source_x86_64=("$pkgname-$pkgver-$CARCH.deb::https://cryonet.io/downloads/linux/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
    
      29               "$pkgname-$pkgver-$CARCH.deb.sig::https://cryonet.io/downloads/linux/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb.sig")
    
      30noextract=()
    
      31#validpgpkeys=('73A522A1186C411D275BA2E6483C615810DFCC8B')
    
      32sha256sums_x86_64=('f85def4fda2d5a7ce5741d0e3d582f54f6b3ec554064d1a43347498ba8f2fb16' '6a884e64c09ce2ded5e30a53d1ae71edcc129b3b9d4989871c9088f4499fa8da')
    
      33
    
      34package() {
    
      35  cd "${srcdir}"
    
      36
    
      37  tar -xJf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      38
    
      39  chown -R root:root "${pkgdir}"
    
      40  rm -rf "${pkgdir}/opt/cryo/tor"
    
      41
    
      42  # Remove group write permissions from all files/directories
    
      43  chmod -R g-w "${pkgdir}"
    
      44}
    
      45
    
      46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2