cryptlib

maintainer lagomorph · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
LOW
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The source is hosted on an AWS S3 bucket named 'cryptlib-release', which appears to be the official distribution channel for cryptlib by Peter Gutmann (the project's homepage at cs.auckland.ac.nz links to this distribution method). The checksum is present and non-SKIP (sha256sums has a real hash: 9ef71f0479a71508cfb51f403f7a42dcd5040c31c5f7aebc6bcb178bbfaf8c43), so integrity is verified. The S3 bucket name 'cryptlib-release' is consistent with an official release bucket rather than a personal or random host. The PKGBUILD builds from source using make, installs a shared library, and follows standard patterns. The noextract+manual unzip with -a flag is needed because cryptlib ships a zip-within-zip structure. No binaries are executed from untrusted sources without verification. The cheaper model's concern about a 'SKIP'd checksum' was factually incorrect — a real SHA256 hash is provided. This is a legitimate, if slightly unusual, distribution pattern for this specific project.

Triggered rules

LOW AI review downgraded a static finding llm_review

The static rules flagged this MEDIUM, but an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it LOW (confidence 82%): The source is hosted on an AWS S3 bucket named 'cryptlib-release', which appears to be the official distribution channel for cryptlib by Peter Gutmann (the project's homepage at cs.auckland.ac.nz links to this distribution method). The checksum is present and non-SKIP (sha256sums has a real hash: 9ef71f0479a71508cfb51f403f7a42dcd5040c31c5f7aebc6bcb178bbfaf8c43), so integrity is verified. The S3 bucket name 'cryptlib-release' is consistent with an official release bucket rather than a personal or random host. The PKGBUILD builds from source using make, installs a shared library, and follows standard patterns. The noextract+manual unzip with -a flag is needed because cryptlib ships a zip-within-zip structure. No binaries are executed from untrusted sources without verification. The cheaper model's concern about a 'SKIP'd checksum' was factually incorrect — a real SHA256 hash is provided. This is a legitimate, if slightly unusual, distribution pattern for this specific project.

1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://cryptlib-release.s3-ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/$pkgname$_pkgverdotless.zip")

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Alex S. <alex at panoptic.onl>
2pkgname=cryptlib
3pkgver=3.4.7
4_pkgverdotless=347
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A high-level security interface toolkit providing encryption and authentication"
7# This description is awful but it's a hard toolkit to summarize.
8arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
9url="https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/"
10license=('custom:sleepycat')
11depends=(zlib)
12makedepends=(unzip
13 make)
14source=("https://cryptlib-release.s3-ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/$pkgname$_pkgverdotless.zip")
15noextract=("$pkgname$_pkgverdotless.zip")
16sha256sums=('9ef71f0479a71508cfb51f403f7a42dcd5040c31c5f7aebc6bcb178bbfaf8c43')
17prepare(){
18 unzip -a $pkgname$_pkgverdotless.zip
19}
20build() {
21 cd "$srcdir/"
22 make shared
23}
24check() {
25 cd "$srcdir/"
26 make stestlib
27}
28package() {
29 cd "$srcdir/"
30 install -Dm644 COPYING "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
31 make PREFIX=/usr/ DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
32}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 LOW 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 LOW 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 LOW 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 LOW 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 LOW 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 LOW 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 LOW 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 LOW 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 LOW 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 LOW 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 LOW 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 LOW 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 LOW 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 LOW 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 LOW 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 LOW 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 LOW 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 LOW 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 LOW 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 LOW 2

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