cryptlib

LOW
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The source is hosted on an AWS S3 bucket named 'cryptlib-release', which appears to be the official distribution channel for cryptlib by Peter Gutmann (the project's homepage at cs.auckland.ac.nz links to this distribution method). The checksum is present and non-SKIP (sha256sums has a real hash: 9ef71f0479a71508cfb51f403f7a42dcd5040c31c5f7aebc6bcb178bbfaf8c43), so integrity is verified. The S3 bucket name 'cryptlib-release' is consistent with an official release bucket rather than a personal or random host. The PKGBUILD builds from source using make, installs a shared library, and follows standard patterns. The noextract+manual unzip with -a flag is needed because cryptlib ships a zip-within-zip structure. No binaries are executed from untrusted sources without verification. The cheaper model's concern about a 'SKIP'd checksum' was factually incorrect — a real SHA256 hash is provided. This is a legitimate, if slightly unusual, distribution pattern for this specific project.

Triggered rules

Low AI review downgraded a static finding llm_review

The static rules flagged this MEDIUM, but an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it LOW (confidence 82%): The source is hosted on an AWS S3 bucket named 'cryptlib-release', which appears to be the official distribution channel for cryptlib by Peter Gutmann (the project's homepage at cs.auckland.ac.nz links to this distribution method). The checksum is present and non-SKIP (sha256sums has a real hash: 9ef71f0479a71508cfb51f403f7a42dcd5040c31c5f7aebc6bcb178bbfaf8c43), so integrity is verified. The S3 bucket name 'cryptlib-release' is consistent with an official release bucket rather than a personal or random host. The PKGBUILD builds from source using make, installs a shared library, and follows standard patterns. The noextract+manual unzip with -a flag is needed because cryptlib ships a zip-within-zip structure. No binaries are executed from untrusted sources without verification. The cheaper model's concern about a 'SKIP'd checksum' was factually incorrect — a real SHA256 hash is provided. This is a legitimate, if slightly unusual, distribution pattern for this specific project.

1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://cryptlib-release.s3-ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/$pkgname$_pkgverdotless.zip")

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Alex S. <alex at panoptic.onl>
2pkgname=cryptlib
3pkgver=3.4.7
4_pkgverdotless=347
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A high-level security interface toolkit providing encryption and authentication"
7# This description is awful but it's a hard toolkit to summarize.
8arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
9url="https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/"
10license=('custom:sleepycat')
11depends=(zlib)
12makedepends=(unzip
13 make)
14source=("https://cryptlib-release.s3-ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/$pkgname$_pkgverdotless.zip")
15noextract=("$pkgname$_pkgverdotless.zip")
16sha256sums=('9ef71f0479a71508cfb51f403f7a42dcd5040c31c5f7aebc6bcb178bbfaf8c43')
17prepare(){
18 unzip -a $pkgname$_pkgverdotless.zip
19}
20build() {
21 cd "$srcdir/"
22 make shared
23}
24check() {
25 cd "$srcdir/"
26 make stestlib
27}
28package() {
29 cd "$srcdir/"
30 install -Dm644 COPYING "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
31 make PREFIX=/usr/ DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
32}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Low 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Low 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Low 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Low 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Low 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Low 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Low 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Low 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Low 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Low 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Low 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Low 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Low 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Low 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Low 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Low 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Low 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Low 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Low 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Low 2

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