cryspmds

maintainer lucaswerkmeister · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt .deb containing a JAR file (cryspmds.jar) from a personal/research host (cryspmds.erinn.io) rather than an official distribution channel. The JAR is installed and executed directly by the user's JVM. While a SHA256 checksum is present (pinning the specific binary), the host is not an official upstream mirror or well-known vendor — it appears to be a personal/research server for a university study (CrySP is the Cryptography, Security, and Privacy research group at University of Waterloo). The risk is real but contextual: the checksum provides some integrity guarantee, but the binary could be silently replaced at the source URL in future installs if the checksum is updated by the maintainer without scrutiny. The JAR executes arbitrary code on the user's machine. This is a legitimate medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-standard personal host, not clearly malicious but not from an official/auditable release infrastructure.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:20 source=('https://cryspmds.erinn.io/dl/cryspmds.deb' 'SystemTrayIsSupported.java')
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb containing a JAR file (cryspmds.jar) from a personal/research host (cryspmds.erinn.io) rather than an official distribution channel. The JAR is installed and executed directly by the user's JVM. While a SHA256 checksum is present (pinning the specific binary), the host is not an official upstream mirror or well-known vendor — it appears to be a personal/research server for a university study (CrySP is the Cryptography, Security, and Privacy research group at University of Waterloo). The risk is real but contextual: the checksum provides some integrity guarantee, but the binary could be silently replaced at the source URL in future installs if the checksum is updated by the maintainer without scrutiny. The JAR executes arbitrary code on the user's machine. This is a legitimate medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-standard personal host, not clearly malicious but not from an official/auditable release infrastructure.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Lucas Werkmeister <mail@lucaswerkmeister.de>
2
3pkgname=cryspmds
4pkgver=1
5pkgrel=6
6pkgdesc='CrySP Multidevice Study'
7arch=('any')
8url='https://cryspmds.erinn.io/'
9depends=(
10 'java-runtime'
11 'java-openjfx'
12 'wireless_tools'
13)
14makedepends=(
15 'java-environment'
16)
17optdepends=(
18 'gnome-shell-extension-topicons-plus: restore system tray on GNOME (application requires a system tray to run)'
19)
20source=('https://cryspmds.erinn.io/dl/cryspmds.deb' 'SystemTrayIsSupported.java')
21sha256sums=('8b84d3bb273daaa8398a823d767c242c7b2b546ea33c41613978cf48890b57ad' 'eea3b1e190509832d3a80f7cff3fd648c2f0d2625b1ed41e7046424a79a5b8ee')
22install=$pkgname.install
23
24prepare() {
25 mkdir -p control data
26 tar xf control.tar.gz -C control
27 tar xf data.tar.xz -C data
28}
29
30build() {
31 sed -i "
32/^Icon=/ s|usr/local/bin/logo48.png|usr/share/icons/$pkgname.png|
33/^Exec=/ s|usr/local/bin/run|usr/bin/java -jar /usr/share/java/$pkgname/$pkgname.jar|
34/^Exec=/ a Path=/usr/share/$pkgname/
35" "data/usr/local/bin/$pkgname.desktop"
36
37 javac SystemTrayIsSupported.java
38}
39
40package() {
41 install -Dm644 "data/usr/local/bin/$pkgname.jar" "$pkgdir/usr/share/java/$pkgname/$pkgname.jar"
42 install -Dm644 "SystemTrayIsSupported.class" "$pkgdir/usr/share/java/$pkgname/SystemTrayIsSupported.class"
43 install -Dm644 "data/usr/local/bin/logo48.png" "$pkgdir/usr/share/icons/$pkgname.png"
44 install -Dm644 "data/usr/local/bin/logo.png" "$pkgdir/usr/share/$pkgname/logo.png"
45 install -Dm644 "data/usr/local/bin/logo.png" "$pkgdir/usr/share/$pkgname/logo-medium.png"
46 install -Dm644 "data/usr/local/bin/$pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/etc/xdg/autostart/$pkgname.desktop"
47}
48

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion