ctyun-cloud-desk

maintainer zzy-ac · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from desk.ctyun.cn:8999, which is a non-standard port on what appears to be China Telecom's cloud desktop distribution server. The package is a proprietary cloud desktop client (Ctyun/天翼云电脑) from a major Chinese state-owned telecom operator, so the host is plausibly official/vendor-operated rather than a random personal server. However, the non-standard port 8999 is unusual for a production distribution endpoint, and the package installs a prebuilt binary blob directly without any source build. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. The core concern is that this is an executed binary from a non-standard endpoint of a Chinese state telecom, with no source code review possible. This is a genuine supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary, non-standard port, opaque proprietary software) but not evidence of active malice. Medium severity is appropriate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 "https://desk.ctyun.cn:8999/desktop-prod/software/linux_x86_xc_client_deb/11/64/202000019/CtyunClouddeskUniversal-2.0.0-202000019-amd64-20230721013253xc.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from desk.ctyun.cn:8999, which is a non-standard port on what appears to be China Telecom's cloud desktop distribution server. The package is a proprietary cloud desktop client (Ctyun/天翼云电脑) from a major Chinese state-owned telecom operator, so the host is plausibly official/vendor-operated rather than a random personal server. However, the non-standard port 8999 is unusual for a production distribution endpoint, and the package installs a prebuilt binary blob directly without any source build. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. The core concern is that this is an executed binary from a non-standard endpoint of a Chinese state telecom, with no source code review possible. This is a genuine supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary, non-standard port, opaque proprietary software) but not evidence of active malice. Medium severity is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: zzy-ac <zzy-ac@qq.com>
2
3pkgname=ctyun-cloud-desk
4pkgver=2.0.0
5pkgrel=202000019
6pkgdesc="天翼云电脑linux客户端:天翼云电脑(Ctyun-Laptop)是云计算技术和终端相结合的创新型产品。依托中国电信优质云网资源,结合自主研发的CLINK数据安全传输协议,具备多重数据安全防护机制,实现安全高效的云电脑使用体验。提供一键部署、灵活可配、集中管控能力,广泛应用于办公、教育、医疗等行业使用场景。"
7arch=("x86_64")
8url="https://www.ctyun.cn/"
9license=()
10depends=('gtk3' 'libnotify' 'libxss' 'libxtst' 'xdg-utils' 'libusb' 'pulseaudio' 'lib32-util-linux' 'util-linux-libs' 'opus' 'pixman')
11source=(
12 "https://desk.ctyun.cn:8999/desktop-prod/software/linux_x86_xc_client_deb/11/64/202000019/CtyunClouddeskUniversal-2.0.0-202000019-amd64-20230721013253xc.deb")
13sha256sums=('00324ba0cf4a2fe1e57470f3200fc3096212c988425170649ae8b28e8f1fcaeb')
14
15build() {
16 mkdir -p "${srcdir}/dpkgdir"
17 tar -xvf data.tar.gz -C "${srcdir}/dpkgdir"
18}
19
20package() {
21 cp -r "${srcdir}/dpkgdir"/* "${pkgdir}"
22}
23

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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