ctyun-cloud-desk
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from desk.ctyun.cn:8999, which is a non-standard port on what appears to be China Telecom's cloud desktop distribution server. The package is a proprietary cloud desktop client (Ctyun/天翼云电脑) from a major Chinese state-owned telecom operator, so the host is plausibly official/vendor-operated rather than a random personal server. However, the non-standard port 8999 is unusual for a production distribution endpoint, and the package installs a prebuilt binary blob directly without any source build. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. The core concern is that this is an executed binary from a non-standard endpoint of a Chinese state telecom, with no source code review possible. This is a genuine supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary, non-standard port, opaque proprietary software) but not evidence of active malice. Medium severity is appropriate.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
"https://desk.ctyun.cn:8999/desktop-prod/software/linux_x86_xc_client_deb/11/64/202000019/CtyunClouddeskUniversal-2.0.0-202000019-amd64-20230721013253xc.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from desk.ctyun.cn:8999, which is a non-standard port on what appears to be China Telecom's cloud desktop distribution server. The package is a proprietary cloud desktop client (Ctyun/天翼云电脑) from a major Chinese state-owned telecom operator, so the host is plausibly official/vendor-operated rather than a random personal server. However, the non-standard port 8999 is unusual for a production distribution endpoint, and the package installs a prebuilt binary blob directly without any source build. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. The core concern is that this is an executed binary from a non-standard endpoint of a Chinese state telecom, with no source code review possible. This is a genuine supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary, non-standard port, opaque proprietary software) but not evidence of active malice. Medium severity is appropriate.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: zzy-ac <zzy-ac@qq.com>
pkgname=ctyun-cloud-desk
pkgver=2.0.0
pkgrel=202000019
pkgdesc="天翼云电脑linux客户端:天翼云电脑(Ctyun-Laptop)是云计算技术和终端相结合的创新型产品。依托中国电信优质云网资源,结合自主研发的CLINK数据安全传输协议,具备多重数据安全防护机制,实现安全高效的云电脑使用体验。提供一键部署、灵活可配、集中管控能力,广泛应用于办公、教育、医疗等行业使用场景。"
arch=("x86_64")
url="https://www.ctyun.cn/"
license=()
depends=('gtk3' 'libnotify' 'libxss' 'libxtst' 'xdg-utils' 'libusb' 'pulseaudio' 'lib32-util-linux' 'util-linux-libs' 'opus' 'pixman')
source=(
"https://desk.ctyun.cn:8999/desktop-prod/software/linux_x86_xc_client_deb/11/64/202000019/CtyunClouddeskUniversal-2.0.0-202000019-amd64-20230721013253xc.deb")
sha256sums=('00324ba0cf4a2fe1e57470f3200fc3096212c988425170649ae8b28e8f1fcaeb')
build() {
mkdir -p "${srcdir}/dpkgdir"
tar -xvf data.tar.gz -C "${srcdir}/dpkgdir"
}
package() {
cp -r "${srcdir}/dpkgdir"/* "${pkgdir}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |