ctyunclouddeskpublic-bin

maintainer venhal · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from desk.ctyun.cn, which is the official China Telecom Cloud (天翼云) client download host. This is a proprietary vendor-hosted binary with no source code, and while the host appears to be the legitimate vendor's distribution server, it is not a well-known canonical upstream like GitHub releases or a major distro mirror. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but there is no GPG signature verification. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the system (/opt and /usr), meaning any compromise of the download host or substitution of the binary would result in arbitrary code execution. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an executed proprietary binary from a single vendor-controlled host with no independent verification mechanism beyond a hash in the PKGBUILD itself (which could also be updated by the maintainer). The prepare/package steps are straightforward .deb extraction with no obfuscation.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:22 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://desk.ctyun.cn/desktop/software/clientsoftware/download/a9c0fc33dba6346061363388fbcce108")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from desk.ctyun.cn, which is the official China Telecom Cloud (天翼云) client download host. This is a proprietary vendor-hosted binary with no source code, and while the host appears to be the legitimate vendor's distribution server, it is not a well-known canonical upstream like GitHub releases or a major distro mirror. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but there is no GPG signature verification. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the system (/opt and /usr), meaning any compromise of the download host or substitution of the binary would result in arbitrary code execution. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an executed proprietary binary from a single vendor-controlled host with no independent verification mechanism beyond a hash in the PKGBUILD itself (which could also be updated by the maintainer). The prepare/package steps are straightforward .deb extraction with no obfuscation.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: venhal <1138706183@qq.com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=ctyunclouddeskpublic-bin
    
      4pkgver=2.9.1.3843
    
      5pkgrel=2
    
      6pkgdesc="天翼云电脑linux客户端。电信牛马必备。"
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://www.ctyun.cn/products/cloudcomputer"
    
      9license=('proprietary')
    
      10
    
      11depends=(
    
      12  'alsa-lib' 'brotli' 'bzip2' 'dbus' 'expat' 'flac' 'fontconfig'
    
      13  'gcc-libs' 'glib2' 'glibc' 'icu' 'lame' 'libasyncns' 'libcap'
    
      14  'libdrm' 'libffi' 'libglvnd' 'libgudev' 'libogg' 'libpng'
    
      15  'libpulse' 'libsndfile' 'libvorbis' 'libx11' 'libxau' 'libxcb'
    
      16  'libxcomposite' 'libxcursor' 'libxdamage' 'libxdmcp' 'libxext'
    
      17  'libxfixes' 'libxi' 'libxml2' 'libxrandr' 'libxrender' 'libxslt'
    
      18  'libxss' 'mpg123' 'nspr' 'nss' 'opus' 'pcre2' 'pixman'
    
      19  'systemd-libs' 'util-linux-libs' 'v4l-utils' 'zlib' 'libxml2-legacy'
    
      20)
    
      21
    
      22source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://desk.ctyun.cn/desktop/software/clientsoftware/download/a9c0fc33dba6346061363388fbcce108")
    
      23sha256sums=('f9e8e4e016b8d1e7c68e7ee27845986221bc6c1c6aa4ad314999f89ce3be235e')
    
      24
    
      25prepare() {
    
      26  tar -xf "$srcdir/data.tar."* -C "$srcdir"
    
      27}
    
      28
    
      29package() {
    
      30  cp -a "$srcdir/opt" "$srcdir/usr" "$pkgdir/"
    
      31  
    
      32  _desktop_file=$(find "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications" -type f -name "*.desktop")
    
      33  
    
      34  if [ -n "$_desktop_file" ]; then
    
      35    sed -i 's|^Exec=\(.*\)|Exec=env QT_QPA_PLATFORM=xcb \1|' "$_desktop_file"
    
      36  else
    
      37    echo "警告：在包里没有找到 .desktop 文件！"
    
      38  fi
    
      39}
    
      40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2