cytrence-kiwi

maintainer chaos2theory · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb (wrapped in a zip) from cytrence.com, which is the vendor's own website (not a personal/random host). Cytrence Kiwi is a real commercial KVM development tool. However, the source URL is a Wix-hosted file storage URL (/_files/archives/...) rather than a canonical GitHub release or versioned download path, which makes it harder to verify authenticity independently. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the system (under /opt/cytrence) without any signature verification beyond the sha256sum of the zip. This is a standard pattern for proprietary AUR packages (like many commercial tools), but it does represent a real supply-chain concern: if cytrence.com or its Wix file storage is compromised, arbitrary binaries would be executed on the user's system. The sha256sum provides some protection against transit tampering but not against the upstream host serving a malicious file. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern — not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-standard (Wix CDN) host without GPG signing.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://www.cytrence.com/_files/archives/5418d8_dfd7984f4e664b8fa25820e5dff5cf6a.zip?dn=CytrenceKiwi-1.5.14-ubuntu24_amd64.zip")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb (wrapped in a zip) from cytrence.com, which is the vendor's own website (not a personal/random host). Cytrence Kiwi is a real commercial KVM development tool. However, the source URL is a Wix-hosted file storage URL (/_files/archives/...) rather than a canonical GitHub release or versioned download path, which makes it harder to verify authenticity independently. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the system (under /opt/cytrence) without any signature verification beyond the sha256sum of the zip. This is a standard pattern for proprietary AUR packages (like many commercial tools), but it does represent a real supply-chain concern: if cytrence.com or its Wix file storage is compromised, arbitrary binaries would be executed on the user's system. The sha256sum provides some protection against transit tampering but not against the upstream host serving a malicious file. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern — not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-standard (Wix CDN) host without GPG signing.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Lucas Oskorep <lucas.oskorep@gmail.com>
2pkgname=cytrence-kiwi
3pkgver=1.5.14
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Cytrence Kiwi - Native-like KVM Development Tool"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://cytrence.com"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('glibc')
10makedepends=('unzip')
11install=cytrence-kiwi.install
12options=('!strip')
13source=("https://www.cytrence.com/_files/archives/5418d8_dfd7984f4e664b8fa25820e5dff5cf6a.zip?dn=CytrenceKiwi-1.5.14-ubuntu24_amd64.zip")
14sha256sums=('73b8a59c1e48b34f992f13ae1e3c928f1247a5b19dcbeeaa15992819e018b32d')
15
16package() {
17 # Extract the deb package from the zip
18 cd "$srcdir"
19 ar x "CytrenceKiwi_${pkgver}-ubuntu24_amd64.deb"
20 tar -xzf data.tar.gz -C "$pkgdir"
21
22 # Install license
23 install -dm755 "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname"
24 install -Dm644 "$pkgdir/opt/cytrence/EULA.txt" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/EULA"
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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