dcos-cli-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from downloads.dcos.io, which is the official DC/OS (Mesosphere/D2iQ) distribution host for their CLI tool. This is the legitimate upstream vendor host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary is downloaded and installed directly without any source compilation, and the sha256sum is a single checksum with no GPG signature verification. The host is official but the pattern of installing an unverified (beyond checksum) prebuilt binary from a vendor CDN is a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the binary was tampered with before the checksum was recorded, there is no additional verification layer. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for -bin packages in the AUR: not malicious, but the execution of a prebuilt binary from a remote host without signature verification is a legitimate concern. The package is also quite old (v1.1.2, DC/OS CLI) and may no longer be maintained.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("https://downloads.dcos.io/binaries/cli/linux/x86-64/$pkgver/$binname")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from downloads.dcos.io, which is the official DC/OS (Mesosphere/D2iQ) distribution host for their CLI tool. This is the legitimate upstream vendor host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary is downloaded and installed directly without any source compilation, and the sha256sum is a single checksum with no GPG signature verification. The host is official but the pattern of installing an unverified (beyond checksum) prebuilt binary from a vendor CDN is a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the binary was tampered with before the checksum was recorded, there is no additional verification layer. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for -bin packages in the AUR: not malicious, but the execution of a prebuilt binary from a remote host without signature verification is a legitimate concern. The package is also quite old (v1.1.2, DC/OS CLI) and may no longer be maintained.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Jiri Tyr <jiri.tyr@gmail.com>
2
3binname='dcos'
4pkgname="$binname-cli-bin"
5pkgver='1.1.2'
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='The DC/OS command line interface utility'
8url='https://docs.mesosphere.com/latest/cli/'
9arch=('x86_64')
10license=('Apache')
11conflicts=('dcos-cli')
12source=("https://downloads.dcos.io/binaries/cli/linux/x86-64/$pkgver/$binname")
13sha256sums=('feaa251744c2346fb4da834fd223de3291c53bccaf8ea225a7bc2ebc5edf1190')
14
15package() {
16 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$binname" -t "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
17}
18

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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