dcos-cli-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from downloads.dcos.io, which is the official DC/OS (Mesosphere/D2iQ) distribution host for their CLI tool. This is the legitimate upstream vendor host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary is downloaded and installed directly without any source compilation, and the sha256sum is a single checksum with no GPG signature verification. The host is official but the pattern of installing an unverified (beyond checksum) prebuilt binary from a vendor CDN is a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the binary was tampered with before the checksum was recorded, there is no additional verification layer. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for -bin packages in the AUR: not malicious, but the execution of a prebuilt binary from a remote host without signature verification is a legitimate concern. The package is also quite old (v1.1.2, DC/OS CLI) and may no longer be maintained.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("https://downloads.dcos.io/binaries/cli/linux/x86-64/$pkgver/$binname")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from downloads.dcos.io, which is the official DC/OS (Mesosphere/D2iQ) distribution host for their CLI tool. This is the legitimate upstream vendor host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary is downloaded and installed directly without any source compilation, and the sha256sum is a single checksum with no GPG signature verification. The host is official but the pattern of installing an unverified (beyond checksum) prebuilt binary from a vendor CDN is a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the binary was tampered with before the checksum was recorded, there is no additional verification layer. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for -bin packages in the AUR: not malicious, but the execution of a prebuilt binary from a remote host without signature verification is a legitimate concern. The package is also quite old (v1.1.2, DC/OS CLI) and may no longer be maintained.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Jiri Tyr <jiri.tyr@gmail.com>
2
3binname='dcos'
4pkgname="$binname-cli-bin"
5pkgver='1.1.2'
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='The DC/OS command line interface utility'
8url='https://docs.mesosphere.com/latest/cli/'
9arch=('x86_64')
10license=('Apache')
11conflicts=('dcos-cli')
12source=("https://downloads.dcos.io/binaries/cli/linux/x86-64/$pkgver/$binname")
13sha256sums=('feaa251744c2346fb4da834fd223de3291c53bccaf8ea225a7bc2ebc5edf1190')
14
15package() {
16 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$binname" -t "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
17}
18

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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