dcos-cli-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from downloads.dcos.io, which is the official DC/OS (Mesosphere/D2iQ) distribution host for their CLI tool. This is the legitimate upstream vendor host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary is downloaded and installed directly without any source compilation, and the sha256sum is a single checksum with no GPG signature verification. The host is official but the pattern of installing an unverified (beyond checksum) prebuilt binary from a vendor CDN is a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the binary was tampered with before the checksum was recorded, there is no additional verification layer. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for -bin packages in the AUR: not malicious, but the execution of a prebuilt binary from a remote host without signature verification is a legitimate concern. The package is also quite old (v1.1.2, DC/OS CLI) and may no longer be maintained.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("https://downloads.dcos.io/binaries/cli/linux/x86-64/$pkgver/$binname")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from downloads.dcos.io, which is the official DC/OS (Mesosphere/D2iQ) distribution host for their CLI tool. This is the legitimate upstream vendor host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary is downloaded and installed directly without any source compilation, and the sha256sum is a single checksum with no GPG signature verification. The host is official but the pattern of installing an unverified (beyond checksum) prebuilt binary from a vendor CDN is a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the binary was tampered with before the checksum was recorded, there is no additional verification layer. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for -bin packages in the AUR: not malicious, but the execution of a prebuilt binary from a remote host without signature verification is a legitimate concern. The package is also quite old (v1.1.2, DC/OS CLI) and may no longer be maintained.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jiri Tyr <jiri.tyr@gmail.com>
binname='dcos'
pkgname="$binname-cli-bin"
pkgver='1.1.2'
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='The DC/OS command line interface utility'
url='https://docs.mesosphere.com/latest/cli/'
arch=('x86_64')
license=('Apache')
conflicts=('dcos-cli')
source=("https://downloads.dcos.io/binaries/cli/linux/x86-64/$pkgver/$binname")
sha256sums=('feaa251744c2346fb4da834fd223de3291c53bccaf8ea225a7bc2ebc5edf1190')
package() {
install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$binname" -t "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |