deepin-wine-plugin-virtual

maintainer orphaned · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cdn-package-store6.deepin.com, which is Deepin's official CDN/app store host, not a random personal server. However, it is still an unofficial (non-distro-agnostic) binary package that gets extracted and installed directly into the system without any signature verification beyond a weak MD5 checksum. The package installs a 'deepin-wine-helper' component (despite the pkgname being deepin-wine-plugin-virtual), which is executed code/libraries rather than pure data. The use of only MD5 (cryptographically broken) and no GPG signature means integrity assurance is weak. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: a compromised or MITM'd CDN could substitute a malicious .deb, and the installed content (wine helper/plugin) is executable code. This is a genuine medium-severity concern — not clearly malicious, but a real risk from an unofficial binary host with insufficient integrity verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:26 source=("https://cdn-package-store6.deepin.com/appstore/pool/appstore/d/deepin-wine-helper/${pkgname}_${_pkgver}_all.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cdn-package-store6.deepin.com, which is Deepin's official CDN/app store host, not a random personal server. However, it is still an unofficial (non-distro-agnostic) binary package that gets extracted and installed directly into the system without any signature verification beyond a weak MD5 checksum. The package installs a 'deepin-wine-helper' component (despite the pkgname being deepin-wine-plugin-virtual), which is executed code/libraries rather than pure data. The use of only MD5 (cryptographically broken) and no GPG signature means integrity assurance is weak. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: a compromised or MITM'd CDN could substitute a malicious .deb, and the installed content (wine helper/plugin) is executable code. This is a genuine medium-severity concern — not clearly malicious, but a real risk from an unofficial binary host with insufficient integrity verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: wszqkzqk <wszqkzqk@gmail.com>
2# Maintainer: Skywol <skywol@qq.com>
3# Maintainer: luosoy <249799588@qq.com>
4
5pkgname=deepin-wine-plugin-virtual
6_pkgver=5.1.13-1
7pkgver=5.1.13
8pkgrel=1
9epoch=
10pkgdesc="Deepin Wine plugin virtual package"
11arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
12url="http://www.deepin.org"
13license=('Proprietary')
14groups=()
15depends=('p7zip' 'python-dbus')
16makedepends=('tar')
17checkdepends=()
18optdepends=()
19provides=()
20conflicts=()
21replaces=()
22backup=()
23options=()
24install=
25changelog=
26source=("https://cdn-package-store6.deepin.com/appstore/pool/appstore/d/deepin-wine-helper/${pkgname}_${_pkgver}_all.deb")
27noextract=("${pkgname}_${_pkgver}_all.deb")
28md5sums=('b0b9c97c8f0f0c48b3e5eb11d3dba942')
29validpgpkeys=()
30
31prepare() {
32 ar -x ${pkgname}_${_pkgver}_all.deb
33 mkdir ${pkgname}-${pkgver}
34 tar -xf data.tar.xz --directory="${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
35}
36
37package() {
38 cd "${pkgname}-${pkgver}"
39 cp -r ./ ${pkgdir}/
40}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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