devbook-bin

maintainer orphaned · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron/proprietary binary .deb from dl.todesktop.com, which is a third-party application distribution platform (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app packaging service used by many SaaS products). The URL has no filename/version component, meaning the same URL could silently serve a different binary over time — the sha512sum provides some protection against substitution at build time, but the URL is not pinned to a specific versioned artifact. The binary is executed directly after extraction (it's an Electron app installed system-wide). This is a real supply-chain concern: an unofficial/third-party host serving an unversioned URL for an executed proprietary binary. However, there is no evidence of active malice, obfuscation, or exfiltration — this is a standard pattern for AUR -bin packages of proprietary Electron apps distributed via ToDesktop. The risk is real but not elevated beyond a typical medium: unversioned URL from a non-upstream CDN delivering an executed binary.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source_x86_64=("https://dl.todesktop.com/2102273jsy18baz/linux/deb/x64")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron/proprietary binary .deb from dl.todesktop.com, which is a third-party application distribution platform (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app packaging service used by many SaaS products). The URL has no filename/version component, meaning the same URL could silently serve a different binary over time — the sha512sum provides some protection against substitution at build time, but the URL is not pinned to a specific versioned artifact. The binary is executed directly after extraction (it's an Electron app installed system-wide). This is a real supply-chain concern: an unofficial/third-party host serving an unversioned URL for an executed proprietary binary. However, there is no evidence of active malice, obfuscation, or exfiltration — this is a standard pattern for AUR -bin packages of proprietary Electron apps distributed via ToDesktop. The risk is real but not elevated beyond a typical medium: unversioned URL from a non-upstream CDN delivering an executed binary.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Matt C <matt@xhec.us>
    
      2pkgname=devbook-bin
    
      3pkgver=0.1.18
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="Search engine for developers"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://usedevbook.com"
    
      8license=('custom:proprietary')
    
      9depends=('alsa-lib' 'atk' 'at-spi2-atk' 'at-spi2-core' 'cairo' 'dbus' 'desktop-file-utils' 'discord' 'expat' 'gdk-pixbuf2' 'glib2' 'gtk3' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'libappindicator-gtk3' 'libcups' 'libdrm' 'libnotify' 'libsecret' 'libx11' 'libxcb' 'libxcomposite' 'libxdamage' 'libxext' 'libxfixes' 'libxkbcommon' 'libxrandr' 'libxss' 'libxtst' 'mesa' 'nspr' 'nss' 'pango' 'util-linux-libs' 'xdg-utils')
    
      10options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
    
      11install=${pkgname}.install
    
      12source_x86_64=("https://dl.todesktop.com/2102273jsy18baz/linux/deb/x64")
    
      13sha512sums_x86_64=('ace150143118976c207e088e8bfd0cfa1e48cc16499b66a583ad8a0d2199c4a361b37df498938cf4b670bba71529624cc198996fa26aae7c7a4d5174cf16268d')
    
      14
    
      15package(){
    
      16
    
      17	# Extract package data
    
      18	tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      19
    
      20}
    
      21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2