devbook-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 2 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron/proprietary binary .deb from dl.todesktop.com, which is a third-party application distribution platform (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app packaging service used by many SaaS products). The URL has no filename/version component, meaning the same URL could silently serve a different binary over time — the sha512sum provides some protection against substitution at build time, but the URL is not pinned to a specific versioned artifact. The binary is executed directly after extraction (it's an Electron app installed system-wide). This is a real supply-chain concern: an unofficial/third-party host serving an unversioned URL for an executed proprietary binary. However, there is no evidence of active malice, obfuscation, or exfiltration — this is a standard pattern for AUR -bin packages of proprietary Electron apps distributed via ToDesktop. The risk is real but not elevated beyond a typical medium: unversioned URL from a non-upstream CDN delivering an executed binary.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source_x86_64=("https://dl.todesktop.com/2102273jsy18baz/linux/deb/x64")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron/proprietary binary .deb from dl.todesktop.com, which is a third-party application distribution platform (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app packaging service used by many SaaS products). The URL has no filename/version component, meaning the same URL could silently serve a different binary over time — the sha512sum provides some protection against substitution at build time, but the URL is not pinned to a specific versioned artifact. The binary is executed directly after extraction (it's an Electron app installed system-wide). This is a real supply-chain concern: an unofficial/third-party host serving an unversioned URL for an executed proprietary binary. However, there is no evidence of active malice, obfuscation, or exfiltration — this is a standard pattern for AUR -bin packages of proprietary Electron apps distributed via ToDesktop. The risk is real but not elevated beyond a typical medium: unversioned URL from a non-upstream CDN delivering an executed binary.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Matt C <matt@xhec.us>
2pkgname=devbook-bin
3pkgver=0.1.18
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Search engine for developers"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://usedevbook.com"
8license=('custom:proprietary')
9depends=('alsa-lib' 'atk' 'at-spi2-atk' 'at-spi2-core' 'cairo' 'dbus' 'desktop-file-utils' 'discord' 'expat' 'gdk-pixbuf2' 'glib2' 'gtk3' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'libappindicator-gtk3' 'libcups' 'libdrm' 'libnotify' 'libsecret' 'libx11' 'libxcb' 'libxcomposite' 'libxdamage' 'libxext' 'libxfixes' 'libxkbcommon' 'libxrandr' 'libxss' 'libxtst' 'mesa' 'nspr' 'nss' 'pango' 'util-linux-libs' 'xdg-utils')
10options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
11install=${pkgname}.install
12source_x86_64=("https://dl.todesktop.com/2102273jsy18baz/linux/deb/x64")
13sha512sums_x86_64=('ace150143118976c207e088e8bfd0cfa1e48cc16499b66a583ad8a0d2199c4a361b37df498938cf4b670bba71529624cc198996fa26aae7c7a4d5174cf16268d')
14
15package(){
16
17 # Extract package data
18 tar xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
19
20}
21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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