dff2dsf

maintainer blackhole · 6 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary from signalyst.com/bins, which is the official vendor website for the Signalyst DFF2DSF tool (the url= field confirms this is the upstream vendor). The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any compilation step. While signalyst.com appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor site, distributing and executing a prebuilt binary from any host — even the official vendor — carries inherent supply-chain risk: there is no source code to audit, no reproducible build, and compromise of the vendor's web server would silently deliver malicious code to users. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good value but does not protect against the vendor serving a different binary in the future or the host being compromised. This is a classic 'binary blob from vendor' pattern that warrants medium severity: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern since an opaque prebuilt binary is being installed system-wide.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=('https://signalyst.com/bins/dff2dsf-122.zip')
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary from signalyst.com/bins, which is the official vendor website for the Signalyst DFF2DSF tool (the url= field confirms this is the upstream vendor). The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any compilation step. While signalyst.com appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor site, distributing and executing a prebuilt binary from any host — even the official vendor — carries inherent supply-chain risk: there is no source code to audit, no reproducible build, and compromise of the vendor's web server would silently deliver malicious code to users. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good value but does not protect against the vendor serving a different binary in the future or the host being compromised. This is a classic 'binary blob from vendor' pattern that warrants medium severity: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern since an opaque prebuilt binary is being installed system-wide.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1## Maintainer: AudioLinux <audiolinux AT fastmail DOT fm>
2
3pkgname=dff2dsf
4_debpkgver=1.2.2
5pkgver=$_debpkgver
6pkgrel=3
7pkgdesc="Signalyst DFF to DSF command line conversion utility"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://www.signalyst.com"
10license=('custom')
11depends=('glibc' 'gcc-libs')
12source=('https://signalyst.com/bins/dff2dsf-122.zip')
13sha256sums=('77ae7297ee1a6efe72014c7ebfd68033be40fae0246e10fc35eb7a252dd1f685')
14
15package() {
16 cd "$srcdir"
17 bsdtar -xf dff2dsf-122.zip -C "$srcdir"
18 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/linux-x64/dff2dsf" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/dff2dsf"
19 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/license.txt" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/COPYING"
20}
21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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