dff2dsf
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary from signalyst.com/bins, which is the official vendor website for the Signalyst DFF2DSF tool (the url= field confirms this is the upstream vendor). The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any compilation step. While signalyst.com appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor site, distributing and executing a prebuilt binary from any host — even the official vendor — carries inherent supply-chain risk: there is no source code to audit, no reproducible build, and compromise of the vendor's web server would silently deliver malicious code to users. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good value but does not protect against the vendor serving a different binary in the future or the host being compromised. This is a classic 'binary blob from vendor' pattern that warrants medium severity: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern since an opaque prebuilt binary is being installed system-wide.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=('https://signalyst.com/bins/dff2dsf-122.zip')
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt x86_64 binary from signalyst.com/bins, which is the official vendor website for the Signalyst DFF2DSF tool (the url= field confirms this is the upstream vendor). The binary is installed directly into /usr/bin without any compilation step. While signalyst.com appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor site, distributing and executing a prebuilt binary from any host — even the official vendor — carries inherent supply-chain risk: there is no source code to audit, no reproducible build, and compromise of the vendor's web server would silently deliver malicious code to users. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good value but does not protect against the vendor serving a different binary in the future or the host being compromised. This is a classic 'binary blob from vendor' pattern that warrants medium severity: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern since an opaque prebuilt binary is being installed system-wide.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted## Maintainer: AudioLinux <audiolinux AT fastmail DOT fm>
pkgname=dff2dsf
_debpkgver=1.2.2
pkgver=$_debpkgver
pkgrel=3
pkgdesc="Signalyst DFF to DSF command line conversion utility"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://www.signalyst.com"
license=('custom')
depends=('glibc' 'gcc-libs')
source=('https://signalyst.com/bins/dff2dsf-122.zip')
sha256sums=('77ae7297ee1a6efe72014c7ebfd68033be40fae0246e10fc35eb7a252dd1f685')
package() {
cd "$srcdir"
bsdtar -xf dff2dsf-122.zip -C "$srcdir"
install -Dm755 "$srcdir/linux-x64/dff2dsf" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/dff2dsf"
install -Dm644 "$srcdir/license.txt" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/COPYING"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |