digital-logic-sim-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer gro-david 2 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

A prebuilt x86_64 binary is downloaded from cdn.matix-media.net (a personal/unofficial CDN, not the upstream GitHub releases page) with 'SKIP' for its checksum, meaning there is zero integrity verification. The binary is then made executable and installed to /opt and /usr/bin. This is a genuine supply-chain risk: if the CDN host is compromised or the file is swapped, arbitrary code runs on the user's machine with no way to detect it. Additional issues: the PKGBUILD uses 'sudo' inside package(), which is non-standard and wrong, and the pkgver includes a 'v' prefix which is unconventional. However, there is no evidence of active malice — this looks like a sloppy but not intentionally malicious packaging of a legitimate open-source project (Sebastian Lague's Digital Logic Sim). The medium rating is correct: executed binary from an unofficial host with no checksum.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:10 source=("dls.zip::https://cdn.matix-media.net/dd/427fcef6" "dls.desktop" "dls-icon.jpg")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): A prebuilt x86_64 binary is downloaded from cdn.matix-media.net (a personal/unofficial CDN, not the upstream GitHub releases page) with 'SKIP' for its checksum, meaning there is zero integrity verification. The binary is then made executable and installed to /opt and /usr/bin. This is a genuine supply-chain risk: if the CDN host is compromised or the file is swapped, arbitrary code runs on the user's machine with no way to detect it. Additional issues: the PKGBUILD uses 'sudo' inside package(), which is non-standard and wrong, and the pkgver includes a 'v' prefix which is unconventional. However, there is no evidence of active malice — this looks like a sloppy but not intentionally malicious packaging of a legitimate open-source project (Sebastian Lague's Digital Logic Sim). The medium rating is correct: executed binary from an unofficial host with no checksum.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: David Gro <gro.david.d@gmail.com>
2pkgname=digital-logic-sim-bin
3pkgrel=1
4pkgver="v2.1.6"
5pkgdesc="The logic simulation used and developed by Sebastian Lague."
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://github.com/SebLague/Digital-Logic-Sim"
8license=("MIT")
9makedepends=("unzip")
10source=("dls.zip::https://cdn.matix-media.net/dd/427fcef6" "dls.desktop" "dls-icon.jpg")
11sha256sums=('SKIP'
12 'a347d30340f3b38cafa156745efef18e768794f73252c8585b2021b4b47b8535'
13 'be3af17e3a63ab19f9526da768e7cdb22242199ea5983593de300e88ba5d202d')
14
15DLAGENTS=("https::/usr/bin/wget --content-disposition -O %o %u")
16
17prepare() {
18 cd "$srcdir"
19
20 # Unzip the zip file
21 unzip "$srcdir/dls.zip" -d "$srcdir/Digital-Logic-Sim"
22}
23
24package() {
25 cd "$srcdir/Digital-Logic-Sim"
26
27 # Install the app to /opt
28 install -d "$pkgdir/opt/dls"
29 cp -r Digital-Logic-Sim/* "$pkgdir/opt/dls/"
30 sudo chmod +x "$pkgdir/opt/dls/Digital-Logic-Sim.x86_64"
31
32 # Create a launcher script in /usr/bin
33 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
34 cat >"$pkgdir/usr/bin/dls" <<EOF
35#!/bin/bash
36exec /opt/dls/Digital-Logic-Sim.x86_64 "\$@"
37EOF
38 chmod +x "$pkgdir/usr/bin/dls"
39
40 # Install the .desktop file
41 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/dls.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/dls.desktop"
42
43 # Install the icon
44 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/dls-icon.jpg" "$pkgdir/usr/share/pixmaps/dls-icon.jpg"
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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