divx265
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (DivX265) directly from download.divx.com — the official DivX/Rovi/Xperi download infrastructure — and installs it as an executable. While download.divx.com is the legitimate vendor host for DivX products, the binary is not accompanied by a GPG signature; only an MD5 checksum is used for integrity verification. MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides weak protection against targeted substitution. The binary is a closed-source, proprietary HEVC encoder distributed as a prebuilt executable, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the host were compromised or the file swapped, the weak checksum would not reliably detect it. The package is also quite old (v1.5.8, pkgrel=1) and the URL scheme suggests a direct binary download rather than a versioned release artifact. This is a genuine medium-risk pattern — executed proprietary binary with only MD5 integrity — but not clearly malicious, as the host is the official vendor domain.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=(DivX265::http://download.divx.com/hevc/DivX265_${_pkgver}
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (DivX265) directly from download.divx.com — the official DivX/Rovi/Xperi download infrastructure — and installs it as an executable. While download.divx.com is the legitimate vendor host for DivX products, the binary is not accompanied by a GPG signature; only an MD5 checksum is used for integrity verification. MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides weak protection against targeted substitution. The binary is a closed-source, proprietary HEVC encoder distributed as a prebuilt executable, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the host were compromised or the file swapped, the weak checksum would not reliably detect it. The package is also quite old (v1.5.8, pkgrel=1) and the URL scheme suggests a direct binary download rather than a versioned release artifact. This is a genuine medium-risk pattern — executed proprietary binary with only MD5 integrity — but not clearly malicious, as the host is the official vendor domain.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: <kfgz at interia dot pl>
pkgname=divx265
pkgver=1.5.8
_pkgver="${pkgver:0:1}_${pkgver:2:1}_${pkgver:4:1}"
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Free for non commercial use H265/HEVC video encoder"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="http://labs.divx.com/divx265/"
license=('other')
options=(!strip)
source=(DivX265::http://download.divx.com/hevc/DivX265_${_pkgver}
DivX265.1)
md5sums=('3cb04e8cf69ad7d63e5001c882f2b4a3'
'd24e50a151d8951b0e996ce60b70c6d4')
if [[ $CARCH == i686 ]]; then
depends=(gcc-libs)
else
depends=(lib32-gcc-libs)
fi
package() {
install -Dm755 "${srcdir}"/DivX265 "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/DivX265
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}"/DivX265.1 "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/man/man1/divx265.1
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |