divx265

MEDIUM
maintainer maz-1 8 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (DivX265) directly from download.divx.com — the official DivX/Rovi/Xperi download infrastructure — and installs it as an executable. While download.divx.com is the legitimate vendor host for DivX products, the binary is not accompanied by a GPG signature; only an MD5 checksum is used for integrity verification. MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides weak protection against targeted substitution. The binary is a closed-source, proprietary HEVC encoder distributed as a prebuilt executable, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the host were compromised or the file swapped, the weak checksum would not reliably detect it. The package is also quite old (v1.5.8, pkgrel=1) and the URL scheme suggests a direct binary download rather than a versioned release artifact. This is a genuine medium-risk pattern — executed proprietary binary with only MD5 integrity — but not clearly malicious, as the host is the official vendor domain.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=(DivX265::http://download.divx.com/hevc/DivX265_${_pkgver}
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (DivX265) directly from download.divx.com — the official DivX/Rovi/Xperi download infrastructure — and installs it as an executable. While download.divx.com is the legitimate vendor host for DivX products, the binary is not accompanied by a GPG signature; only an MD5 checksum is used for integrity verification. MD5 is cryptographically broken and provides weak protection against targeted substitution. The binary is a closed-source, proprietary HEVC encoder distributed as a prebuilt executable, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the host were compromised or the file swapped, the weak checksum would not reliably detect it. The package is also quite old (v1.5.8, pkgrel=1) and the URL scheme suggests a direct binary download rather than a versioned release artifact. This is a genuine medium-risk pattern — executed proprietary binary with only MD5 integrity — but not clearly malicious, as the host is the official vendor domain.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: <kfgz at interia dot pl>
2
3pkgname=divx265
4pkgver=1.5.8
5_pkgver="${pkgver:0:1}_${pkgver:2:1}_${pkgver:4:1}"
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="Free for non commercial use H265/HEVC video encoder"
8arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
9url="http://labs.divx.com/divx265/"
10license=('other')
11options=(!strip)
12source=(DivX265::http://download.divx.com/hevc/DivX265_${_pkgver}
13 DivX265.1)
14md5sums=('3cb04e8cf69ad7d63e5001c882f2b4a3'
15 'd24e50a151d8951b0e996ce60b70c6d4')
16
17if [[ $CARCH == i686 ]]; then
18 depends=(gcc-libs)
19 else
20 depends=(lib32-gcc-libs)
21fi
22
23package() {
24 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}"/DivX265 "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/DivX265
25 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}"/DivX265.1 "${pkgdir}"/usr/share/man/man1/divx265.1
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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