doctotext-bin

maintainer dracorp · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball from silvercoders.com, which is the official vendor website for the DocToText product. The URL pattern and product page match the upstream vendor. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary (not source-built) is fetched from a small commercial vendor's own server over plain HTTP (no TLS), and installed directly into /opt. The sha256sums provide integrity checking, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat, but the HTTP download means the checksum itself could be bypassed by a MITM if the PKGBUILD were modified. The binary is executed at runtime as a document converter. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: an executed binary from a non-major distribution platform (even if it is the legitimate vendor), installed without source verification. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern given the non-HTTPS download and opaque prebuilt binary.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:21 source=(http://silvercoders.com/download/doctotext-${pkgver}.${_pkgver}-${_arch}-linux.tar.bz2)

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball from silvercoders.com, which is the official vendor website for the DocToText product. The URL pattern and product page match the upstream vendor. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary (not source-built) is fetched from a small commercial vendor's own server over plain HTTP (no TLS), and installed directly into /opt. The sha256sums provide integrity checking, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat, but the HTTP download means the checksum itself could be bypassed by a MITM if the PKGBUILD were modified. The binary is executed at runtime as a document converter. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: an executed binary from a non-major distribution platform (even if it is the legitimate vendor), installed without source verification. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern given the non-HTTPS download and opaque prebuilt binary.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et ft=sh tw=100: expandtab
    
      2# Maintainer: Piotr Rogoża <rogoza dot piotr at gmail dot com>
    
      3# Contributor: Piotr Rogoża <rogoza dot piotr at gmail dot com>
    
      4
    
      5pkgname=doctotext-bin
    
      6_pkgname=doctotext
    
      7pkgver=4.0
    
      8_pkgver=838
    
      9pkgrel=1
    
      10pkgdesc='A powerful utility that can convert documents in many formats to plain text.'
    
      11arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
    
      12url='http://silvercoders.com/en/products/doctotext/'
    
      13license=('GPL')
    
      14depends=(libxml2 gcc-libs)
    
      15options=(!strip)
    
      16install=''
    
      17#CARCH=x86_64
    
      18case $CARCH in
    
      19  i686)
    
      20    _arch=x86
    
      21    source=(http://silvercoders.com/download/doctotext-${pkgver}.${_pkgver}-${_arch}-linux.tar.bz2)
    
      22    sha256sums=('10e9e666993b151447dc76003c78763c67bd99590cb4801db2b62be31e7b8ee6')
    
      23    ;;
    
      24  x86_64)
    
      25    _pkgver=882
    
      26    _arch=$CARCH
    
      27    source=(http://silvercoders.com/download/doctotext-${pkgver}.${_pkgver}-${_arch}-linux.tar.bz2)
    
      28    sha256sums=('c9683d6fc588c75173d1ee263c37b7ba0e26af8347f7b538ae24d976563d88a8')
    
      29    ;;
    
      30esac
    
      31package(){
    
      32  cd "$srcdir"/$_pkgname
    
      33
    
      34  install -dm755 $pkgdir/opt/doctotext
    
      35  cp -r ./ $pkgdir/opt/doctotext/
    
      36  install -Dm755 doctotext.sh $pkgdir/usr/bin/doctotext
    
      37
    
      38  sed -e 's#\.#/opt/doctotext#' -e 's#\./#/opt/doctotext/#' -i \
    
      39    $pkgdir/usr/bin/doctotext
    
      40}
    
      41

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2