doctotext-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball from silvercoders.com, which is the official vendor website for the DocToText product. The URL pattern and product page match the upstream vendor. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary (not source-built) is fetched from a small commercial vendor's own server over plain HTTP (no TLS), and installed directly into /opt. The sha256sums provide integrity checking, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat, but the HTTP download means the checksum itself could be bypassed by a MITM if the PKGBUILD were modified. The binary is executed at runtime as a document converter. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: an executed binary from a non-major distribution platform (even if it is the legitimate vendor), installed without source verification. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern given the non-HTTPS download and opaque prebuilt binary.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:21
source=(http://silvercoders.com/download/doctotext-${pkgver}.${_pkgver}-${_arch}-linux.tar.bz2)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary tarball from silvercoders.com, which is the official vendor website for the DocToText product. The URL pattern and product page match the upstream vendor. However, the concern is real: a prebuilt binary (not source-built) is fetched from a small commercial vendor's own server over plain HTTP (no TLS), and installed directly into /opt. The sha256sums provide integrity checking, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat, but the HTTP download means the checksum itself could be bypassed by a MITM if the PKGBUILD were modified. The binary is executed at runtime as a document converter. This is a classic medium-risk pattern: an executed binary from a non-major distribution platform (even if it is the legitimate vendor), installed without source verification. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern given the non-HTTPS download and opaque prebuilt binary.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et ft=sh tw=100: expandtab
# Maintainer: Piotr Rogoża <rogoza dot piotr at gmail dot com>
# Contributor: Piotr Rogoża <rogoza dot piotr at gmail dot com>
pkgname=doctotext-bin
_pkgname=doctotext
pkgver=4.0
_pkgver=838
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='A powerful utility that can convert documents in many formats to plain text.'
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url='http://silvercoders.com/en/products/doctotext/'
license=('GPL')
depends=(libxml2 gcc-libs)
options=(!strip)
install=''
#CARCH=x86_64
case $CARCH in
i686)
_arch=x86
source=(http://silvercoders.com/download/doctotext-${pkgver}.${_pkgver}-${_arch}-linux.tar.bz2)
sha256sums=('10e9e666993b151447dc76003c78763c67bd99590cb4801db2b62be31e7b8ee6')
;;
x86_64)
_pkgver=882
_arch=$CARCH
source=(http://silvercoders.com/download/doctotext-${pkgver}.${_pkgver}-${_arch}-linux.tar.bz2)
sha256sums=('c9683d6fc588c75173d1ee263c37b7ba0e26af8347f7b538ae24d976563d88a8')
;;
esac
package(){
cd "$srcdir"/$_pkgname
install -dm755 $pkgdir/opt/doctotext
cp -r ./ $pkgdir/opt/doctotext/
install -Dm755 doctotext.sh $pkgdir/usr/bin/doctotext
sed -e 's#\.#/opt/doctotext#' -e 's#\./#/opt/doctotext/#' -i \
$pkgdir/usr/bin/doctotext
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |