doomsday-bin

maintainer orphaned · 4 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt x86_64 RPM binary from api.dengine.net, which is the official Doomsday Engine API/build server (dengine.net is the project's own domain). The URL pattern 'http://api.dengine.net/1/builds?dl=...' is the official Doomsday Engine build distribution endpoint used by the project. However, several concerns remain: (1) the download uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), making it vulnerable to MITM substitution in transit; (2) it is a prebuilt binary RPM being extracted and installed directly, so any compromise of the dengine.net build server would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system; (3) the sha256sum provides integrity verification, which mitigates the HTTP concern somewhat. The host itself is the legitimate upstream vendor, not a personal or unofficial host, so this is closer to clean than a true supply-chain risk. The main residual concern is the HTTP-only transport for an executed binary. Overall this is a low-to-medium concern: the host is official, the checksum is present, but HTTP transport for a binary package is a real (if modest) security weakness.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:19 source=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-1.x86_64.rpm::http://api.dengine.net/1/builds?dl=${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-1.x86_64.rpm")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt x86_64 RPM binary from api.dengine.net, which is the official Doomsday Engine API/build server (dengine.net is the project's own domain). The URL pattern 'http://api.dengine.net/1/builds?dl=...' is the official Doomsday Engine build distribution endpoint used by the project. However, several concerns remain: (1) the download uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), making it vulnerable to MITM substitution in transit; (2) it is a prebuilt binary RPM being extracted and installed directly, so any compromise of the dengine.net build server would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system; (3) the sha256sum provides integrity verification, which mitigates the HTTP concern somewhat. The host itself is the legitimate upstream vendor, not a personal or unofficial host, so this is closer to clean than a true supply-chain risk. The main residual concern is the HTTP-only transport for an executed binary. Overall this is a low-to-medium concern: the host is official, the checksum is present, but HTTP transport for a binary package is a real (if modest) security weakness.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Parker Reed <parker.l.reed@gmail.com>
    
      2# Valerio Pizzi (Pival81) <pival81@yahoo.com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=doomsday-bin
    
      5_pkgname=doomsday
    
      6pkgver=2.3.1
    
      7pkgrel=1
    
      8pkgdesc="An advanced Doom engine that supports DOOM, Heretic and Hexen."
    
      9url="http://dengine.net/"
    
      10arch=('x86_64')
    
      11license=('GPL2')
    
      12conflicts=('doomsday2-unstable' 'i686-doomsday2-unstable' 'doomsday')
    
      13depends=('qt5-base' 'qt5-x11extras' 'sdl2_net' 'sdl2_mixer' 'fmodex' 'python-wxpython' 'assimp' 'fluidsynth' 'soundfont-fluid')
    
      14conflicts=('doomsday')
    
      15provides=('doomsday')
    
      16optdepends=('doom1-wad: Doom shareware', 
    
      17            'heretic1-wad: Heretic shareware', 
    
      18            'hexen1-wad: Hexen shareware')
    
      19source=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-1.x86_64.rpm::http://api.dengine.net/1/builds?dl=${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-1.x86_64.rpm")
    
      20sha256sums=('04312dd2373e4cf8c6e13d7206e267af6a562fd6caeb884fcba75ba34ba48112')
    
      21
    
      22package() {
    
      23	cd $pkgdir
    
      24	bsdtar -xf $srcdir/${_pkgname}-${pkgver}-1.x86_64.rpm
    
      25	mv usr/lib64 usr/lib
    
      26	rm -rf usr/include/assimp
    
      27}
    
      28

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2