dotctl

maintainer zepyx · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged Multiple real concerns here: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means the source tarball is never verified, so a compromised upstream release could go undetected. (2) `pipx install nuitka` during build() fetches Nuitka from PyPI at build time with no pinned version and no integrity check — a compromised or typosquatted PyPI package would execute arbitrary code during the build. (3) `--assume-yes-for-downloads` tells Nuitka to silently download additional components (e.g. the C runtime, MinGW on Windows, or other deps) without user confirmation, further expanding the unverified download surface. (4) The result is a compiled binary installed to /usr/bin with no checksum. Together these constitute a genuine supply-chain risk: unverified source + unpinned runtime build-tool fetched from the network + auto-downloading compiler components = real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM External install via pipx/uv/poetry/cargo/go/gem alt_pkg_manager_install

A non-pip/npm package manager (pipx, uv, poetry, cargo install, go install, gem, conda…) fetches and builds an external package at build time, outside source=() and makepkg's checksums.

PKGBUILD:19 pipx install nuitka || true

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): Multiple real concerns here: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means the source tarball is never verified, so a compromised upstream release could go undetected. (2) `pipx install nuitka` during build() fetches Nuitka from PyPI at build time with no pinned version and no integrity check — a compromised or typosquatted PyPI package would execute arbitrary code during the build. (3) `--assume-yes-for-downloads` tells Nuitka to silently download additional components (e.g. the C runtime, MinGW on Windows, or other deps) without user confirmation, further expanding the unverified download surface. (4) The result is a compiled binary installed to /usr/bin with no checksum. Together these constitute a genuine supply-chain risk: unverified source + unpinned runtime build-tool fetched from the network + auto-downloading compiler components = real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1pkgname=dotctl
    
      2pkgver=0.1.0
    
      3pkgrel=2
    
      4pkgdesc="dotctl - simple dotfiles control utility"
    
      5arch=("x86_64")
    
      6options=(!strip)
    
      7url="https://github.com/xZepyx/dotctl"
    
      8license=("MIT")
    
      9depends=("python")
    
      10makedepends=("python-pipx" "patchelf")
    
      11source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/xZepyx/dotctl/archive/refs/tags/v$pkgver.tar.gz")
    
      12sha256sums=("SKIP")
    
      13
    
      14build() {
    
      15    cd "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/src"
    
      16
    
      17    export PATH="$PATH:$HOME/.local/bin"
    
      18
    
      19    pipx install nuitka || true
    
      20
    
      21    nuitka \
    
      22        --onefile \
    
      23        --assume-yes-for-downloads \
    
      24        dotctl.py
    
      25}
    
      26
    
      27package() {
    
      28    install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/src/dotctl.bin" \
    
      29        "$pkgdir/usr/bin/dotctl"
    
      30}
    
      31

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2