dotctl

MEDIUM

maintainer zepyx 1 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

Multiple real concerns here: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means the source tarball is never verified, so a compromised upstream release could go undetected. (2) `pipx install nuitka` during build() fetches Nuitka from PyPI at build time with no pinned version and no integrity check — a compromised or typosquatted PyPI package would execute arbitrary code during the build. (3) `--assume-yes-for-downloads` tells Nuitka to silently download additional components (e.g. the C runtime, MinGW on Windows, or other deps) without user confirmation, further expanding the unverified download surface. (4) The result is a compiled binary installed to /usr/bin with no checksum. Together these constitute a genuine supply-chain risk: unverified source + unpinned runtime build-tool fetched from the network + auto-downloading compiler components = real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium External install via pipx/uv/poetry/cargo/go/gem alt_pkg_manager_install

A non-pip/npm package manager (pipx, uv, poetry, cargo install, go install, gem, conda…) fetches and builds an external package at build time, outside source=() and makepkg's checksums.

PKGBUILD:19 pipx install nuitka || true

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): Multiple real concerns here: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means the source tarball is never verified, so a compromised upstream release could go undetected. (2) `pipx install nuitka` during build() fetches Nuitka from PyPI at build time with no pinned version and no integrity check — a compromised or typosquatted PyPI package would execute arbitrary code during the build. (3) `--assume-yes-for-downloads` tells Nuitka to silently download additional components (e.g. the C runtime, MinGW on Windows, or other deps) without user confirmation, further expanding the unverified download surface. (4) The result is a compiled binary installed to /usr/bin with no checksum. Together these constitute a genuine supply-chain risk: unverified source + unpinned runtime build-tool fetched from the network + auto-downloading compiler components = real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1pkgname=dotctl
    
      2pkgver=0.1.0
    
      3pkgrel=2
    
      4pkgdesc="dotctl - simple dotfiles control utility"
    
      5arch=("x86_64")
    
      6options=(!strip)
    
      7url="https://github.com/xZepyx/dotctl"
    
      8license=("MIT")
    
      9depends=("python")
    
      10makedepends=("python-pipx" "patchelf")
    
      11source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/xZepyx/dotctl/archive/refs/tags/v$pkgver.tar.gz")
    
      12sha256sums=("SKIP")
    
      13
    
      14build() {
    
      15    cd "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/src"
    
      16
    
      17    export PATH="$PATH:$HOME/.local/bin"
    
      18
    
      19    pipx install nuitka || true
    
      20
    
      21    nuitka \
    
      22        --onefile \
    
      23        --assume-yes-for-downloads \
    
      24        dotctl.py
    
      25}
    
      26
    
      27package() {
    
      28    install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/src/dotctl.bin" \
    
      29        "$pkgdir/usr/bin/dotctl"
    
      30}
    
      31

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2