dotctl

MEDIUM

maintainer zepyx 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

Multiple real concerns here: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means the source tarball is never verified, so a compromised upstream release could go undetected. (2) `pipx install nuitka` during build() fetches Nuitka from PyPI at build time with no pinned version and no integrity check — a compromised or typosquatted PyPI package would execute arbitrary code during the build. (3) `--assume-yes-for-downloads` tells Nuitka to silently download additional components (e.g. the C runtime, MinGW on Windows, or other deps) without user confirmation, further expanding the unverified download surface. (4) The result is a compiled binary installed to /usr/bin with no checksum. Together these constitute a genuine supply-chain risk: unverified source + unpinned runtime build-tool fetched from the network + auto-downloading compiler components = real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium External install via pipx/uv/poetry/cargo/go/gem alt_pkg_manager_install

A non-pip/npm package manager (pipx, uv, poetry, cargo install, go install, gem, conda…) fetches and builds an external package at build time, outside source=() and makepkg's checksums.

PKGBUILD:19 pipx install nuitka || true

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): Multiple real concerns here: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means the source tarball is never verified, so a compromised upstream release could go undetected. (2) `pipx install nuitka` during build() fetches Nuitka from PyPI at build time with no pinned version and no integrity check — a compromised or typosquatted PyPI package would execute arbitrary code during the build. (3) `--assume-yes-for-downloads` tells Nuitka to silently download additional components (e.g. the C runtime, MinGW on Windows, or other deps) without user confirmation, further expanding the unverified download surface. (4) The result is a compiled binary installed to /usr/bin with no checksum. Together these constitute a genuine supply-chain risk: unverified source + unpinned runtime build-tool fetched from the network + auto-downloading compiler components = real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1pkgname=dotctl
    
      2pkgver=0.1.0
    
      3pkgrel=2
    
      4pkgdesc="dotctl - simple dotfiles control utility"
    
      5arch=("x86_64")
    
      6options=(!strip)
    
      7url="https://github.com/xZepyx/dotctl"
    
      8license=("MIT")
    
      9depends=("python")
    
      10makedepends=("python-pipx" "patchelf")
    
      11source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/xZepyx/dotctl/archive/refs/tags/v$pkgver.tar.gz")
    
      12sha256sums=("SKIP")
    
      13
    
      14build() {
    
      15    cd "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/src"
    
      16
    
      17    export PATH="$PATH:$HOME/.local/bin"
    
      18
    
      19    pipx install nuitka || true
    
      20
    
      21    nuitka \
    
      22        --onefile \
    
      23        --assume-yes-for-downloads \
    
      24        dotctl.py
    
      25}
    
      26
    
      27package() {
    
      28    install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/src/dotctl.bin" \
    
      29        "$pkgdir/usr/bin/dotctl"
    
      30}
    
      31

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2