dpatch
The source is a prebuilt Debian .deb package pulled from http.debian.net, which is the official Debian HTTP redirector/mirror network (a legitimate Debian infrastructure host, not a personal or unofficial host). The package is an 'any'-arch Perl/shell script package (dpatch), not a native binary, so the risk from the prebuilt artifact is lower than for compiled code. A sha256sum is provided and pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks at the mirror level. The main concerns are: (1) http:// rather than https:// means the download is not transport-encrypted, but the sha256 check compensates; (2) extracting a .deb directly with dpkg-deb and installing its contents into pkgdir is non-standard but not malicious. Overall this is sloppy/non-standard packaging (pulling from Debian instead of building from source) but not a genuine supply-chain threat given the hash pin and the nature of the content.
Triggered rules
llm_review
The static rules flagged this MEDIUM, but an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it LOW (confidence 82%): The source is a prebuilt Debian .deb package pulled from http.debian.net, which is the official Debian HTTP redirector/mirror network (a legitimate Debian infrastructure host, not a personal or unofficial host). The package is an 'any'-arch Perl/shell script package (dpatch), not a native binary, so the risk from the prebuilt artifact is lower than for compiled code. A sha256sum is provided and pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks at the mirror level. The main concerns are: (1) http:// rather than https:// means the download is not transport-encrypted, but the sha256 check compensates; (2) extracting a .deb directly with dpkg-deb and installing its contents into pkgdir is non-standard but not malicious. Overall this is sloppy/non-standard packaging (pulling from Debian instead of building from source) but not a genuine supply-chain threat given the hash pin and the nature of the content.
1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:36
"dpatch_${_pkgver}${_deblevel}_all.deb::http://http.debian.net/debian/pool/main/d/dpatch/dpatch_${_pkgver}${_deblevel}_all.deb"
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted#!/bin/bash
pkgname=dpatch
_pkgver="2.0.41"
_deblevel=""
pkgver="${_pkgver}${_deblevel}"
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="A easy to use patch system for Debian packages, somewhat similar to the dbs package, but much simpler to use."
url="https://packages.debian.org/stable/dpatch"
license=('GPL2')
arch=(
'any'
)
depends=(
'debhelper'
'dpkg'
'make'
'perl'
)
makedepends=()
optdepends=(
'fakeroot'
'patchutils'
'curl'
)
provides=()
replaces=()
conflicts=()
options=('emptydirs')
source=(
"dpatch_${_pkgver}${_deblevel}_all.deb::http://http.debian.net/debian/pool/main/d/dpatch/dpatch_${_pkgver}${_deblevel}_all.deb"
)
sha256sums=(
'267461f5998ad7472aeb50f7d66708518d51923ca79bb16a3726e24e5ab3a8b2'
)
noextract=(
"dpatch_${_pkgver}${_deblevel}_all.deb"
)
package() {
cd "${srcdir}"
msg "Extracting files with dpkg-deb to \$pkgdir ..."
dpkg-deb -x "dpatch_${_pkgver}${_deblevel}_all.deb" "${pkgdir}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Low | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Low | 2 |