drupalconsole
The PKGBUILD downloads a PHP installer script from drupalconsole.com/installer — the official Drupal Console project website — and installs it as an executable binary at /usr/bin/drupal. While drupalconsole.com is the legitimate upstream vendor site (not a personal or unofficial host), the concern is real: this is a single-file executable script fetched directly from a live URL on a non-forge host with no versioned path (the URL is just /installer, not pinned to a specific release artifact). If the domain were compromised or the file silently replaced, the sha512sum would catch it — but only if the checksum itself was captured from a trustworthy state. The sha512sum is present and non-trivial, which mitigates the risk somewhat. The pattern (vendor-hosted installer script, executed directly) is a legitimate medium supply-chain concern: it's an executed artifact from a non-standard host with no versioned URL, even if the domain is the official project site. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver//_/-}"::"https://drupalconsole.com/installer")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a PHP installer script from drupalconsole.com/installer — the official Drupal Console project website — and installs it as an executable binary at /usr/bin/drupal. While drupalconsole.com is the legitimate upstream vendor site (not a personal or unofficial host), the concern is real: this is a single-file executable script fetched directly from a live URL on a non-forge host with no versioned path (the URL is just /installer, not pinned to a specific release artifact). If the domain were compromised or the file silently replaced, the sha512sum would catch it — but only if the checksum itself was captured from a trustworthy state. The sha512sum is present and non-trivial, which mitigates the risk somewhat. The pattern (vendor-hosted installer script, executed directly) is a legitimate medium supply-chain concern: it's an executed artifact from a non-standard host with no versioned URL, even if the domain is the official project site. Not clearly malicious, but not clean either.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Stefan Auditor <stefan.auditor@erdfisch.de>
# Please report issues at https://github.com/sanduhrs/arch-aur-drupalconsole
_pkgname=drupalconsole
pkgname=${_pkgname}
pkgver=1.9.10
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="The Drupal Console is a suite of tools that you run on a command line interface (CLI) to generate boilerplate code and interact with a Drupal 8 installation."
arch=('any')
url="http://drupalconsole.com/"
license=('GPL')
depends=('php>=5.9.5')
install="${_pkgname}.install"
source=("${_pkgname}-${pkgver//_/-}"::"https://drupalconsole.com/installer")
sha512sums=('a58e78621b9e1bccb181641682c2c66356b2559638ebe2272c0d8f9302e4f973b70a77d2ce5f7e83e346d475ad4ab95fc90a77c0b09c40908af0c8d1c9597147')
package() {
install -D -m755 "${_pkgname}-${pkgver//_/-}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/drupal"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |