dudenbib

MEDIUM
maintainer bwrst 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary .deb binary from cdn.duden.de (the official Duden CDN, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. While cdn.duden.de is the vendor's own CDN for Duden software distribution, it is not a standard upstream release host like GitHub releases or a distro mirror, and the package installs a closed-source binary blob without source verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). The binary is extracted and executed/installed into /opt and /usr, including a postinst script. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: if the CDN were compromised or the URL redirected, a malicious binary would be installed with 755 permissions. The use of MD5 rather than SHA-256 weakens integrity guarantees. However, cdn.duden.de is the legitimate vendor CDN for this commercial software, so this is closer to a legitimate vendor binary package than a truly unofficial host — the risk is real but not elevated to a clear attack.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://cdn.duden.de/downloads/proxy/duden_bibliothek-update-6.5/$FILE")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary .deb binary from cdn.duden.de (the official Duden CDN, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. While cdn.duden.de is the vendor's own CDN for Duden software distribution, it is not a standard upstream release host like GitHub releases or a distro mirror, and the package installs a closed-source binary blob without source verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). The binary is extracted and executed/installed into /opt and /usr, including a postinst script. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: if the CDN were compromised or the URL redirected, a malicious binary would be installed with 755 permissions. The use of MD5 rather than SHA-256 weakens integrity guarantees. However, cdn.duden.de is the legitimate vendor CDN for this commercial software, so this is closer to a legitimate vendor binary package than a truly unofficial host — the risk is real but not elevated to a clear attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Contributor: Steff <archuserrepository at gmx dot de>
2# Contributor: Felix <flx.bier at googlemail dot com>
3
4pkgname=dudenbib
5pkgver=6.5.2
6pkgrel=2
7arch=('x86_64')
8pkgdesc="Utility to view books from Duden, Brockhaus and some others"
9url="https://www.duden.de/digitales/duden-bibliothek"
10license=('custom:dudenbib')
11install=duden.install
12depends=('libxmu' 'libxft' 'libxcursor' 'libxrandr' 'gcc-libs' 'libxi' 'libxinerama' 'libxcb' 'xcb-util-cursor')
13FILE="dudenbibliothek6_6.5.2.0_amd64.deb"
14source=("https://cdn.duden.de/downloads/proxy/duden_bibliothek-update-6.5/$FILE")
15noextract=("$FILE")
16md5sums=('0086cb9b3e39c40fcb858b542af5a3d4')
17package() {
18 ar -x $FILE data.tar.zst control.tar.zst
19 tar -xf data.tar.zst -C "$pkgdir"
20 tar -xf control.tar.zst
21
22 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/opt"
23 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/usr"
24
25 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/postinst" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/dudenbib/postinst"
26}
27
28

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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