dudenbib

maintainer bwrst · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary .deb binary from cdn.duden.de (the official Duden CDN, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. While cdn.duden.de is the vendor's own CDN for Duden software distribution, it is not a standard upstream release host like GitHub releases or a distro mirror, and the package installs a closed-source binary blob without source verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). The binary is extracted and executed/installed into /opt and /usr, including a postinst script. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: if the CDN were compromised or the URL redirected, a malicious binary would be installed with 755 permissions. The use of MD5 rather than SHA-256 weakens integrity guarantees. However, cdn.duden.de is the legitimate vendor CDN for this commercial software, so this is closer to a legitimate vendor binary package than a truly unofficial host — the risk is real but not elevated to a clear attack.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://cdn.duden.de/downloads/proxy/duden_bibliothek-update-6.5/$FILE")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt proprietary .deb binary from cdn.duden.de (the official Duden CDN, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. While cdn.duden.de is the vendor's own CDN for Duden software distribution, it is not a standard upstream release host like GitHub releases or a distro mirror, and the package installs a closed-source binary blob without source verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak). The binary is extracted and executed/installed into /opt and /usr, including a postinst script. This constitutes a real supply-chain concern: if the CDN were compromised or the URL redirected, a malicious binary would be installed with 755 permissions. The use of MD5 rather than SHA-256 weakens integrity guarantees. However, cdn.duden.de is the legitimate vendor CDN for this commercial software, so this is closer to a legitimate vendor binary package than a truly unofficial host — the risk is real but not elevated to a clear attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Contributor: Steff <archuserrepository at gmx dot de>
    
      2# Contributor: Felix <flx.bier at googlemail dot com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=dudenbib
    
      5pkgver=6.5.2
    
      6pkgrel=2
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8pkgdesc="Utility to view books from Duden, Brockhaus and some others"
    
      9url="https://www.duden.de/digitales/duden-bibliothek"
    
      10license=('custom:dudenbib')
    
      11install=duden.install
    
      12depends=('libxmu' 'libxft' 'libxcursor' 'libxrandr' 'gcc-libs' 'libxi' 'libxinerama' 'libxcb' 'xcb-util-cursor')
    
      13FILE="dudenbibliothek6_6.5.2.0_amd64.deb"
    
      14source=("https://cdn.duden.de/downloads/proxy/duden_bibliothek-update-6.5/$FILE")
    
      15noextract=("$FILE")
    
      16md5sums=('0086cb9b3e39c40fcb858b542af5a3d4')
    
      17package() {
    
      18  ar -x $FILE data.tar.zst control.tar.zst
    
      19  tar -xf data.tar.zst -C "$pkgdir"
    
      20  tar -xf control.tar.zst
    
      21
    
      22  chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/opt"
    
      23  chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/usr"
    
      24
    
      25  install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/postinst" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/dudenbib/postinst"
    
      26}
    
      27
    
      28

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2