duelsplus

MEDIUM
maintainer leeteral 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from launcher-updates.duelsplus.com, which is the project's own update/distribution host rather than a well-known package registry or GitHub releases. The AppImage is then extracted and installed as an executable. While a sha256sum is pinned (providing integrity at build time), the host is a project-controlled server that could silently serve a different binary if the domain or infrastructure were compromised, and there is no GPG signature verification. This is a classic supply-chain concern for AUR packages distributing prebuilt binaries from unofficial/personal hosts. The package itself appears to be a legitimate Minecraft proxy client tool, not malware, but the risk pattern (executed binary from a non-standard host, no signature check) warrants medium severity.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source=("${_appimage}::https://launcher-updates.duelsplus.com/download/flavor/default/${pkgver}/linux_64/${_appimage}")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from launcher-updates.duelsplus.com, which is the project's own update/distribution host rather than a well-known package registry or GitHub releases. The AppImage is then extracted and installed as an executable. While a sha256sum is pinned (providing integrity at build time), the host is a project-controlled server that could silently serve a different binary if the domain or infrastructure were compromised, and there is no GPG signature verification. This is a classic supply-chain concern for AUR packages distributing prebuilt binaries from unofficial/personal hosts. The package itself appears to be a legitimate Minecraft proxy client tool, not malware, but the risk pattern (executed binary from a non-standard host, no signature check) warrants medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: kneesdev <kneesdev@naver.com>
2pkgname=duelsplus
3_pkgname=duelsplus
4pkgver=2.8.4
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Lightweight, custom Minecraft Proxy designed to enhance your experience on Hypixel Duels."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://duelsplus.com"
9license=('MIT')
10depends=('fuse2')
11options=(!strip !debug)
12provides=('duelsplus')
13conflicts=('duelsplus-bin')
14_appimage="Duels+-${pkgver}-x64.AppImage"
15source=("${_appimage}::https://launcher-updates.duelsplus.com/download/flavor/default/${pkgver}/linux_64/${_appimage}")
16sha256sums=('87c302b773722cc555ff63590d60ab1cb08fefcec3c1b1b666f1a229a50a3f4a')
17
18prepare() {
19 chmod +x "${_appimage}"
20 ./"${_appimage}" --appimage-extract
21}
22
23build() {
24 sed -i -E \
25 "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=env DESKTOPINTEGRATION=false /usr/bin/${_pkgname}|" \
26 "squashfs-root/Duels+.desktop"
27 chmod -R a-x+rX squashfs-root/usr
28}
29
30package() {
31 install -Dm755 \
32 "${srcdir}/${_appimage}" \
33 "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
34
35 install -Dm644 \
36 "squashfs-root/Duels+.desktop" \
37 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
38
39 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps"
40 install -Dm644 \
41 "squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps/duelsplus-launcher.png" \
42 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps/duelsplus-launcher.png"
43
44 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
45 ln -s \
46 /usr/bin/duelsplus-launcher \
47 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/duelsplus"
48 ln -s \
49 "/opt/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}.AppImage" \
50 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/duelsplus-launcher"
51}
52

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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