dust-emu-bin

maintainer kojq · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary from nightly.link, which serves CI artifacts from GitHub Actions workflows. While nightly.link is a legitimate third-party service that proxies GitHub Actions artifacts, there are real concerns: (1) the binary is a prebuilt executable installed directly to /usr/bin with no integrity verification (sha256sums=SKIP), (2) nightly.link is not the upstream vendor's own distribution channel — it's a third-party service that could theoretically serve different content, (3) CI artifacts are ephemeral and can be replaced/rotated, and (4) there's no way to pin to a specific known-good build. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-official host with no checksum verification. The GitHub Actions workflow itself could also be modified to produce malicious artifacts. This fits the medium category: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern due to unverified prebuilt binary from an unofficial redistribution host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:8 source=(https://nightly.link/kelpsyberry/dust/workflows/build-release/main/Linux.zip)

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary from nightly.link, which serves CI artifacts from GitHub Actions workflows. While nightly.link is a legitimate third-party service that proxies GitHub Actions artifacts, there are real concerns: (1) the binary is a prebuilt executable installed directly to /usr/bin with no integrity verification (sha256sums=SKIP), (2) nightly.link is not the upstream vendor's own distribution channel — it's a third-party service that could theoretically serve different content, (3) CI artifacts are ephemeral and can be replaced/rotated, and (4) there's no way to pin to a specific known-good build. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-official host with no checksum verification. The GitHub Actions workflow itself could also be modified to produce malicious artifacts. This fits the medium category: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern due to unverified prebuilt binary from an unofficial redistribution host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: kojq <kojq@mailfence.com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=dust-emu-bin
    
      4pkgver=0.0.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc='A Nintendo DS emulator written in Rust for desktop devices and the web, with debugging features and a focus on accuracy'
    
      7url=https://github.com/kelpsyberry/dust
    
      8source=(https://nightly.link/kelpsyberry/dust/workflows/build-release/main/Linux.zip)
    
      9license=(GPL-3.0)
    
      10arch=(x86_64)
    
      11conflicts=(dust-emu dust-emu-git)
    
      12provides=(dust-emu)
    
      13sha256sums=(SKIP)
    
      14
    
      15prepare() {
    
      16  cd $srcdir
    
      17  tar -xf dust-desktop.tar.gz
    
      18}
    
      19
    
      20package() {
    
      21  cd $srcdir
    
      22  install -Dm755 dust-desktop $pkgdir/usr/bin/dust-desktop
    
      23}
    
      24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2