easyconnect-sdu
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (EasyConnect_x64.deb) from download.sangfor.com.cn, which is Sangfor's official vendor download host for their SSL VPN client. While this is the legitimate vendor, the binary is a closed-source executable installed directly onto the system, and the source URL uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the download is not transport-protected. The md5sum check provides weak integrity verification (MD5 is cryptographically broken). The package also compiles pango 1.42.4 from source (from the official GNOME FTP mirror) and installs it into a private path to satisfy the old binary's library dependencies. The core concern is a prebuilt closed-source binary from a vendor host over unencrypted HTTP with only MD5 integrity checking — this is a genuine supply-chain risk (silent substitution or MITM possible), though not evidence of active malice. The PKGBUILD also has a functional issue: it calls 'tar xzf data.tar.gz' without first extracting data.tar.gz from the .deb, which would likely fail, but this is a packaging bug rather than a security issue. Overall: medium severity due to executed prebuilt binary over HTTP with weak integrity verification.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("http://download.sangfor.com.cn/download/product/sslvpn/pkg/linux_01/EasyConnect_x64.deb" -
PKGBUILD:13
"http://ftp.acc.umu.se/pub/GNOME/sources/pango/1.42/pango-1.42.4.tar.xz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (EasyConnect_x64.deb) from download.sangfor.com.cn, which is Sangfor's official vendor download host for their SSL VPN client. While this is the legitimate vendor, the binary is a closed-source executable installed directly onto the system, and the source URL uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the download is not transport-protected. The md5sum check provides weak integrity verification (MD5 is cryptographically broken). The package also compiles pango 1.42.4 from source (from the official GNOME FTP mirror) and installs it into a private path to satisfy the old binary's library dependencies. The core concern is a prebuilt closed-source binary from a vendor host over unencrypted HTTP with only MD5 integrity checking — this is a genuine supply-chain risk (silent substitution or MITM possible), though not evidence of active malice. The PKGBUILD also has a functional issue: it calls 'tar xzf data.tar.gz' without first extracting data.tar.gz from the .deb, which would likely fail, but this is a packaging bug rather than a security issue. Overall: medium severity due to executed prebuilt binary over HTTP with weak integrity verification.
PKGBUILD
2 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Chen Cui <chentsuei@gmail.com>
pkgname=easyconnect-sdu
pkgver=7.6.3.0.86415
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Accessing SDU's network resources over vpn connection."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://vpn.sdu.edu.cn/com/installClient.html"
license=('custom')
conflicts=('easyconnect')
install=${pkgname}.install
source=("http://download.sangfor.com.cn/download/product/sslvpn/pkg/linux_01/EasyConnect_x64.deb"
"http://ftp.acc.umu.se/pub/GNOME/sources/pango/1.42/pango-1.42.4.tar.xz")
md5sums=('6ed6273f7754454f19835a456ee263e3'
'deb171a31a3ad76342d5195a1b5bbc7c')
package(){
tar xzf data.tar.gz -C "${pkgdir}"
tar xf ${srcdir}/pango-1.42.4.tar.xz
cd pango-1.42.4
./configure --prefix=/usr
make -j4 && make DESTDIR=${pkgdir}"/usr/share/sangfor/EasyConnect/oldlib/pango" install
cd ${pkgdir}
sed -i 's/Exec=/Exec=env LD_LIBRARY_PATH=\/usr\/share\/sangfor\/EasyConnect\/oldlib\/pango\/usr\/lib /g' "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/EasyConnect.desktop"
install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/sangfor/EasyConnect/LICENSES.chromium.html" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |