easycrypt-bin

maintainer Herbrant · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Debian binary (.deb) from repo.formosa-crypto.org, which is not an official distribution channel (GitHub releases, official distro repos, etc.) but rather a third-party Debian repository operated by the Formosa-Crypto project. The binary is then extracted and installed directly onto the system. While a sha256sum is pinned (mitigating casual tampering), the host is not the upstream GitHub project itself, and the key question is whether repo.formosa-crypto.org is a trustworthy, project-controlled host. The Formosa-Crypto project (https://github.com/formosa-crypto) is a legitimate academic cryptography project closely related to EasyCrypt, and this Debian repo appears to be their official distribution channel for EasyCrypt binaries. However, it remains a third-party binary host rather than a GitHub release artifact, and the sha256sum provides only integrity, not authenticity (no GPG signature verification). This is a real, if modest, supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub host with no signature check. The risk is real but not clearly malicious, consistent with a medium rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:29 "${_pkgname}_${_debver}_amd64.deb::https://repo.formosa-crypto.org/debian/pool/main/e/easycrypt/${_pkgname}_${_debver}_amd64.deb"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Debian binary (.deb) from repo.formosa-crypto.org, which is not an official distribution channel (GitHub releases, official distro repos, etc.) but rather a third-party Debian repository operated by the Formosa-Crypto project. The binary is then extracted and installed directly onto the system. While a sha256sum is pinned (mitigating casual tampering), the host is not the upstream GitHub project itself, and the key question is whether repo.formosa-crypto.org is a trustworthy, project-controlled host. The Formosa-Crypto project (https://github.com/formosa-crypto) is a legitimate academic cryptography project closely related to EasyCrypt, and this Debian repo appears to be their official distribution channel for EasyCrypt binaries. However, it remains a third-party binary host rather than a GitHub release artifact, and the sha256sum provides only integrity, not authenticity (no GPG signature verification). This is a real, if modest, supply-chain concern: a prebuilt binary from a non-GitHub host with no signature check. The risk is real but not clearly malicious, consistent with a medium rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Davide Carnemolla <herbrant@protonmail.com>
2
3pkgname=easycrypt-bin
4pkgver=2026.02
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Interactive framework for cryptographic proofs (EasyCrypt)"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://github.com/EasyCrypt/easycrypt"
9license=('MIT')
10
11# Runtime dependencies available in official repositories
12depends=(
13 'ocaml'
14 'gmp'
15 'mpfr'
16 'why3-bin'
17)
18
19# Tools required to extract the Debian package
20makedepends=('binutils' 'tar')
21
22# Debian packages
23_pkgname=easycrypt
24
25# Debian version string used in the source URL
26_debver="${pkgver}-1"
27
28source=(
29 "${_pkgname}_${_debver}_amd64.deb::https://repo.formosa-crypto.org/debian/pool/main/e/easycrypt/${_pkgname}_${_debver}_amd64.deb"
30)
31
32sha256sums=('f4d9fa9b8a73d0d1d2fef3da242608654491c881fe9005a3f51f68b644f75bfd')
33
34package() {
35 cd "$srcdir"
36
37 # Extract the Debian package
38 ar x "${_pkgname}_${_debver}_amd64.deb"
39
40 # Extract the data archive (format may vary)
41 if [ -f data.tar.xz ]; then
42 tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir"
43 elif [ -f data.tar.gz ]; then
44 tar -xf data.tar.gz -C "$pkgdir"
45 elif [ -f data.tar.zst ]; then
46 tar -xf data.tar.zst -C "$pkgdir"
47 fi
48
49 # Remove Debian-specific changelog files
50 if [ -d "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$_pkgname" ]; then
51 rm -f "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$_pkgname/changelog.Debian"*
52 fi
53
54 # Install license file if provided
55 if [ -f "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$_pkgname/copyright" ]; then
56 install -Dm644 \
57 "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$_pkgname/copyright" \
58 "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$_pkgname/LICENSE"
59 fi
60}
61

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Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
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