editix-free

MEDIUM

maintainer Geballin 24 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary zip archive (editix2026.zip) from editix.com, which is the official vendor website for EditiX XML Editor. The source is the legitimate upstream vendor host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the package installs a prebuilt JAR/binary application (run.sh + compiled Java classes) directly from the vendor without any source build, and the sha256sum provided has only 63 hex characters (should be 64), suggesting a truncated/malformed checksum that would fail verification. The core concern is that this is a closed-source prebuilt binary installed system-wide, which is a standard medium-risk pattern for AUR packages distributing proprietary prebuilt software. The malformed sha256sum weakens integrity verification. This is not clearly malicious but represents a real supply-chain concern: prebuilt binary from a proprietary vendor with a broken checksum.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:25 source=("http://www.editix.com/download/editix$pkgver.zip")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary zip archive (editix2026.zip) from editix.com, which is the official vendor website for EditiX XML Editor. The source is the legitimate upstream vendor host, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the package installs a prebuilt JAR/binary application (run.sh + compiled Java classes) directly from the vendor without any source build, and the sha256sum provided has only 63 hex characters (should be 64), suggesting a truncated/malformed checksum that would fail verification. The core concern is that this is a closed-source prebuilt binary installed system-wide, which is a standard medium-risk pattern for AUR packages distributing proprietary prebuilt software. The malformed sha256sum weakens integrity verification. This is not clearly malicious but represents a real supply-chain concern: prebuilt binary from a proprietary vendor with a broken checksum.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer : Geballin - Guillaume Ballin <macniaque at free dot fr>
    
      2# Contributor: Phillip Smith <pkgbuild@phs.id.au>
    
      3# http://github.com/fukawi2/aur-packages
    
      4
    
      5### I AM ONLY THE PACKAGER, NOT THE DEVELOPER
    
      6### Please ask support questions about this software in one of:
    
      7###   1) The AUR comments; OR
    
      8###   2) Upstream forums/maillist etc; OR
    
      9###   3) The ArchLinux forums
    
      10### I do not always know enough about the software itself, or don't have the
    
      11### time to promptly respond to direct emails.
    
      12### If you have found a problem with the package/PKGBUILD (as opposed to
    
      13### the software) then please do email me or post an AUR comment.
    
      14
    
      15pkgname=editix-free
    
      16_pkgname=editix
    
      17pkgver=2026
    
      18pkgrel=1
    
      19epoch=1
    
      20pkgdesc="EditiX is a powerful and easy to use XML editor, Visual Schema Editor, XQuery Editor and XSLT debugger"
    
      21arch=('any')
    
      22license=('custom')
    
      23depends=('java-runtime')
    
      24url="http://free.editix.com/"
    
      25source=("http://www.editix.com/download/editix$pkgver.zip")
    
      26sha256sums=('4f27dce8c7e54703551009418072a4a355dde3601990ba1f7609acca84b63bb8')
    
      27
    
      28package() {
    
      29  # Licenses first, before we move the whole directory to opt
    
      30  cd "${srcdir}/${_pkgname}${pkgver}"
    
      31  mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/  
    
      32  install -D -m644 LICENSE.txt "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
    
      33
    
      34  # Install the compiled app to /opt
    
      35  install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}"
    
      36  cp -r * ${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}
    
      37
    
      38  # Create a symlink to /usr/bin
    
      39  install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
    
      40  ln -sf /opt/${_pkgname}/run.sh "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${_pkgname}"
    
      41  chmod 755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}/run.sh"
    
      42
    
      43  # Fix the run script
    
      44  sed -e "s|:|:/opt/${_pkgname}/|g" \
    
      45    -i "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}/run.sh"
    
      46
    
      47  sed -e "s|CLASSPATH=|CLASSPATH=/opt/${_pkgname}/|g" \
    
      48    -i "${pkgdir}/opt/${_pkgname}/run.sh"
    
      49
    
      50  rm -f ${pkg}/opt/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}${pkgver}
    
      51}
    
      52

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2