elasticmq

maintainer thebits · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt JAR file (executable JVM bytecode) from an S3 bucket (softwaremill-public on AWS eu-west-1) rather than building from source. While this S3 bucket is the official distribution channel used by SoftwareMill for elasticmq releases (consistent with the upstream GitHub repo at github.com/softwaremill/elasticmq), it is still an S3 bucket rather than a GitHub release asset, meaning there is no cryptographic provenance tied to a GitHub release. The JAR is installed directly as an executable. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the hash only protects against accidental corruption or a swap after the PKGBUILD was written — it does not verify the JAR's authenticity or signing. The core concern is a prebuilt binary from a cloud storage bucket with no GPG/sigstore verification. This is a real but low-probability supply-chain risk: medium severity is appropriate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/softwaremill-public/elasticmq-server-${pkgver}.jar")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt JAR file (executable JVM bytecode) from an S3 bucket (softwaremill-public on AWS eu-west-1) rather than building from source. While this S3 bucket is the official distribution channel used by SoftwareMill for elasticmq releases (consistent with the upstream GitHub repo at github.com/softwaremill/elasticmq), it is still an S3 bucket rather than a GitHub release asset, meaning there is no cryptographic provenance tied to a GitHub release. The JAR is installed directly as an executable. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the hash only protects against accidental corruption or a swap after the PKGBUILD was written — it does not verify the JAR's authenticity or signing. The core concern is a prebuilt binary from a cloud storage bucket with no GPG/sigstore verification. This is a real but low-probability supply-chain risk: medium severity is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Sergey Mezentsev <thebits@yandex.ru>
    
      2pkgname=elasticmq
    
      3pkgver=1.7.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="Amazon SQS compatible in-memory message queue"
    
      6arch=('any')
    
      7url="https://github.com/softwaremill/elasticmq"
    
      8license=("Apache-2.0")
    
      9depends=("java-runtime-headless")
    
      10source=("https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/softwaremill-public/elasticmq-server-${pkgver}.jar")
    
      11noextract=("elasticmq-server-${pkgver}.jar")
    
      12sha256sums=('a40dfd03fd8e2f17418f3c61a460c1daea902119145bdce97d09a81f03aa0428')
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15  cd "${srcdir}"
    
      16  install -D -m755 "elasticmq-server-${pkgver}.jar" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/elasticmq"
    
      17}
    
      18

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2