elysia-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary ('elysia') directly from dawn.wine, which is a personal/project host rather than an official distribution channel like GitHub releases or a well-known vendor CDN. The binary is installed as an executable (Dm755) into /usr/bin. While sha256sums are present (providing integrity at a point in time), the host is not a recognized, auditable source — if the host is compromised or the maintainer swaps the file at the same URL, users could receive a different binary with the same apparent legitimacy. The URL pattern mimics a Gitea/Forgejo instance path (/releases/download/v$pkgver/), but dawn.wine is not a widely trusted forge. This is a classic supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial personal host. No obfuscation, no piracy indicators, and the checksums do provide some protection, but the risk of silent substitution or host compromise remains a genuine medium-severity concern.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:28
"$_pkgname-$pkgver::https://dawn.wine/$_pkgname/$_pkgname/releases/download/v$pkgver/$_pkgname"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary ('elysia') directly from dawn.wine, which is a personal/project host rather than an official distribution channel like GitHub releases or a well-known vendor CDN. The binary is installed as an executable (Dm755) into /usr/bin. While sha256sums are present (providing integrity at a point in time), the host is not a recognized, auditable source — if the host is compromised or the maintainer swaps the file at the same URL, users could receive a different binary with the same apparent legitimacy. The URL pattern mimics a Gitea/Forgejo instance path (/releases/download/v$pkgver/), but dawn.wine is not a widely trusted forge. This is a classic supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial personal host. No obfuscation, no piracy indicators, and the checksums do provide some protection, but the risk of silent substitution or host compromise remains a genuine medium-severity concern.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: NelloKudo <marshnelloosu@gmail.com>
pkgname=elysia-bin
_pkgname=${pkgname%-bin}
pkgver=0.2
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Universal anime game launcher, supporting Wine and Proton"
arch=(x86_64)
url="https://dawn.wine/elysia/elysia"
license=(GPL-3.0-only)
provides=("elysia")
conflicts=("elysia")
depends=(
'ffmpeg' 'openssl'
'freetype2' 'fontconfig'
'mesa' 'libx11'
'libxcb' 'alsa-lib'
'libpulse' 'libwebp'
'gcc-libs' 'glibc'
'cairo' 'glib2'
'pango' 'harfbuzz'
'librsvg' 'gdk-pixbuf2'
'libva' 'libdrm'
)
options=(!strip)
source=(
"$_pkgname-$pkgver::https://dawn.wine/$_pkgname/$_pkgname/releases/download/v$pkgver/$_pkgname"
"$_pkgname.png::https://dawn.wine/$_pkgname/$_pkgname/raw/tag/v$pkgver/assets/elysia.png"
"$_pkgname.desktop"
)
sha256sums=('ee39e8dc0b08ec21f7b34b1437a7c4fbb6e2107c56d9adfe05411d93e3911196'
'a5ad1cc5bdeeb146ad10a71f15b1f59f300200e56bc14276044d693afe80276e'
'e595a40ad47039e75fbf0e05fd1c85cf7a7a59d57a05769c721b4795f69459f7')
package() {
cd "$srcdir"
# Installing binary
install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$_pkgname-$pkgver" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$_pkgname"
# Install pixmap and desktop files
install -Dm644 "$_pkgname.png" "$pkgdir/usr/share/pixmaps/$_pkgname.png"
install -Dm644 "$_pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/$_pkgname.desktop"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |