elysia-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer NelloKudo 3 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary ('elysia') directly from dawn.wine, which is a personal/project host rather than an official distribution channel like GitHub releases or a well-known vendor CDN. The binary is installed as an executable (Dm755) into /usr/bin. While sha256sums are present (providing integrity at a point in time), the host is not a recognized, auditable source — if the host is compromised or the maintainer swaps the file at the same URL, users could receive a different binary with the same apparent legitimacy. The URL pattern mimics a Gitea/Forgejo instance path (/releases/download/v$pkgver/), but dawn.wine is not a widely trusted forge. This is a classic supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial personal host. No obfuscation, no piracy indicators, and the checksums do provide some protection, but the risk of silent substitution or host compromise remains a genuine medium-severity concern.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:28 "$_pkgname-$pkgver::https://dawn.wine/$_pkgname/$_pkgname/releases/download/v$pkgver/$_pkgname"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary ('elysia') directly from dawn.wine, which is a personal/project host rather than an official distribution channel like GitHub releases or a well-known vendor CDN. The binary is installed as an executable (Dm755) into /usr/bin. While sha256sums are present (providing integrity at a point in time), the host is not a recognized, auditable source — if the host is compromised or the maintainer swaps the file at the same URL, users could receive a different binary with the same apparent legitimacy. The URL pattern mimics a Gitea/Forgejo instance path (/releases/download/v$pkgver/), but dawn.wine is not a widely trusted forge. This is a classic supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial personal host. No obfuscation, no piracy indicators, and the checksums do provide some protection, but the risk of silent substitution or host compromise remains a genuine medium-severity concern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: NelloKudo <marshnelloosu@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=elysia-bin
4_pkgname=${pkgname%-bin}
5pkgver=0.2
6pkgrel=2
7pkgdesc="Universal anime game launcher, supporting Wine and Proton"
8arch=(x86_64)
9url="https://dawn.wine/elysia/elysia"
10license=(GPL-3.0-only)
11provides=("elysia")
12conflicts=("elysia")
13depends=(
14 'ffmpeg' 'openssl'
15 'freetype2' 'fontconfig'
16 'mesa' 'libx11'
17 'libxcb' 'alsa-lib'
18 'libpulse' 'libwebp'
19 'gcc-libs' 'glibc'
20 'cairo' 'glib2'
21 'pango' 'harfbuzz'
22 'librsvg' 'gdk-pixbuf2'
23 'libva' 'libdrm'
24)
25options=(!strip)
26
27source=(
28 "$_pkgname-$pkgver::https://dawn.wine/$_pkgname/$_pkgname/releases/download/v$pkgver/$_pkgname"
29 "$_pkgname.png::https://dawn.wine/$_pkgname/$_pkgname/raw/tag/v$pkgver/assets/elysia.png"
30 "$_pkgname.desktop"
31)
32sha256sums=('ee39e8dc0b08ec21f7b34b1437a7c4fbb6e2107c56d9adfe05411d93e3911196'
33 'a5ad1cc5bdeeb146ad10a71f15b1f59f300200e56bc14276044d693afe80276e'
34 'e595a40ad47039e75fbf0e05fd1c85cf7a7a59d57a05769c721b4795f69459f7')
35
36package() {
37 cd "$srcdir"
38
39 # Installing binary
40 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$_pkgname-$pkgver" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$_pkgname"
41
42 # Install pixmap and desktop files
43 install -Dm644 "$_pkgname.png" "$pkgdir/usr/share/pixmaps/$_pkgname.png"
44 install -Dm644 "$_pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/$_pkgname.desktop"
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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