empoche

maintainer bytee · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a .pacman archive containing an Electron/native application installed to /opt) from an AWS S3 bucket controlled by the upstream vendor (empoche-desktop.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com). While this is the vendor's own distribution channel rather than a third-party unofficial host, it is still a prebuilt binary blob rather than source built from a verifiable VCS. The sha256sum provides integrity at the moment of packaging, but S3 objects can be silently replaced by the bucket owner at any time without changing the URL, and there is no GPG signature verification. The binary is executed directly (/opt/Empoche/empoche via a launcher script). This is a real supply-chain concern: a compromised or malicious update to the S3 object would result in arbitrary code execution on user systems with no additional verification. This pattern is common for proprietary AUR packages but still constitutes a medium-severity supply-chain risk — not a false positive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source_x86_64=("https://empoche-desktop.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/empoche-${pkgver}.pacman")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary package (a .pacman archive containing an Electron/native application installed to /opt) from an AWS S3 bucket controlled by the upstream vendor (empoche-desktop.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com). While this is the vendor's own distribution channel rather than a third-party unofficial host, it is still a prebuilt binary blob rather than source built from a verifiable VCS. The sha256sum provides integrity at the moment of packaging, but S3 objects can be silently replaced by the bucket owner at any time without changing the URL, and there is no GPG signature verification. The binary is executed directly (/opt/Empoche/empoche via a launcher script). This is a real supply-chain concern: a compromised or malicious update to the S3 object would result in arbitrary code execution on user systems with no additional verification. This pattern is common for proprietary AUR packages but still constitutes a medium-severity supply-chain risk — not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Yves Hoppe <contact@empoche.com>
2# Maintainer: Guido de Gobbis <guido@degobbis.de>
3
4pkgname=empoche
5pkgrel=1
6pkgver=0.4.5
7pkgdesc="New Time Tracking and Task Management application."
8url="https://empoche.com"
9provides=('empoche')
10arch=('x86_64')
11license=('proprietary')
12depends=('libnotify' 'libappindicator-gtk3' 'libxss' 'nss')
13source_x86_64=("https://empoche-desktop.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/empoche-${pkgver}.pacman")
14sha256sums_x86_64=('643a3e474b6d53a8ab256066f644067c81a91d069ba7e6d48baa1a85742db662')
15
16package() {
17 # Install in /opt
18 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
19 cp -R "${srcdir}/opt/Empoche" "${pkgdir}/opt/"
20
21 # Install the .desktop file
22 install -D -m644 "${srcdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
23
24 # Install the icons
25 for icon_size in 16 24 32 48 64 128 256 512 1024; do
26 icons_dir="/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${icon_size}x${icon_size}/apps"
27 install -d "${pkgdir}/${icons_dir}"
28 install -m644 "${srcdir}${icons_dir}/${pkgname}.png" \
29 "${pkgdir}${icons_dir}/${pkgname}.png"
30 done
31
32 # Add a launch script
33 printf '#!/usr/bin/bash\n\nXDG_DATA_DIRS=/usr/local/share/:/usr/share/ "/opt/Empoche/empoche"' > "${srcdir}/empoche"
34 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
35 install -D -m755 "${srcdir}/empoche" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
36}
37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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