epub2pdf

maintainer mambuco · 5 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary ZIP (containing JAR files that will be executed at runtime) from openpkg.org, which is a third-party mirror/cache site rather than the official epub2pdf.com project host. While openpkg.org is a known open-source package cache/mirror service (not a random personal host), it is still not the canonical upstream source. The JAR files inside the ZIP are executed code, not pure data. An MD5 checksum is present but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The combination of: (1) executed JARs, (2) sourced from a non-official third-party host, (3) only MD5 integrity check, constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The epub2pdf.sh launcher script has no checksum at all (SKIP). This is a real medium-severity concern: not clearly malicious, but the trust chain for the executed code is weaker than it should be.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:9 source=("http://download.openpkg.org/components/cache/epub2pdf/epub2pdf-0.5.zip"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary ZIP (containing JAR files that will be executed at runtime) from openpkg.org, which is a third-party mirror/cache site rather than the official epub2pdf.com project host. While openpkg.org is a known open-source package cache/mirror service (not a random personal host), it is still not the canonical upstream source. The JAR files inside the ZIP are executed code, not pure data. An MD5 checksum is present but MD5 is cryptographically weak. The combination of: (1) executed JARs, (2) sourced from a non-official third-party host, (3) only MD5 integrity check, constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. The epub2pdf.sh launcher script has no checksum at all (SKIP). This is a real medium-severity concern: not clearly malicious, but the trust chain for the executed code is weaker than it should be.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname=epub2pdf
2pkgver=0.5
3pkgrel=1
4pkgdesc="epub2pdf is a command-line tool that quickly generates PDF files from EPUB ebooks. It will run on any platform that supports JRE version 6 or later."
5arch=('any')
6url="http://epub2pdf.com"
7license=('GPL3')
8depends=('java-runtime>=6')
9source=("http://download.openpkg.org/components/cache/epub2pdf/epub2pdf-0.5.zip"
10"epub2pdf.sh")
11md5sums=('7189ee61628a72dfdb89120aa9e86a89'
12'SKIP')
13
14package() {
15 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/share/java/epub2pdf/
16 cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}/
17 rm -f ./epub2pdf.bat
18 rm -f ./epub2pdf.sh
19 cp -R * ${pkgdir}/usr/share/java/epub2pdf/
20 find ${pkgdir}/usr/share/java/epub2pdf/* -type f -exec chmod 644 {} \;
21 find ${pkgdir}/usr/share/java/epub2pdf/* -type d -exec chmod 755 {} \;
22 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/
23 install -Dm755 ${srcdir}/epub2pdf.sh \
24 ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/epub2pdf || return 1
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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