evplayer2-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer xiadoudou 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Windows PE executable (EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe) from ctpublic.ieway.cn, which appears to be the vendor's own CDN (ieway.cn is the official EV Tools/ieway company domain matching the url= field). The executable is extracted with innoextract and then run under Wine. Two concerns: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — if the CDN is compromised or the file is swapped, users get arbitrary code executed under Wine with no detection; (2) the binary is a closed-source Windows executable run via Wine, which is an inherently elevated-trust operation. However, the host domain matches the official vendor URL, so this is not an obviously unofficial or personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution CDN. The SKIP checksum is the real issue here: it is sloppy and creates a supply-chain window, but the source itself appears legitimate. This sits at the lower end of medium: executed proprietary binary with no checksum, but from what appears to be the official vendor host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://ctpublic.ieway.cn/public/download/EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Windows PE executable (EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe) from ctpublic.ieway.cn, which appears to be the vendor's own CDN (ieway.cn is the official EV Tools/ieway company domain matching the url= field). The executable is extracted with innoextract and then run under Wine. Two concerns: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — if the CDN is compromised or the file is swapped, users get arbitrary code executed under Wine with no detection; (2) the binary is a closed-source Windows executable run via Wine, which is an inherently elevated-trust operation. However, the host domain matches the official vendor URL, so this is not an obviously unofficial or personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution CDN. The SKIP checksum is the real issue here: it is sloppy and creates a supply-chain window, but the source itself appears legitimate. This sits at the lower end of medium: executed proprietary binary with no checksum, but from what appears to be the official vendor host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Your Name <your@mail.com>
2pkgname=evplayer2-bin
3pkgver=4.8.2
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="一唯EV加密播放器,Wine封装版"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://www.ieway.cn/evplayer2.html"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('wine-staging' 'winetricks' 'xdg-utils')
10makedepends=('innoextract' 'icoutils')
11source=("https://ctpublic.ieway.cn/public/download/EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe")
12sha256sums=('SKIP')
13
14build() {
15 innoextract EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe
16
17 cd app
18 wrestool -x --type=group_icon EVPlayer2.exe | icotool -x -o evplayer2.png -
19}
20
21package() {
22 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/evplayer2"
23 cp -r app/* "${pkgdir}/opt/evplayer2/"
24
25 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/app/evplayer2.png" \
26 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps/evplayer2.png"
27
28 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
29 cat > "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/evplayer2.desktop" << EOF
30[Desktop Entry]
31Type=Application
32Name=EVPlayer2
33Comment=EV Encrypted Video Player
34Exec=wine /opt/evplayer2/EVPlayer2.exe
35Icon=evplayer2
36Terminal=false
37Categories=AudioVideo;Player;
38EOF
39
40 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
41 cat > "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/evplayer2" << EOF
42#!/bin/bash
43wine /opt/evplayer2/EVPlayer2.exe "\$@"
44EOF
45 chmod +x "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/evplayer2"
46}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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