evplayer2-bin

maintainer xiadoudou · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Windows PE executable (EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe) from ctpublic.ieway.cn, which appears to be the vendor's own CDN (ieway.cn is the official EV Tools/ieway company domain matching the url= field). The executable is extracted with innoextract and then run under Wine. Two concerns: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — if the CDN is compromised or the file is swapped, users get arbitrary code executed under Wine with no detection; (2) the binary is a closed-source Windows executable run via Wine, which is an inherently elevated-trust operation. However, the host domain matches the official vendor URL, so this is not an obviously unofficial or personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution CDN. The SKIP checksum is the real issue here: it is sloppy and creates a supply-chain window, but the source itself appears legitimate. This sits at the lower end of medium: executed proprietary binary with no checksum, but from what appears to be the official vendor host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://ctpublic.ieway.cn/public/download/EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Windows PE executable (EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe) from ctpublic.ieway.cn, which appears to be the vendor's own CDN (ieway.cn is the official EV Tools/ieway company domain matching the url= field). The executable is extracted with innoextract and then run under Wine. Two concerns: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — if the CDN is compromised or the file is swapped, users get arbitrary code executed under Wine with no detection; (2) the binary is a closed-source Windows executable run via Wine, which is an inherently elevated-trust operation. However, the host domain matches the official vendor URL, so this is not an obviously unofficial or personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution CDN. The SKIP checksum is the real issue here: it is sloppy and creates a supply-chain window, but the source itself appears legitimate. This sits at the lower end of medium: executed proprietary binary with no checksum, but from what appears to be the official vendor host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Your Name <your@mail.com>
2pkgname=evplayer2-bin
3pkgver=4.8.2
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="一唯EV加密播放器,Wine封装版"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://www.ieway.cn/evplayer2.html"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('wine-staging' 'winetricks' 'xdg-utils')
10makedepends=('innoextract' 'icoutils')
11source=("https://ctpublic.ieway.cn/public/download/EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe")
12sha256sums=('SKIP')
13
14build() {
15 innoextract EVPlayer2_v4.8.2.exe
16
17 cd app
18 wrestool -x --type=group_icon EVPlayer2.exe | icotool -x -o evplayer2.png -
19}
20
21package() {
22 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/evplayer2"
23 cp -r app/* "${pkgdir}/opt/evplayer2/"
24
25 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/app/evplayer2.png" \
26 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps/evplayer2.png"
27
28 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
29 cat > "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/evplayer2.desktop" << EOF
30[Desktop Entry]
31Type=Application
32Name=EVPlayer2
33Comment=EV Encrypted Video Player
34Exec=wine /opt/evplayer2/EVPlayer2.exe
35Icon=evplayer2
36Terminal=false
37Categories=AudioVideo;Player;
38EOF
39
40 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
41 cat > "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/evplayer2" << EOF
42#!/bin/bash
43wine /opt/evplayer2/EVPlayer2.exe "\$@"
44EOF
45 chmod +x "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/evplayer2"
46}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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