expandrive-bin

maintainer lsfe87 · 9 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from 'corp.hosted-by-files.com', which is not the official ExpanDrive distribution host (expandrive.com). This is a third-party/CDN-style host that is not verifiably controlled by the ExpanDrive vendor. A prebuilt binary executed on the user's system from an unofficial host constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the file is substituted, arbitrary code runs as the user. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection against in-transit tampering, but does not guarantee the binary was originally sourced from the legitimate vendor. The pattern is consistent with a maintainer using a personal or corporate file-hosting service rather than the official vendor download URL, which is a real (if not clearly malicious) supply-chain concern. Medium severity is appropriate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:26 "https://corp.hosted-by-files.com/builds/ExpanDrive/${pkgver}/linux/ExpanDrive_${pkgver%.*}_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from 'corp.hosted-by-files.com', which is not the official ExpanDrive distribution host (expandrive.com). This is a third-party/CDN-style host that is not verifiably controlled by the ExpanDrive vendor. A prebuilt binary executed on the user's system from an unofficial host constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk — if the host is compromised or the file is substituted, arbitrary code runs as the user. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection against in-transit tampering, but does not guarantee the binary was originally sourced from the legitimate vendor. The pattern is consistent with a maintainer using a personal or corporate file-hosting service rather than the official vendor download URL, which is a real (if not clearly malicious) supply-chain concern. Medium severity is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Lionel Fernandes <lsfe87 at gmail dot com>
2# Contributor: Wagner Skellington <kelson dot glint at gmail dot com>
3# Contributor: Seth Murphy <seth.murphy18@gmail.com>
4
5pkgname='expandrive-bin'
6pkgver='2025.11.21.808'
7pkgrel='1'
8pkgdesc='A utility for managing multiple cloud storage services'
9arch=('x86_64')
10url='https://www.expandrive.com/'
11license=('custom:proprietary')
12depends=(
13 'alsa-lib'
14 'at-spi2-core'
15 'fuse2'
16 'gtk3'
17 'libnotify'
18 'libsecret'
19 'libxss'
20 'libxtst'
21 'nss'
22 'xdg-utils'
23)
24
25source=('LICENSE'
26 "https://corp.hosted-by-files.com/builds/ExpanDrive/${pkgver}/linux/ExpanDrive_${pkgver%.*}_amd64.deb")
27sha256sums=('0d764524f7d542d267cc68a7fdfa07ebd3146e784aa89fc157fceb800001d823'
28 'b558f56dfcd9c7486d2498695847e06edf16960e7a1056f67345dce48d73036a')
29
30prepare() {
31 # Create the package directory, if it doesn't already exist
32 if [ ! -d "$srcdir/data" ]; then
33 mkdir "$srcdir/data"
34 else
35 # If the directory exists, wipe its contents
36 rm -rf "$srcdir/data"
37 mkdir "$srcdir/data"
38 fi
39
40 tar -xf "$srcdir/data.tar.xz" -C "$srcdir/data"
41
42 # Remove unnecessary files from the package
43 rm -rf "$srcdir/data/opt/ExpanDrive/resources/app.asar.unpacked"
44}
45
46package() {
47 # Copy the source files to the package directory
48 cp -R "$srcdir/data/opt/" "$pkgdir/opt/"
49 cp -R "$srcdir/data/usr/" "$pkgdir/usr/"
50
51 # Install the LICENSE file in the correct place
52 install -Dm644 LICENSE "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
53}
54
55post_install() {
56 # Link the ExpanDrive binary to /usr/local/bin
57 ln -sf '/opt/ExpanDrive/expandrive' '/usr/local/bin/expandrive'
58}
59
60pre_remove() {
61 # Remove ExpanDrive from /usr/local/bin
62 rm -f '/usr/local/bin/expandrive'
63}
64

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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