fcast-receiver-bin

maintainer LA-MJ · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron .deb binary from dl.fcast.org, which is a subdomain of fcast.org — the project's own distribution domain (FCast is a FUTO project). This is not a random personal host; it appears to be the official release CDN for the FCast receiver. However, it is still a prebuilt binary (Electron app) pulled from a non-forge host rather than being built from source or pulled from the GitLab releases page directly. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk. The concern is real but mild: if dl.fcast.org were compromised, a malicious binary would be installed. This is the standard risk profile for any -bin AUR package pulling from a vendor CDN rather than a forge release attachment. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible but arguably a false positive for a vendor-operated CDN with a pinned checksum — this is standard -bin package practice. Keeping MEDIUM due to the prebuilt binary nature and the fact that dl.fcast.org is a separate infrastructure from the GitLab forge, but confidence is moderate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:38 source=("${pkgname}.deb::https://dl.fcast.org/electron/${pkgver}/deb/x64/fcast-receiver-${pkgver}-linux-x64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron .deb binary from dl.fcast.org, which is a subdomain of fcast.org — the project's own distribution domain (FCast is a FUTO project). This is not a random personal host; it appears to be the official release CDN for the FCast receiver. However, it is still a prebuilt binary (Electron app) pulled from a non-forge host rather than being built from source or pulled from the GitLab releases page directly. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk. The concern is real but mild: if dl.fcast.org were compromised, a malicious binary would be installed. This is the standard risk profile for any -bin AUR package pulling from a vendor CDN rather than a forge release attachment. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible but arguably a false positive for a vendor-operated CDN with a pinned checksum — this is standard -bin package practice. Keeping MEDIUM due to the prebuilt binary nature and the fact that dl.fcast.org is a separate infrastructure from the GitLab forge, but confidence is moderate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer LA-MJ [ 4mr.minj at google-mail , com ]
2pkgname=fcast-receiver-bin
3epoch=1
4pkgver=2.2.4
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Binary releases of Fcast"
7arch=('x86_64')
8conflicts=("fcast-receiver-bin" "fcast-receiver-git" "fcast-receiver")
9provides=("fcast-receiver")
10url="https://gitlab.futo.org/videostreaming/fcast"
11license=('MIT')
12depends=(
13'alsa-lib'
14'at-spi2-core'
15'cairo'
16'dbus'
17'expat'
18'gcc-libs'
19'glib2'
20'glibc'
21'gtk3'
22'libcups'
23'libdrm'
24'libudev.so=1'
25'libx11'
26'libxcb'
27'libxcomposite'
28'libxdamage'
29'libxext'
30'libxfixes'
31'libxkbcommon'
32'libxrandr'
33'mesa'
34'nspr'
35'nss'
36'pango'
37)
38source=("${pkgname}.deb::https://dl.fcast.org/electron/${pkgver}/deb/x64/fcast-receiver-${pkgver}-linux-x64.deb")
39sha256sums=('f89953b60eda63aaf73d64c70ea7d55205a9a22a0b2da80ff829eaa73f64a4dd')
40
41package() {
42 bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir/"
43 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/fcast-receiver/copyright" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
44 rm -r "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/lintian"
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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