fcast-receiver-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer LA-MJ 3 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron .deb binary from dl.fcast.org, which is a subdomain of fcast.org — the project's own distribution domain (FCast is a FUTO project). This is not a random personal host; it appears to be the official release CDN for the FCast receiver. However, it is still a prebuilt binary (Electron app) pulled from a non-forge host rather than being built from source or pulled from the GitLab releases page directly. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk. The concern is real but mild: if dl.fcast.org were compromised, a malicious binary would be installed. This is the standard risk profile for any -bin AUR package pulling from a vendor CDN rather than a forge release attachment. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible but arguably a false positive for a vendor-operated CDN with a pinned checksum — this is standard -bin package practice. Keeping MEDIUM due to the prebuilt binary nature and the fact that dl.fcast.org is a separate infrastructure from the GitLab forge, but confidence is moderate.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:38 source=("${pkgname}.deb::https://dl.fcast.org/electron/${pkgver}/deb/x64/fcast-receiver-${pkgver}-linux-x64.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron .deb binary from dl.fcast.org, which is a subdomain of fcast.org — the project's own distribution domain (FCast is a FUTO project). This is not a random personal host; it appears to be the official release CDN for the FCast receiver. However, it is still a prebuilt binary (Electron app) pulled from a non-forge host rather than being built from source or pulled from the GitLab releases page directly. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk. The concern is real but mild: if dl.fcast.org were compromised, a malicious binary would be installed. This is the standard risk profile for any -bin AUR package pulling from a vendor CDN rather than a forge release attachment. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is defensible but arguably a false positive for a vendor-operated CDN with a pinned checksum — this is standard -bin package practice. Keeping MEDIUM due to the prebuilt binary nature and the fact that dl.fcast.org is a separate infrastructure from the GitLab forge, but confidence is moderate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer LA-MJ [ 4mr.minj at google-mail , com ]
2pkgname=fcast-receiver-bin
3epoch=1
4pkgver=2.2.4
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Binary releases of Fcast"
7arch=('x86_64')
8conflicts=("fcast-receiver-bin" "fcast-receiver-git" "fcast-receiver")
9provides=("fcast-receiver")
10url="https://gitlab.futo.org/videostreaming/fcast"
11license=('MIT')
12depends=(
13'alsa-lib'
14'at-spi2-core'
15'cairo'
16'dbus'
17'expat'
18'gcc-libs'
19'glib2'
20'glibc'
21'gtk3'
22'libcups'
23'libdrm'
24'libudev.so=1'
25'libx11'
26'libxcb'
27'libxcomposite'
28'libxdamage'
29'libxext'
30'libxfixes'
31'libxkbcommon'
32'libxrandr'
33'mesa'
34'nspr'
35'nss'
36'pango'
37)
38source=("${pkgname}.deb::https://dl.fcast.org/electron/${pkgver}/deb/x64/fcast-receiver-${pkgver}-linux-x64.deb")
39sha256sums=('f89953b60eda63aaf73d64c70ea7d55205a9a22a0b2da80ff829eaa73f64a4dd')
40
41package() {
42 bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir/"
43 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/fcast-receiver/copyright" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
44 rm -r "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/lintian"
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion