filecloudsync

maintainer filecloud · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary (filecloudsync_linux_amd64.zip) from patch.codelathe.com, which is a subdomain of codelathe.com — the company behind FileCloud (formerly Tonido/CodeLathe). This is the vendor's own patch/update distribution host, not a random personal or third-party host. The sha256 checksum is present and pinned, which mitigates MITM risk. However, the binary is a closed-source proprietary executable installed to /opt and run directly, sourced from a non-primary vendor subdomain rather than a canonical release page. This is a legitimate vendor binary with a checksum, but the non-standard subdomain (patch.codelathe.com rather than a GitHub release or primary download page) and the fact that it's a prebuilt binary with no source verification beyond the hash keeps this at medium rather than clean. The maintainer email matches the vendor domain, further supporting legitimacy. Overall this is a borderline medium: real supply-chain concern due to prebuilt binary from a vendor subdomain, but not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source_x86_64=("filecloudsync_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.zip::http://patch.codelathe.com/tonido/live/installer/x86-linux/filecloudsync_linux_amd64.zip" 'FileCloud.desktop' 'LICENSE')

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary (filecloudsync_linux_amd64.zip) from patch.codelathe.com, which is a subdomain of codelathe.com — the company behind FileCloud (formerly Tonido/CodeLathe). This is the vendor's own patch/update distribution host, not a random personal or third-party host. The sha256 checksum is present and pinned, which mitigates MITM risk. However, the binary is a closed-source proprietary executable installed to /opt and run directly, sourced from a non-primary vendor subdomain rather than a canonical release page. This is a legitimate vendor binary with a checksum, but the non-standard subdomain (patch.codelathe.com rather than a GitHub release or primary download page) and the fact that it's a prebuilt binary with no source verification beyond the hash keeps this at medium rather than clean. The maintainer email matches the vendor domain, further supporting legitimacy. Overall this is a borderline medium: real supply-chain concern due to prebuilt binary from a vendor subdomain, but not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: CodeLathe <itservices@codelathe.com>
    
      2# Contributor: CodeLathe <itservices@codelathe.com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=filecloudsync
    
      5pkgver=21.3.3.7527
    
      6pkgrel=1
    
      7pkgdesc="FileCloud Sync for Linux: targeted for Ubuntu (12.04 and higher). Uses GTK2."
    
      8arch=('x86_64')
    
      9url="https://www.filecloud.com/additional-downloads"
    
      10license=('proprietary')
    
      11depends=('libdbusmenu-gtk2' 'libpng12' 'openssl-1.0' 'wxgtk2')
    
      12
    
      13#https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/65042
    
      14source_x86_64=("filecloudsync_${pkgver}_linux_amd64.zip::http://patch.codelathe.com/tonido/live/installer/x86-linux/filecloudsync_linux_amd64.zip" 'FileCloud.desktop' 'LICENSE')
    
      15
    
      16sha256sums_x86_64=('99c914317fc13dbee9a5778b8a85b45f499ea6ef3b7d2885c99237cfc012befe'
    
      17                   '90db80ec4ca61283e5ed09a300df55a3aa87be7b7fbf53a6ee0be8d71cfa8d75'
    
      18                   'a397573d54734349929b3572875577073c3aeab6d9e4d6dbae4400a6954a61ed')
    
      19install=${pkgname}.install
    
      20
    
      21package() {
    
      22  cd "$srcdir/"
    
      23  install -dm751 "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync"
    
      24  install -Dm644 -t "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync" lib*
    
      25  install -Dm644 -t "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync" *.{png,pem}
    
      26  install -Dm644 -t "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync" translationsdc.zip
    
      27  install -Dm755 -t "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync" filecloudsync
    
      28  install -Dm644 -t "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync" filecloudsynccon
    
      29  install -Dm755 -t "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync" filecloudsyncstart.sh
    
      30  install -Dm644 -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/" FileCloud.desktop
    
      31  install -Dm644 -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname" LICENSE
    
      32  install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
    
      33  sed -i 's|\./filecloudsync 2> /dev/null 1>&2|/opt/filecloudsync/filecloudsync|' "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync/filecloudsyncstart.sh"
    
      34  sed -i 's|export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=\.|export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/filecloudsync/|' "$pkgdir/opt/filecloudsync/filecloudsyncstart.sh"
    
      35  ln -s "/opt/filecloudsync/filecloudsyncstart.sh" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/filecloudsyncstart.sh"
    
      36  ln -s "/opt/filecloudsync/filecloudsync" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/filecloudsync"
    
      37}
    
      38
    
      39

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2