finalcrypt

MEDIUM
maintainer iamawacko 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
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Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the project's own domain (finalcrypt.org) rather than from a verifiable source like GitHub releases or a distribution mirror. The .deb contains executed code (a Java application with native dependencies) and there is no source build. The sha256sum pins a specific file, which mitigates casual tampering, but the host is a personal project site with no transparency about build provenance. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if finalcrypt.org is compromised or the maintainer silently replaces the file, users execute arbitrary code. However, this is a common AUR pattern for closed/binary packages and the URL is the official project website, so it is not clearly malicious — correctly rated medium.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:17 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::http://www.finalcrypt.org/downloads/linux/finalcrypt_linux_x86_64_debian_based.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the project's own domain (finalcrypt.org) rather than from a verifiable source like GitHub releases or a distribution mirror. The .deb contains executed code (a Java application with native dependencies) and there is no source build. The sha256sum pins a specific file, which mitigates casual tampering, but the host is a personal project site with no transparency about build provenance. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if finalcrypt.org is compromised or the maintainer silently replaces the file, users execute arbitrary code. However, this is a common AUR pattern for closed/binary packages and the URL is the official project website, so it is not clearly malicious — correctly rated medium.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: iamawacko <iamawacko@protonmail.com>
2# Contributor: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
3
4pkgname=finalcrypt
5pkgver=6.8.0
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="The World's Strongest Encryption"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url='http://www.finalcrypt.org'
10license=('CCPL')
11depends=('java-runtime>=8'
12 'gtk2'
13 'libnet'
14 'ffmpeg'
15 'gtk3')
16makedepends=('tar')
17source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::http://www.finalcrypt.org/downloads/linux/finalcrypt_linux_x86_64_debian_based.deb")
18sha256sums=('f6df42b3ff05dced53efc33760028d62375e52fc7a1988790e54a670073e891c')
19
20package() {
21 tar xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
22 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/FinalCrypt/FinalCrypt.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
23 rm "${pkgdir}/opt/FinalCrypt/FinalCrypt.desktop"
24}
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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