finalcrypt

maintainer iamawacko · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the project's own domain (finalcrypt.org) rather than from a verifiable source like GitHub releases or a distribution mirror. The .deb contains executed code (a Java application with native dependencies) and there is no source build. The sha256sum pins a specific file, which mitigates casual tampering, but the host is a personal project site with no transparency about build provenance. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if finalcrypt.org is compromised or the maintainer silently replaces the file, users execute arbitrary code. However, this is a common AUR pattern for closed/binary packages and the URL is the official project website, so it is not clearly malicious — correctly rated medium.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:17 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::http://www.finalcrypt.org/downloads/linux/finalcrypt_linux_x86_64_debian_based.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the project's own domain (finalcrypt.org) rather than from a verifiable source like GitHub releases or a distribution mirror. The .deb contains executed code (a Java application with native dependencies) and there is no source build. The sha256sum pins a specific file, which mitigates casual tampering, but the host is a personal project site with no transparency about build provenance. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if finalcrypt.org is compromised or the maintainer silently replaces the file, users execute arbitrary code. However, this is a common AUR pattern for closed/binary packages and the URL is the official project website, so it is not clearly malicious — correctly rated medium.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: iamawacko <iamawacko@protonmail.com>
    
      2# Contributor: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=finalcrypt
    
      5pkgver=6.8.0
    
      6pkgrel=1
    
      7pkgdesc="The World's Strongest Encryption"
    
      8arch=('x86_64')
    
      9url='http://www.finalcrypt.org'
    
      10license=('CCPL')
    
      11depends=('java-runtime>=8'
    
      12         'gtk2'
    
      13         'libnet'
    
      14         'ffmpeg'
    
      15         'gtk3')
    
      16makedepends=('tar')
    
      17source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::http://www.finalcrypt.org/downloads/linux/finalcrypt_linux_x86_64_debian_based.deb")
    
      18sha256sums=('f6df42b3ff05dced53efc33760028d62375e52fc7a1988790e54a670073e891c')
    
      19
    
      20package() {
    
      21  tar xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
    
      22  install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/FinalCrypt/FinalCrypt.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
    
      23  rm "${pkgdir}/opt/FinalCrypt/FinalCrypt.desktop"
    
      24}
    
      25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2