finalcrypt

MEDIUM

maintainer iamawacko 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the project's own domain (finalcrypt.org) rather than from a verifiable source like GitHub releases or a distribution mirror. The .deb contains executed code (a Java application with native dependencies) and there is no source build. The sha256sum pins a specific file, which mitigates casual tampering, but the host is a personal project site with no transparency about build provenance. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if finalcrypt.org is compromised or the maintainer silently replaces the file, users execute arbitrary code. However, this is a common AUR pattern for closed/binary packages and the URL is the official project website, so it is not clearly malicious — correctly rated medium.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:17 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::http://www.finalcrypt.org/downloads/linux/finalcrypt_linux_x86_64_debian_based.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from the project's own domain (finalcrypt.org) rather than from a verifiable source like GitHub releases or a distribution mirror. The .deb contains executed code (a Java application with native dependencies) and there is no source build. The sha256sum pins a specific file, which mitigates casual tampering, but the host is a personal project site with no transparency about build provenance. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if finalcrypt.org is compromised or the maintainer silently replaces the file, users execute arbitrary code. However, this is a common AUR pattern for closed/binary packages and the URL is the official project website, so it is not clearly malicious — correctly rated medium.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: iamawacko <iamawacko@protonmail.com>
    
      2# Contributor: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=finalcrypt
    
      5pkgver=6.8.0
    
      6pkgrel=1
    
      7pkgdesc="The World's Strongest Encryption"
    
      8arch=('x86_64')
    
      9url='http://www.finalcrypt.org'
    
      10license=('CCPL')
    
      11depends=('java-runtime>=8'
    
      12         'gtk2'
    
      13         'libnet'
    
      14         'ffmpeg'
    
      15         'gtk3')
    
      16makedepends=('tar')
    
      17source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::http://www.finalcrypt.org/downloads/linux/finalcrypt_linux_x86_64_debian_based.deb")
    
      18sha256sums=('f6df42b3ff05dced53efc33760028d62375e52fc7a1988790e54a670073e891c')
    
      19
    
      20package() {
    
      21  tar xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
    
      22  install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/FinalCrypt/FinalCrypt.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
    
      23  rm "${pkgdir}/opt/FinalCrypt/FinalCrypt.desktop"
    
      24}
    
      25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2