finalshell

maintainer lucas007 · 8 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from dl.hostbuf.com (the vendor's own distribution host for FinalShell, a proprietary Chinese SSH/server management tool) and installs them directly without building from source. The sha256sums are pinned, which mitigates tampering at rest, but the binaries are closed-source executables from a single vendor-controlled CDN with no independent verification. FinalShell is a proprietary application with a history of controversy around its network behavior (phone-home, telemetry). The risk is a real supply-chain concern: if dl.hostbuf.com is compromised or the vendor pushes malicious updates, users receive arbitrary code execution as the installed binary runs with user privileges. This is a textbook medium: not clearly malicious, but executed closed-source binaries from a non-auditable unofficial/vendor host with no source build path.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source_x86_64=('https://dl.hostbuf.com/finalshell3/finalshell_linux_x64.deb')
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from dl.hostbuf.com (the vendor's own distribution host for FinalShell, a proprietary Chinese SSH/server management tool) and installs them directly without building from source. The sha256sums are pinned, which mitigates tampering at rest, but the binaries are closed-source executables from a single vendor-controlled CDN with no independent verification. FinalShell is a proprietary application with a history of controversy around its network behavior (phone-home, telemetry). The risk is a real supply-chain concern: if dl.hostbuf.com is compromised or the vendor pushes malicious updates, users receive arbitrary code execution as the installed binary runs with user privileges. This is a textbook medium: not clearly malicious, but executed closed-source binaries from a non-auditable unofficial/vendor host with no source build path.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: lucas007 <lucaszhou007@163.com>
2
3pkgname=finalshell
4pkgver=4.6.4
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="FinalShell是一体化的的服务器、网络管理软件,不仅是ssh客户端,还是功能强大的开发、运维工具,充分满足开发、运维需求。"
7url="https://www.hostbuf.com/"
8arch=("x86_64" "aarch64" "loong64")
9license=('custom')
10provides=('FinalShell')
11makedepends=("rsync")
12source=('FinalShell.desktop')
13sha256sums=('3aa0a806f4fd3cdb5a8065226dc779f1915d5535e8bdec64fb7967698a693ed0')
14
15source_x86_64=('https://dl.hostbuf.com/finalshell3/finalshell_linux_x64.deb')
16source_aarch64=('https://dl.hostbuf.com/finalshell3/finalshell_linux_arm64.deb')
17source_loong64=('https://dl.hostbuf.com/finalshell3/finalshell_linux_loong64.deb')
18sha256sums_x86_64=('71d1326da3a864c6e5c64694ac669fb9b0870b175566bf8008e90fedd5aea90d')
19sha256sums_aarch64=('06779669866b05c054fb9edd90efaf6768841d12c7f0839af28b0e9957b298d5')
20sha256sums_loong64=('108b81abc1cd7afccd08025457871e1234e57c0f9a53330a00b354024840c43a')
21
22prepare() {
23 tar -Jxf data.tar.xz
24 tar -Jxf control.tar.xz
25}
26
27pkgver() {
28 printf $(grep Version control | awk '{print $2}')
29}
30
31package() {
32 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/usr/lib/finalshell/lib/FinalShell.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/FinalShell.png"
33 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/FinalShell.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/FinalShell.desktop"
34 rm -rf "${srcdir}/usr/lib/finalshell/lib/FinalShell.png" "${srcdir}/usr/lib/finalshell/lib/finalshell-FinalShell.desktop"
35
36 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
37 rsync -rq --delete "${srcdir}/usr/lib/finalshell" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
38
39 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
40 ln -sf "/usr/lib/finalshell/bin/FinalShell" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/FinalShell"
41}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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