firefox-extension-connective-signing

MEDIUM
maintainer richard_mt 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (.xpi Firefox extension) from plugin.connective.eu, which is the official vendor website for Connective (a Belgian e-signing company), not a personal or unofficial host. The sha512sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering. However, the source is a prebuilt binary from a corporate vendor host rather than Mozilla AMO or a major public forge — if the vendor host were compromised or the binary swapped, the pinned hash would catch it, but the hash itself cannot be independently verified against a transparency log. The extension is installed system-wide into Firefox's extensions directory and will execute as browser-privileged JavaScript. This is a legitimate vendor product with a real corporate identity, but the supply-chain concern of a prebuilt binary from a non-Mozilla-AMO host is real enough to warrant medium rather than clean, consistent with AUR policy on prebuilt binaries from unofficial sources.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi::https://plugin.connective.eu/software/firefox/connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (.xpi Firefox extension) from plugin.connective.eu, which is the official vendor website for Connective (a Belgian e-signing company), not a personal or unofficial host. The sha512sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering. However, the source is a prebuilt binary from a corporate vendor host rather than Mozilla AMO or a major public forge — if the vendor host were compromised or the binary swapped, the pinned hash would catch it, but the hash itself cannot be independently verified against a transparency log. The extension is installed system-wide into Firefox's extensions directory and will execute as browser-privileged JavaScript. This is a legitimate vendor product with a real corporate identity, but the supply-chain concern of a prebuilt binary from a non-Mozilla-AMO host is real enough to warrant medium rather than clean, consistent with AUR policy on prebuilt binaries from unofficial sources.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Richard Mathot <richard.mathot@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=firefox-extension-connective-signing
4pkgver=1.0.5
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc='Connective Signing Extension for Firefox'
7arch=('any')
8url='https://plugin.connective.eu/'
9license=('unknown')
10depends=('firefox')
11# see https://plugin.connective.eu/download-index.json
12source=("connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi::https://plugin.connective.eu/software/firefox/connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi")
13noextract=("connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi")
14sha512sums=('924cc008b4f3e111b7fa7fed679940a66481564494304a04e680247a948dc592223f2df8d8b1d9d55a68b28929748f1d740e5d99ff9dba159dc72139bd1d9a29')
15
16package() {
17 install -Dm644 "connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/firefox/browser/extensions/{4f643bc8-78f5-49c6-8efd-78ee30289f0b}.xpi"
18}
19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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