firefox-extension-connective-signing
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (.xpi Firefox extension) from plugin.connective.eu, which is the official vendor website for Connective (a Belgian e-signing company), not a personal or unofficial host. The sha512sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering. However, the source is a prebuilt binary from a corporate vendor host rather than Mozilla AMO or a major public forge — if the vendor host were compromised or the binary swapped, the pinned hash would catch it, but the hash itself cannot be independently verified against a transparency log. The extension is installed system-wide into Firefox's extensions directory and will execute as browser-privileged JavaScript. This is a legitimate vendor product with a real corporate identity, but the supply-chain concern of a prebuilt binary from a non-Mozilla-AMO host is real enough to warrant medium rather than clean, consistent with AUR policy on prebuilt binaries from unofficial sources.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi::https://plugin.connective.eu/software/firefox/connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary (.xpi Firefox extension) from plugin.connective.eu, which is the official vendor website for Connective (a Belgian e-signing company), not a personal or unofficial host. The sha512sum is pinned, which mitigates casual tampering. However, the source is a prebuilt binary from a corporate vendor host rather than Mozilla AMO or a major public forge — if the vendor host were compromised or the binary swapped, the pinned hash would catch it, but the hash itself cannot be independently verified against a transparency log. The extension is installed system-wide into Firefox's extensions directory and will execute as browser-privileged JavaScript. This is a legitimate vendor product with a real corporate identity, but the supply-chain concern of a prebuilt binary from a non-Mozilla-AMO host is real enough to warrant medium rather than clean, consistent with AUR policy on prebuilt binaries from unofficial sources.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Richard Mathot <richard.mathot@gmail.com>
pkgname=firefox-extension-connective-signing
pkgver=1.0.5
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='Connective Signing Extension for Firefox'
arch=('any')
url='https://plugin.connective.eu/'
license=('unknown')
depends=('firefox')
# see https://plugin.connective.eu/download-index.json
source=("connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi::https://plugin.connective.eu/software/firefox/connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi")
noextract=("connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi")
sha512sums=('924cc008b4f3e111b7fa7fed679940a66481564494304a04e680247a948dc592223f2df8d8b1d9d55a68b28929748f1d740e5d99ff9dba159dc72139bd1d9a29')
package() {
install -Dm644 "connective_signing_extension-${pkgver}.xpi" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/firefox/browser/extensions/{4f643bc8-78f5-49c6-8efd-78ee30289f0b}.xpi"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |