flasher-harmattan
The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages (containing an executable flasher binary installed to /usr/bin) from coderus.openrepos.net, which is a personal/community hosting site rather than an official Nokia/Maemo distribution channel. The original Maemo flasher tool was distributed by Nokia and is no longer officially available, so this is a common workaround, but the binary is executed code from a non-official third-party host. The sha256sums provide some integrity protection against in-transit tampering, but do not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. openrepos.net is a known Maemo/Sailfish community repository and coderus is a well-known community developer in that ecosystem, which lowers (but does not eliminate) the risk. The concern is real but not clearly malicious — a classic medium supply-chain risk for an executed binary from an unofficial host.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:19
source_x86_64=('https://coderus.openrepos.net/flasher/flasher_3.12.1_amd64.deb')
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages (containing an executable flasher binary installed to /usr/bin) from coderus.openrepos.net, which is a personal/community hosting site rather than an official Nokia/Maemo distribution channel. The original Maemo flasher tool was distributed by Nokia and is no longer officially available, so this is a common workaround, but the binary is executed code from a non-official third-party host. The sha256sums provide some integrity protection against in-transit tampering, but do not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. openrepos.net is a known Maemo/Sailfish community repository and coderus is a well-known community developer in that ecosystem, which lowers (but does not eliminate) the risk. The concern is real but not clearly malicious — a classic medium supply-chain risk for an executed binary from an unofficial host.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Louis Tim Larsen <louis(a)louis.dk>
# Contributor: jtts
# Contributor: Mikael Eriksson <mikael_eriksson@miffe.org>
pkgname=flasher-harmattan
pkgver=3.12.1
pkgrel=5
pkgdesc="Maemo Flasher-3.12.1 Tool for Harmattan"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="https://wiki.maemo.org/Flashing_N9"
license=('custom')
depends=('libusb-compat')
conflicts=('flasher')
install=flasher-harmattan.install
source=('LICENSE.txt'
'flasher-harmattan.conf')
sha256sums=('a3c2014fb8c45a209a77f69bbda3ee2e726a995999e3e7c6aa37ce895accb43d'
'01c53815c3a300a3c4174f999e6eabbaa654e6cd2edeb0861ff388dfb7e739fa')
source_x86_64=('https://coderus.openrepos.net/flasher/flasher_3.12.1_amd64.deb')
source_i686=('https://coderus.openrepos.net/flasher/flasher_3.12.1_i386.deb')
sha256sums_x86_64=('c1b613952af32c1484cfcdf0b16d652b11770d77aa549d27c33a02dc2b95ac82')
sha256sums_i686=('bd528247cdba30f6f87283554e76a2a4134f2e725f6636f998a89e47128d16af')
package() {
cd "$srcdir"
tar -xnf "$srcdir/data.tar.gz"
install -m755 -d $pkgdir/{etc/modprobe.d,usr/{bin,share/doc/flasher,share/licenses/flasher-harmattan}}
install -m755 usr/bin/flasher $pkgdir/usr/bin/flasher
install -m644 usr/share/doc/flasher/copyright $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/flasher/copyright
install -m644 usr/share/doc/flasher/changelog.gz $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/flasher/changelog.gz
install -m644 LICENSE.txt $pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/flasher-harmattan/LICENSE.txt
install -m644 flasher-harmattan.conf $pkgdir/etc/modprobe.d/flasher-harmattan.conf
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |