flasher-harmattan

maintainer Louis · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages (containing an executable flasher binary installed to /usr/bin) from coderus.openrepos.net, which is a personal/community hosting site rather than an official Nokia/Maemo distribution channel. The original Maemo flasher tool was distributed by Nokia and is no longer officially available, so this is a common workaround, but the binary is executed code from a non-official third-party host. The sha256sums provide some integrity protection against in-transit tampering, but do not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. openrepos.net is a known Maemo/Sailfish community repository and coderus is a well-known community developer in that ecosystem, which lowers (but does not eliminate) the risk. The concern is real but not clearly malicious — a classic medium supply-chain risk for an executed binary from an unofficial host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:19 source_x86_64=('https://coderus.openrepos.net/flasher/flasher_3.12.1_amd64.deb')
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages (containing an executable flasher binary installed to /usr/bin) from coderus.openrepos.net, which is a personal/community hosting site rather than an official Nokia/Maemo distribution channel. The original Maemo flasher tool was distributed by Nokia and is no longer officially available, so this is a common workaround, but the binary is executed code from a non-official third-party host. The sha256sums provide some integrity protection against in-transit tampering, but do not protect against the host owner substituting a malicious binary. openrepos.net is a known Maemo/Sailfish community repository and coderus is a well-known community developer in that ecosystem, which lowers (but does not eliminate) the risk. The concern is real but not clearly malicious — a classic medium supply-chain risk for an executed binary from an unofficial host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Louis Tim Larsen <louis(a)louis.dk>
2# Contributor: jtts
3# Contributor: Mikael Eriksson <mikael_eriksson@miffe.org>
4
5pkgname=flasher-harmattan
6pkgver=3.12.1
7pkgrel=5
8pkgdesc="Maemo Flasher-3.12.1 Tool for Harmattan"
9arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
10url="https://wiki.maemo.org/Flashing_N9"
11license=('custom')
12depends=('libusb-compat')
13conflicts=('flasher')
14install=flasher-harmattan.install
15source=('LICENSE.txt'
16 'flasher-harmattan.conf')
17sha256sums=('a3c2014fb8c45a209a77f69bbda3ee2e726a995999e3e7c6aa37ce895accb43d'
18 '01c53815c3a300a3c4174f999e6eabbaa654e6cd2edeb0861ff388dfb7e739fa')
19source_x86_64=('https://coderus.openrepos.net/flasher/flasher_3.12.1_amd64.deb')
20source_i686=('https://coderus.openrepos.net/flasher/flasher_3.12.1_i386.deb')
21sha256sums_x86_64=('c1b613952af32c1484cfcdf0b16d652b11770d77aa549d27c33a02dc2b95ac82')
22sha256sums_i686=('bd528247cdba30f6f87283554e76a2a4134f2e725f6636f998a89e47128d16af')
23
24package() {
25 cd "$srcdir"
26 tar -xnf "$srcdir/data.tar.gz"
27
28 install -m755 -d $pkgdir/{etc/modprobe.d,usr/{bin,share/doc/flasher,share/licenses/flasher-harmattan}}
29 install -m755 usr/bin/flasher $pkgdir/usr/bin/flasher
30 install -m644 usr/share/doc/flasher/copyright $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/flasher/copyright
31 install -m644 usr/share/doc/flasher/changelog.gz $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/flasher/changelog.gz
32 install -m644 LICENSE.txt $pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/flasher-harmattan/LICENSE.txt
33 install -m644 flasher-harmattan.conf $pkgdir/etc/modprobe.d/flasher-harmattan.conf
34}
35

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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