formal-desktop-bin

maintainer anizocani · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt proprietary binaries (Electron-based desktop app) from formalcloud.net/static-assets, which is the vendor's own CDN host for the Formal product. The checksums are pinned with sha256sums, providing integrity verification. The pattern is standard for binary AUR packages (-bin suffix). The host 'static-assets.formalcloud.net' is the official distribution channel for the joinformal.com product, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, this is still a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a proprietary vendor with no way to audit the binary contents — the sha256 only guarantees the file hasn't changed in transit, not that the binary itself is safe. This is the inherent risk of any -bin proprietary package and is the standard medium-risk classification for such packages in the AUR ecosystem. There is no obfuscation, no unusual execution, no piracy concern, and no evidence of malicious intent — just the normal supply-chain trust concern of executing unauditable vendor binaries.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source_x86_64=("formal-desktop-${pkgver}-x86_64.deb::https://static-assets.formalcloud.net/desktop-app/linux/formal-desktop_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt proprietary binaries (Electron-based desktop app) from formalcloud.net/static-assets, which is the vendor's own CDN host for the Formal product. The checksums are pinned with sha256sums, providing integrity verification. The pattern is standard for binary AUR packages (-bin suffix). The host 'static-assets.formalcloud.net' is the official distribution channel for the joinformal.com product, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, this is still a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a proprietary vendor with no way to audit the binary contents — the sha256 only guarantees the file hasn't changed in transit, not that the binary itself is safe. This is the inherent risk of any -bin proprietary package and is the standard medium-risk classification for such packages in the AUR ecosystem. There is no obfuscation, no unusual execution, no piracy concern, and no evidence of malicious intent — just the normal supply-chain trust concern of executing unauditable vendor binaries.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Ani Betts <anais@anaisbetts.org>
2pkgname=formal-desktop-bin
3pkgver=0.5.5
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="The Formal Desktop app for Linux - database access control and security"
6arch=('x86_64' 'aarch64')
7url="https://joinformal.com"
8license=('custom:proprietary')
9depends=('gtk3' 'glibc' 'libayatana-appindicator' 'libsecret' 'libx11')
10provides=('formal-desktop' 'formal')
11conflicts=('formal-desktop')
12options=('!strip')
13
14source_x86_64=("formal-desktop-${pkgver}-x86_64.deb::https://static-assets.formalcloud.net/desktop-app/linux/formal-desktop_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
15source_aarch64=("formal-desktop-${pkgver}-aarch64.deb::https://static-assets.formalcloud.net/desktop-app/linux/formal-desktop_${pkgver}_arm64.deb")
16
17sha256sums_x86_64=('9a37fa0eed061e87d88f0af64c798ee44edaf5c5b568e71c57ea50b70ad6b37e')
18sha256sums_aarch64=('993c6a41dd0cb8a82ca06bac4feb42da12f66d21590d31a8a944a13b42f0a82c')
19
20package() {
21 cd "${srcdir}"
22
23 # Extract the deb package
24 if [[ "${CARCH}" == "x86_64" ]]; then
25 ar -x "formal-desktop-${pkgver}-x86_64.deb"
26 else
27 ar -x "formal-desktop-${pkgver}-aarch64.deb"
28 fi
29
30 # Extract data archive (could be .tar.gz, .tar.xz, or .tar.zst)
31 if [[ -f data.tar.gz ]]; then
32 tar -xzf data.tar.gz -C "${pkgdir}"
33 elif [[ -f data.tar.xz ]]; then
34 tar -xJf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
35 elif [[ -f data.tar.zst ]]; then
36 tar --zstd -xf data.tar.zst -C "${pkgdir}"
37 else
38 # Try to find any data.tar.* file
39 tar -xf data.tar.* -C "${pkgdir}"
40 fi
41}
42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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