foundry-nuke
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.tgz containing a .run file) from foundry.com, which is the official vendor domain. However, it then executes that .run binary directly during the package() phase (./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula), which is a real supply-chain concern: a .run installer is an opaque self-extracting binary that runs arbitrary code at install time rather than being inspected/unpacked cleanly. The domain is legitimate (The Foundry is the actual vendor of Nuke), and an md5sum is provided (though MD5 is weak). The main concern is executing a prebuilt binary installer rather than extracting it, which is non-standard packaging practice and carries inherent risk if the upstream binary were ever compromised. This is a genuine medium: executed binary from a vendor host, not clearly malicious but not clean packaging either.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://www.foundry.com/products/download_product?file=Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.tgz)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.tgz containing a .run file) from foundry.com, which is the official vendor domain. However, it then executes that .run binary directly during the package() phase (./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula), which is a real supply-chain concern: a .run installer is an opaque self-extracting binary that runs arbitrary code at install time rather than being inspected/unpacked cleanly. The domain is legitimate (The Foundry is the actual vendor of Nuke), and an md5sum is provided (though MD5 is weak). The main concern is executing a prebuilt binary installer rather than extracting it, which is non-standard packaging practice and carries inherent risk if the upstream binary were ever compromised. This is a genuine medium: executed binary from a vendor host, not clearly malicious but not clean packaging either.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Adrià Cabello <adro.cc79 at protonmail dot com>
pkgname=foundry-nuke
_pkgver_major=15
_pkgver_minor=1
_pkgver_build=5
pkgver=${_pkgver_major}.${_pkgver_minor}v${_pkgver_build}
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Nuke is a node-based digital compositing and visual effects application"
arch=('x86_64')
license=('Custom: The Foundry')
provides=('nuke')
depends=('libxcrypt-compat')
url="https://www.foundry.com/products/nuke"
source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://www.foundry.com/products/download_product?file=Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.tgz)
md5sums=('88aaaba3b7840f4dc5e851b48e62be41')
package() {
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt"
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula
mv "Nuke$pkgver" "${pkgdir}/opt/nuke"
ln -s "/opt/nuke/Nuke${_pkgver_major}.${_pkgver_minor}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/nuke"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |