foundry-nuke

maintainer adro · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.tgz containing a .run file) from foundry.com, which is the official vendor domain. However, it then executes that .run binary directly during the package() phase (./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula), which is a real supply-chain concern: a .run installer is an opaque self-extracting binary that runs arbitrary code at install time rather than being inspected/unpacked cleanly. The domain is legitimate (The Foundry is the actual vendor of Nuke), and an md5sum is provided (though MD5 is weak). The main concern is executing a prebuilt binary installer rather than extracting it, which is non-standard packaging practice and carries inherent risk if the upstream binary were ever compromised. This is a genuine medium: executed binary from a vendor host, not clearly malicious but not clean packaging either.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://www.foundry.com/products/download_product?file=Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.tgz)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.tgz containing a .run file) from foundry.com, which is the official vendor domain. However, it then executes that .run binary directly during the package() phase (./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula), which is a real supply-chain concern: a .run installer is an opaque self-extracting binary that runs arbitrary code at install time rather than being inspected/unpacked cleanly. The domain is legitimate (The Foundry is the actual vendor of Nuke), and an md5sum is provided (though MD5 is weak). The main concern is executing a prebuilt binary installer rather than extracting it, which is non-standard packaging practice and carries inherent risk if the upstream binary were ever compromised. This is a genuine medium: executed binary from a vendor host, not clearly malicious but not clean packaging either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Adrià Cabello <adro.cc79 at protonmail dot com>
2pkgname=foundry-nuke
3_pkgver_major=15
4_pkgver_minor=1
5_pkgver_build=5
6pkgver=${_pkgver_major}.${_pkgver_minor}v${_pkgver_build}
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="Nuke is a node-based digital compositing and visual effects application"
9arch=('x86_64')
10license=('Custom: The Foundry')
11provides=('nuke')
12depends=('libxcrypt-compat')
13url="https://www.foundry.com/products/nuke"
14source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://www.foundry.com/products/download_product?file=Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.tgz)
15md5sums=('88aaaba3b7840f4dc5e851b48e62be41')
16
17package() {
18 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt"
19 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
20
21 ./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula
22
23 mv "Nuke$pkgver" "${pkgdir}/opt/nuke"
24
25 ln -s "/opt/nuke/Nuke${_pkgver_major}.${_pkgver_minor}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/nuke"
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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