foundry-nuke

MEDIUM
maintainer adro 2 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.tgz containing a .run file) from foundry.com, which is the official vendor domain. However, it then executes that .run binary directly during the package() phase (./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula), which is a real supply-chain concern: a .run installer is an opaque self-extracting binary that runs arbitrary code at install time rather than being inspected/unpacked cleanly. The domain is legitimate (The Foundry is the actual vendor of Nuke), and an md5sum is provided (though MD5 is weak). The main concern is executing a prebuilt binary installer rather than extracting it, which is non-standard packaging practice and carries inherent risk if the upstream binary were ever compromised. This is a genuine medium: executed binary from a vendor host, not clearly malicious but not clean packaging either.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://www.foundry.com/products/download_product?file=Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.tgz)
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.tgz containing a .run file) from foundry.com, which is the official vendor domain. However, it then executes that .run binary directly during the package() phase (./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula), which is a real supply-chain concern: a .run installer is an opaque self-extracting binary that runs arbitrary code at install time rather than being inspected/unpacked cleanly. The domain is legitimate (The Foundry is the actual vendor of Nuke), and an md5sum is provided (though MD5 is weak). The main concern is executing a prebuilt binary installer rather than extracting it, which is non-standard packaging practice and carries inherent risk if the upstream binary were ever compromised. This is a genuine medium: executed binary from a vendor host, not clearly malicious but not clean packaging either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Adrià Cabello <adro.cc79 at protonmail dot com>
2pkgname=foundry-nuke
3_pkgver_major=15
4_pkgver_minor=1
5_pkgver_build=5
6pkgver=${_pkgver_major}.${_pkgver_minor}v${_pkgver_build}
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="Nuke is a node-based digital compositing and visual effects application"
9arch=('x86_64')
10license=('Custom: The Foundry')
11provides=('nuke')
12depends=('libxcrypt-compat')
13url="https://www.foundry.com/products/nuke"
14source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://www.foundry.com/products/download_product?file=Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.tgz)
15md5sums=('88aaaba3b7840f4dc5e851b48e62be41')
16
17package() {
18 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt"
19 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
20
21 ./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula
22
23 mv "Nuke$pkgver" "${pkgdir}/opt/nuke"
24
25 ln -s "/opt/nuke/Nuke${_pkgver_major}.${_pkgver_minor}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/nuke"
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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