foundry-nuke
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.tgz containing a .run file) from foundry.com, which is the official vendor domain. However, it then executes that .run binary directly during the package() phase (./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula), which is a real supply-chain concern: a .run installer is an opaque self-extracting binary that runs arbitrary code at install time rather than being inspected/unpacked cleanly. The domain is legitimate (The Foundry is the actual vendor of Nuke), and an md5sum is provided (though MD5 is weak). The main concern is executing a prebuilt binary installer rather than extracting it, which is non-standard packaging practice and carries inherent risk if the upstream binary were ever compromised. This is a genuine medium: executed binary from a vendor host, not clearly malicious but not clean packaging either.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://www.foundry.com/products/download_product?file=Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.tgz)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.tgz containing a .run file) from foundry.com, which is the official vendor domain. However, it then executes that .run binary directly during the package() phase (./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula), which is a real supply-chain concern: a .run installer is an opaque self-extracting binary that runs arbitrary code at install time rather than being inspected/unpacked cleanly. The domain is legitimate (The Foundry is the actual vendor of Nuke), and an md5sum is provided (though MD5 is weak). The main concern is executing a prebuilt binary installer rather than extracting it, which is non-standard packaging practice and carries inherent risk if the upstream binary were ever compromised. This is a genuine medium: executed binary from a vendor host, not clearly malicious but not clean packaging either.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Adrià Cabello <adro.cc79 at protonmail dot com>
pkgname=foundry-nuke
_pkgver_major=15
_pkgver_minor=1
_pkgver_build=5
pkgver=${_pkgver_major}.${_pkgver_minor}v${_pkgver_build}
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Nuke is a node-based digital compositing and visual effects application"
arch=('x86_64')
license=('Custom: The Foundry')
provides=('nuke')
depends=('libxcrypt-compat')
url="https://www.foundry.com/products/nuke"
source=($pkgname-$pkgver.tgz::https://www.foundry.com/products/download_product?file=Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.tgz)
md5sums=('88aaaba3b7840f4dc5e851b48e62be41')
package() {
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt"
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
./Nuke$pkgver-linux-x86_64.run --accept-foundry-eula
mv "Nuke$pkgver" "${pkgdir}/opt/nuke"
ln -s "/opt/nuke/Nuke${_pkgver_major}.${_pkgver_minor}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/nuke"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |