frame0
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:24
source=("https://files.frame0.app/releases/linux/x64/frame0_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package from files.frame0.app, which is the vendor's own release host (matching the official product URL frame0.app). The binary is extracted and installed directly without any source compilation. While the host appears to be the official vendor distribution channel (subdomain of the product's own domain), it is still a prebuilt binary from a non-standard packaging host with no additional verification beyond a single SHA256 checksum. This is a legitimate medium-risk supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the binary is replaced, the SHA256 would need to be updated to detect it, and there is no GPG signature verification. The risk is real but not indicative of malicious intent — this is a common pattern for proprietary Electron-based apps distributed via AUR. The severity remains medium due to the executed binary from a non-major-platform host, though the domain alignment with the official product URL reduces suspicion somewhat.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: PanNNN <cool.panjianhao@gmail.com>
pkgname=frame0
pkgver=1.2.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A Balsamiq-alternative wireframming tool for modern apps"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://frame0.app"
license=('custom')
depends=(
"gtk3"
"nss"
"libnotify"
"libxtst"
"xdg-utils"
"at-spi2-core"
"libdrm"
"mesa"
"libxcb"
"glib2"
)
optdepends=(
'pulseaudio'
)
source=("https://files.frame0.app/releases/linux/x64/frame0_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('1fd9cbad0ccecfb0bd839dd15408a6343e0ad01168f983cca57d9d74b14896ce')
package() {
cd "${srcdir}"
# Extract the .deb file
ar x frame0_${pkgver}_amd64.deb
# Extract the data.tar.xz file
bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |