front-panel-designer-eu

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from assets.schaeffer-ag.de, which appears to be the official CDN/asset host for Schaeffer AG (the vendor of Front Panel Designer). The binary is executed during build (--appimage-extract, then repackaged with appimagetool) and installed as a setuid-capable executable. The integrity check is only MD5 (weak, collision-prone), not SHA256 or a cryptographic signature. While assets.schaeffer-ag.de is plausibly the legitimate vendor host (schaeffer-ag.de is the official domain), it is not a well-known package registry, and there is no GPG signature verification. The pattern of downloading and executing a prebuilt binary with only MD5 verification from a corporate asset CDN is a genuine supply-chain concern (medium), not a clear attack. The cheaper model's assessment is correct in classification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 "https://assets.schaeffer-ag.de/fpd/Version-$pkgver/FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from assets.schaeffer-ag.de, which appears to be the official CDN/asset host for Schaeffer AG (the vendor of Front Panel Designer). The binary is executed during build (--appimage-extract, then repackaged with appimagetool) and installed as a setuid-capable executable. The integrity check is only MD5 (weak, collision-prone), not SHA256 or a cryptographic signature. While assets.schaeffer-ag.de is plausibly the legitimate vendor host (schaeffer-ag.de is the official domain), it is not a well-known package registry, and there is no GPG signature verification. The pattern of downloading and executing a prebuilt binary with only MD5 verification from a corporate asset CDN is a genuine supply-chain concern (medium), not a clear attack. The cheaper model's assessment is correct in classification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Nicolas Goy <kuon@goyman.com>
2
3pkgname=front-panel-designer-eu
4pkgver=6.3.6
5pkgrel=2
6epoch=
7pkgdesc="Free CAD software for front panel design"
8arch=("any")
9url="http://www.schaeffer-ag.de/en/"
10license=('custom')
11groups=()
12depends=(libpng12)
13makedepends=(appimagetool)
14options=(!strip)
15source_x86_64=(
16"https://assets.schaeffer-ag.de/fpd/Version-$pkgver/FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage"
17"front-panel-express-eu.desktop")
18md5sums_x86_64=("95268b130b2fa2b1af0289f639920998" "d34b7ed5d87a206fe8b50fd4a8f8e167")
19noextract=("FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage")
20
21
22prepare() {
23 rm FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage
24 cp -L ../FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage .
25}
26
27build() {
28 chmod a+x FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage
29 rm -rf tmp
30 mkdir tmp
31 cd tmp
32 ../FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage --appimage-extract
33
34 # fix AppImage
35 rm squashfs-root/usr/lib/libgmodule-2.0.so.0
36
37 # save and unset SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH for appimagetool
38 _SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=$SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
39 unset SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
40
41 appimagetool squashfs-root ../FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage
42
43 # restore SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
44 export SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=$_SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH
45}
46
47package() {
48 install -Dm 755 \
49 "$srcdir/FrontDesign-EU-$pkgver-amd64.AppImage" \
50 "$pkgdir/opt/FrontDesignEU/FrontDesignEU.AppImage"
51
52 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
53 ln -s "/opt/FrontDesignEU/FrontDesignEU.AppImage" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/FrontDesignEU"
54
55 install -Dm 644 \
56 "$srcdir/front-panel-express-eu.desktop" \
57 "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/front-panel-express-eu.desktop"
58}
59

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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