ftkimager
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:19
source=(https://d1kpmuwb7gvu1i.cloudfront.net/${pkgname}.${pkgver}_fedora${ARCH}.tar.gz)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): FTK Imager is a legitimate forensic tool from AccessData/Exterro, and the CloudFront URL (d1kpmuwb7gvu1i.cloudfront.net) appears to be Exterro's own CDN distribution endpoint — the official download page URL in the PKGBUILD points to exterro.com. However, there is no way to independently verify that this CloudFront distribution belongs to Exterro, there is no GPG signature, and only an MD5 checksum is used (which is weak). The package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary directly to /usr/bin. This is a real supply-chain concern: if the CloudFront bucket is misconfigured or the distribution is hijacked, an arbitrary binary would be executed on the user's system. The pattern is consistent with a legitimate vendor binary distributed via CDN, but the lack of a verifiable chain of custody (no GPG, weak hash, unofficial-looking CDN hostname) keeps this at MEDIUM rather than clean.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# FTK Imager CLI, Copyright 2006-2012 AccessData (accessdata.com)
# Submitted by: David Hunter <archlinux at synackrst dot net>
# Maintained by: Jay M. <jskier at gmail dot com>
pkgname=ftkimager
pkgver=3.1.1
pkgrel=3
pkgdesc="Closed source binary CLI forensic imaging software by Access Data"
arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
url="https://www.exterro.com/ftk-product-downloads/fedora-and-red-hat-version-x64-3-1-1"
license=('Commercial')
depends=("zlib" "openssl")
if [ "${CARCH}" = 'x86_64' ]; then
ARCH='64'
md5sums=('c604300050bdd1c88e83951d4f222e4e')
elif [ "${CARCH}" = 'i686' ]; then
ARCH='32'
md5sums=('0a27829a261e8ab8c69846bfe40733')
fi
source=(https://d1kpmuwb7gvu1i.cloudfront.net/${pkgname}.${pkgver}_fedora${ARCH}.tar.gz)
package() {
mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
cp ${srcdir}/${pkgname} ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |