gear-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer Booomeii 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt x86_64 binary downloaded from an S3 bucket (gear-builds.s3.amazonaws.com) rather than from the official GitHub releases page (github.com/gear-tech/gear/releases). While the upstream project is legitimate (Gear Protocol / gear-tech), the S3 bucket is an unofficial/personal/CI host with no cryptographic provenance beyond a single SHA-256 checksum in the PKGBUILD itself. There is no GPG signature verification. If the S3 bucket is compromised, misconfigured, or controlled by a third party, an arbitrary binary could be substituted. The binary is directly installed to /usr/bin/gear and executed by users. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-canonical host without signature verification. The SHA-256 does provide some integrity guarantee against in-transit tampering, but does not protect against the bucket owner substituting a malicious binary and updating the PKGBUILD checksum. Medium severity is appropriate.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=(https://gear-builds.s3.amazonaws.com/gear-v1.6.2-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz)

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt x86_64 binary downloaded from an S3 bucket (gear-builds.s3.amazonaws.com) rather than from the official GitHub releases page (github.com/gear-tech/gear/releases). While the upstream project is legitimate (Gear Protocol / gear-tech), the S3 bucket is an unofficial/personal/CI host with no cryptographic provenance beyond a single SHA-256 checksum in the PKGBUILD itself. There is no GPG signature verification. If the S3 bucket is compromised, misconfigured, or controlled by a third party, an arbitrary binary could be substituted. The binary is directly installed to /usr/bin/gear and executed by users. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-canonical host without signature verification. The SHA-256 does provide some integrity guarantee against in-transit tampering, but does not protect against the bucket owner substituting a malicious binary and updating the PKGBUILD checksum. Medium severity is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Booomeii <604772159@qq.com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=gear-bin
    
      4pkgver=1.6.2
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Web3 Ultimate Execution Engine"
    
      7arch=(x86_64)
    
      8url="https://github.com/gear-tech/gear"
    
      9licenses=(GPL3)
    
      10provides=("gear")
    
      11conflicts=("gear")
    
      12source=(https://gear-builds.s3.amazonaws.com/gear-v1.6.2-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz)
    
      13sha256sums=('009476a3f6e96ba688bd8a0b5a78b09effa1340b46c05cd8287f8899347a2e1c')
    
      14options=('!debug')
    
      15
    
      16package() {
    
      17    install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/gear" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/gear"
    
      18}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2