gear-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer Booomeii 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt x86_64 binary downloaded from an S3 bucket (gear-builds.s3.amazonaws.com) rather than from the official GitHub releases page (github.com/gear-tech/gear/releases). While the upstream project is legitimate (Gear Protocol / gear-tech), the S3 bucket is an unofficial/personal/CI host with no cryptographic provenance beyond a single SHA-256 checksum in the PKGBUILD itself. There is no GPG signature verification. If the S3 bucket is compromised, misconfigured, or controlled by a third party, an arbitrary binary could be substituted. The binary is directly installed to /usr/bin/gear and executed by users. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-canonical host without signature verification. The SHA-256 does provide some integrity guarantee against in-transit tampering, but does not protect against the bucket owner substituting a malicious binary and updating the PKGBUILD checksum. Medium severity is appropriate.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=(https://gear-builds.s3.amazonaws.com/gear-v1.6.2-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz)

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt x86_64 binary downloaded from an S3 bucket (gear-builds.s3.amazonaws.com) rather than from the official GitHub releases page (github.com/gear-tech/gear/releases). While the upstream project is legitimate (Gear Protocol / gear-tech), the S3 bucket is an unofficial/personal/CI host with no cryptographic provenance beyond a single SHA-256 checksum in the PKGBUILD itself. There is no GPG signature verification. If the S3 bucket is compromised, misconfigured, or controlled by a third party, an arbitrary binary could be substituted. The binary is directly installed to /usr/bin/gear and executed by users. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-canonical host without signature verification. The SHA-256 does provide some integrity guarantee against in-transit tampering, but does not protect against the bucket owner substituting a malicious binary and updating the PKGBUILD checksum. Medium severity is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Booomeii <604772159@qq.com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=gear-bin
    
      4pkgver=1.6.2
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Web3 Ultimate Execution Engine"
    
      7arch=(x86_64)
    
      8url="https://github.com/gear-tech/gear"
    
      9licenses=(GPL3)
    
      10provides=("gear")
    
      11conflicts=("gear")
    
      12source=(https://gear-builds.s3.amazonaws.com/gear-v1.6.2-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.xz)
    
      13sha256sums=('009476a3f6e96ba688bd8a0b5a78b09effa1340b46c05cd8287f8899347a2e1c')
    
      14options=('!debug')
    
      15
    
      16package() {
    
      17    install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/gear" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/gear"
    
      18}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2