geminishell

maintainer strawhatluffy · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD pulls from a personal GitHub repo on the main branch (no pinned commit, sha256sums='SKIP'), then at build time runs 'pip install -r requirements.txt' and 'pip install pyinstaller' inside a venv — downloading arbitrary PyPI packages with no version pinning or integrity verification. The resulting PyInstaller binary bundles all those dynamically-fetched packages and is installed to /usr/bin. The combination of: (1) unpinned git HEAD from a personal repo, (2) unpinned/unverified pip dependencies, and (3) the final artifact being a compiled executable placed in /usr/bin constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk — any of the upstream sources (git repo, requirements.txt contents, PyPI packages) could be altered to inject malicious code that ends up executed as a bundled binary. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM pip install of an external package pip_install_external

`pip install <package>` fetches an unpinned package from PyPI at build time, outside source=() and makepkg's checksums.

  • PKGBUILD:19 pip install -r requirements.txt
  • PKGBUILD:20 pip install pyinstaller
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD pulls from a personal GitHub repo on the main branch (no pinned commit, sha256sums='SKIP'), then at build time runs 'pip install -r requirements.txt' and 'pip install pyinstaller' inside a venv — downloading arbitrary PyPI packages with no version pinning or integrity verification. The resulting PyInstaller binary bundles all those dynamically-fetched packages and is installed to /usr/bin. The combination of: (1) unpinned git HEAD from a personal repo, (2) unpinned/unverified pip dependencies, and (3) the final artifact being a compiled executable placed in /usr/bin constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk — any of the upstream sources (git repo, requirements.txt contents, PyPI packages) could be altered to inject malicious code that ends up executed as a bundled binary. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Kshitij Aucharmal <kshitijaucharmal21@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=geminishell
4pkgver=1.0.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A shell program written in Python"
7arch=('any')
8url="https://github.com/kshitijaucharmal/geminishell" # Replace with your project's URL
9license=('Apache')
10depends=('python' 'python-pip') # Add other dependencies if needed
11source=("git+https://github.com/kshitijaucharmal/$pkgname.git#branch=main")
12sha256sums=('SKIP') # Not required when using git
13
14build() {
15 cd "$srcdir/$pkgname"
16 # Create virtual environment and install dependencies
17 python -m venv env
18 source env/bin/activate
19 pip install -r requirements.txt
20 pip install pyinstaller
21
22 # Build the application
23 pyinstaller src/__main__.py --clean -n geminishell --distpath target
24
25 deactivate
26
27 # Remove virtual environment
28 rm -rf env
29}
30
31package() {
32 cd "$srcdir/$pkgname"
33
34 # Install the binary into /usr/bin
35 install -Dm755 "target/geminishell/geminishell" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/geminishell"
36
37 # Install the LICENSE file
38 install -Dm644 LICENSE "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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