gitblade-bin

MEDIUM

maintainer liberodark 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from gitblade.com (the project's own domain, not a standard release host like GitHub releases or a distro mirror). The PKGBUILD unpacks the .deb and installs the contained binaries directly. There is a sha512sum check, which provides some integrity guarantee, but only against the current state of that URL — if the upstream host were compromised or the file silently replaced, the checksum would need to be manually updated. The domain is the official project domain, which is a mild mitigating factor, but distributing and executing prebuilt binaries from a personal/project PPA-style host (rather than a verifiable release artifact) is a genuine supply-chain concern. This is a textbook medium: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-standard host with no reproducibility guarantee.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source_x86_64=("https://gitblade.com/ppa/gitblade_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from gitblade.com (the project's own domain, not a standard release host like GitHub releases or a distro mirror). The PKGBUILD unpacks the .deb and installs the contained binaries directly. There is a sha512sum check, which provides some integrity guarantee, but only against the current state of that URL — if the upstream host were compromised or the file silently replaced, the checksum would need to be manually updated. The domain is the official project domain, which is a mild mitigating factor, but distributing and executing prebuilt binaries from a personal/project PPA-style host (rather than a verifiable release artifact) is a genuine supply-chain concern. This is a textbook medium: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-standard host with no reproducibility guarantee.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: liberodark
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=gitblade-bin
    
      4pkgver=1.0.6
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="An elegant GUI for Git."
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url="https://gitblade.com/"
    
      9license=('Custom')
    
      10depends=('xdg-utils' 'git')
    
      11source_x86_64=("https://gitblade.com/ppa/gitblade_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
    
      12sha512sums_x86_64=('d411e706f6e0845838e8078251ab6b67613bd0dcd9060db24d49ec7ba15ef5ba191faa42cd710552c7132be50f94eba97d6732a31565a6ab8543066cde1a3055')
    
      13        
    
      14package() {
    
      15  cd $srcdir
    
      16  tar xvf data.tar.xz
    
      17  cp -r usr $pkgdir
    
      18}
    
      19
    
      20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2