glise-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer bycomputing 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from twistednormal.com (the upstream vendor's own website for the Glise 3D modeler), extracts and installs it directly. The host appears to be the official project website (url= matches the source host), so this is not a random personal host — it is the upstream distribution point. However, several concerns remain: (1) the source uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the download is susceptible to MITM substitution in transit; (2) only an MD5 checksum is provided, which is cryptographically weak and insufficient to guarantee integrity against a determined attacker; (3) the package installs a closed-source prebuilt binary with a custom EULA, which is a supply-chain trust concern by nature. The combination of HTTP-only transport and MD5-only integrity check for an executed binary is a real (if not severe) supply-chain risk. The cheaper model's 'non-standard host' concern is partially a false positive since this is the vendor's own site, but the HTTP+MD5 issue is a genuine medium-level concern for an installed binary.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:28 source=(http://www.twistednormal.com/download/glise_1.7.1_amd64.deb)
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from twistednormal.com (the upstream vendor's own website for the Glise 3D modeler), extracts and installs it directly. The host appears to be the official project website (url= matches the source host), so this is not a random personal host — it is the upstream distribution point. However, several concerns remain: (1) the source uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the download is susceptible to MITM substitution in transit; (2) only an MD5 checksum is provided, which is cryptographically weak and insufficient to guarantee integrity against a determined attacker; (3) the package installs a closed-source prebuilt binary with a custom EULA, which is a supply-chain trust concern by nature. The combination of HTTP-only transport and MD5-only integrity check for an executed binary is a real (if not severe) supply-chain risk. The cheaper model's 'non-standard host' concern is partially a false positive since this is the vendor's own site, but the HTTP+MD5 issue is a genuine medium-level concern for an installed binary.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Ryan Salvador <salvadorrye@gmail.com>
2# Contributor: Ryan Salvador <salvadorrye@gmail.com>
3pkgname=glise-bin
4pkgver=1.7.1_1
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A subdivision surfaces 3D modeler featuring a complete Python API."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="http://www.twistednormal.com/"
9license=('custom')
10depends=('aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc'
11 'freetype2'
12 'gcc-libs'
13 'glibc'
14 'intel-tbb'
15 'libpng12'
16 'libx11'
17 'libxau'
18 'libxcb'
19 'libxcursor'
20 'libxdmcp'
21 'libxext'
22 'libxfixes'
23 'libxinerama'
24 'libxrandr'
25 'libxrender'
26 'libxxf86vm'
27 'vagrant')
28source=(http://www.twistednormal.com/download/glise_1.7.1_amd64.deb)
29md5sums=('eb0453d1708e9113e24f333a6b5e4553')
30package() {
31 tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
32 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/glise/COPYRIGHTS.txt" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
33 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/glise/EULA.txt" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/EULA"
34 ln -s "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libembree.so" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libembree.so"
35 ln -s "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libembree.so.2" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libembree.so.2"
36 ln -s "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libembree.so.2.13.0" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libembree.so.2.13.0"
37}
38

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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