glise-bin

maintainer bycomputing · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from twistednormal.com (the upstream vendor's own website for the Glise 3D modeler), extracts and installs it directly. The host appears to be the official project website (url= matches the source host), so this is not a random personal host — it is the upstream distribution point. However, several concerns remain: (1) the source uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the download is susceptible to MITM substitution in transit; (2) only an MD5 checksum is provided, which is cryptographically weak and insufficient to guarantee integrity against a determined attacker; (3) the package installs a closed-source prebuilt binary with a custom EULA, which is a supply-chain trust concern by nature. The combination of HTTP-only transport and MD5-only integrity check for an executed binary is a real (if not severe) supply-chain risk. The cheaper model's 'non-standard host' concern is partially a false positive since this is the vendor's own site, but the HTTP+MD5 issue is a genuine medium-level concern for an installed binary.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:28 source=(http://www.twistednormal.com/download/glise_1.7.1_amd64.deb)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from twistednormal.com (the upstream vendor's own website for the Glise 3D modeler), extracts and installs it directly. The host appears to be the official project website (url= matches the source host), so this is not a random personal host — it is the upstream distribution point. However, several concerns remain: (1) the source uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the download is susceptible to MITM substitution in transit; (2) only an MD5 checksum is provided, which is cryptographically weak and insufficient to guarantee integrity against a determined attacker; (3) the package installs a closed-source prebuilt binary with a custom EULA, which is a supply-chain trust concern by nature. The combination of HTTP-only transport and MD5-only integrity check for an executed binary is a real (if not severe) supply-chain risk. The cheaper model's 'non-standard host' concern is partially a false positive since this is the vendor's own site, but the HTTP+MD5 issue is a genuine medium-level concern for an installed binary.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Ryan Salvador <salvadorrye@gmail.com>
2# Contributor: Ryan Salvador <salvadorrye@gmail.com>
3pkgname=glise-bin
4pkgver=1.7.1_1
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A subdivision surfaces 3D modeler featuring a complete Python API."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="http://www.twistednormal.com/"
9license=('custom')
10depends=('aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc'
11 'freetype2'
12 'gcc-libs'
13 'glibc'
14 'intel-tbb'
15 'libpng12'
16 'libx11'
17 'libxau'
18 'libxcb'
19 'libxcursor'
20 'libxdmcp'
21 'libxext'
22 'libxfixes'
23 'libxinerama'
24 'libxrandr'
25 'libxrender'
26 'libxxf86vm'
27 'vagrant')
28source=(http://www.twistednormal.com/download/glise_1.7.1_amd64.deb)
29md5sums=('eb0453d1708e9113e24f333a6b5e4553')
30package() {
31 tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
32 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/glise/COPYRIGHTS.txt" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
33 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/glise/EULA.txt" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/EULA"
34 ln -s "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libembree.so" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libembree.so"
35 ln -s "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libembree.so.2" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libembree.so.2"
36 ln -s "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libembree.so.2.13.0" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/libembree.so.2.13.0"
37}
38

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion