godoos-bin

maintainer zxp19821005 · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary downloaded directly from godoos.com/upload/ — the vendor's own website rather than a standard forge release page (GitHub/Gitee releases). While the vendor operates the project and the domain matches the project URL, the /upload/ path is an informal hosting location rather than a versioned release artifact on a code forge. SHA256 checksums are provided, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the binary is executed directly (install -Dm755) with no source build. The concern is real but not clearly malicious: if godoos.com were compromised or the upload path were manipulated, users would receive and execute a trojanized binary. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern — prebuilt binary from an unofficial/informal host path — consistent with the original rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:23 source_aarch64=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}-aarch64::https://godoos.com/upload/${pkgname%-bin}/${pkgver}/web/${pkgname%-bin}_web_linux_arm64")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): This PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary downloaded directly from godoos.com/upload/ — the vendor's own website rather than a standard forge release page (GitHub/Gitee releases). While the vendor operates the project and the domain matches the project URL, the /upload/ path is an informal hosting location rather than a versioned release artifact on a code forge. SHA256 checksums are provided, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the binary is executed directly (install -Dm755) with no source build. The concern is real but not clearly malicious: if godoos.com were compromised or the upload path were manipulated, users would receive and execute a trojanized binary. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern — prebuilt binary from an unofficial/informal host path — consistent with the original rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: zxp19821005 <zxp19821005 at 163 dot com>
2pkgname=godoos-bin
3_pkgname=GodoOS
4pkgver=1.0.5
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="An efficient intranet office platform that includes various tools such as Word, Excel, PPT, PDF, intranet chat, whiteboard, and mind mapping, and supports native file storage."
7arch=(
8 'aarch64'
9 'x86_64'
10)
11url="https://godoos.com/home/os/"
12_ghurl="https://github.com/phpk/godoos"
13_gturl="https://gitee.com/godoos/godoos"
14license=('MIT')
15provides=("${pkgname%-bin}=${pkgver}")
16conflicts=("${pkgname%-bin}")
17depends=()
18source=(
19 "LICENSE-${pkgver}::${_gturl}/raw/v${pkgver}/LICENSE"
20 "README-${pkgver}.en.md::${_gturl}/raw/v${pkgver}/README.en.md"
21 "README-${pkgver}.zhs.md::${_gturl}/raw/v${pkgver}/README.md"
22)
23source_aarch64=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}-aarch64::https://godoos.com/upload/${pkgname%-bin}/${pkgver}/web/${pkgname%-bin}_web_linux_arm64")
24source_x86_64=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}-x86_64::https://godoos.com/upload/${pkgname%-bin}/${pkgver}/web/${pkgname%-bin}_web_linux_amd64")
25sha256sums=('13fb48a6c31a72e0e2b69650b1cebe8954f7b73449848492dcfd22b25bd91afa'
26 '3d0df5272c4b4c94a859eaa74022934a1239ba1f9b6445bc91e53a8e7b11e361'
27 '3f0a57e751c9352cd03afa60ecad878d3ffd2243586a0e4ad991886916dee180')
28sha256sums_aarch64=('01cf0a81e8f16ddeba510b0ac9465a54aa67961c3a280ee8006d56772fa5ec0c')
29sha256sums_x86_64=('0edb476ab2b2287c2b0b22c8922df94d11c9fd020a89f7c67a0bb11da43fc06e')
30package() {
31 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}-${CARCH}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname%-bin}"
32 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/LICENSE-${pkgver}" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
33 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/README-${pkgver}.en.md" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname%-bin}/README.en.md"
34 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/README-${pkgver}.zhs.md" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname%-bin}/README.md"
35}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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